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ABSTRACT

Author: Shimko, Alison R. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: “Though Troubled Be My Brain:” Madness in Early Modern England, 1603-1714
Major Professor: Melinda S. Zook
This dissertation is a study of madness in Stuart-era England. Madness was pervasive in
early modern England. it was in the streets, performed on stage, discussed in political pamphlets
and legal treatises, and physically housed in Bethlehem Hospital. Madness, therefore, serves as a
significant lens because in differentiating between madness and sanity, contemporaries regularly
drew clear boundaries between acceptable, or “normal” behavior, and unacceptable, or
“abnormal” behavior, that was particular to seventeenth-century English culture and society.
Specifically, I argue that madness serves as a channel to examine the diagnoses and treatment of
mental disorders that contemporaries believed altered the body and mind, the legal repercussions
of abnormal behavior at the state and local level, gender relations and stereotypes, and the use of
corporeal rhetoric in political culture. Before public institutions for the insane were founded
specifically for that purpose, family or community-based care was the norm for the mad (in
addition to the few private madhouses that were founded by private entrepreneurs during the last
half of the seventeenth century). This dissertation therefore draws on a wide variety of sources,
including manuscripts, parish records, land commissions, autobiographies, spiritual biographies,
criminal cases, political pamphlets, doctors’ notes, medical guidebooks, and more.

1

INTRODUCTION

...I will resolve you; I am lunatic,
And ever this in mad men you shall find,
what they last thought on when the brain grew sick,
In most distraction keep that still in mind.
Thus talking idly in this bedlam fit,
Reason and I, (you must conceive) are twain,
Tis nine years now, since first I lost my wit,
Bear with me then, though troubled be my brain;
with diet and correction, men distraught,
(Not too far past) may to their wits be brought.
—Michael Drayton (1603)1
This sonnet was not about lunacy or madness, at least not in a literal, diagnostic sense.
Michael Drayton’s sonnets instead reflected his feelings of unrequited love, which had driven
him metaphorically crazy. Yet Drayton describes lunacy with words that his readers would have
recognized: mad men, brainsickness, a “distracted” mind, Bedlam, and a “troubled” brain. The
question we must ask ourselves is how a renowned poet found himself identifying with the mad,
who were regularly depicted as beasts reveling in their unreason and odd behavior. Mad people
occupied a liminal space in early modern English society and culture. While contemporaries
placed them socially at the margins of society, they were quite visible to all, including Drayton.
They were present both literally and figuratively: literally, in and around villages, workhouses,
and in Bedlam hospital, and figuratively, in representations crafted by others in rhetoric and
discourse.

1

Michael Drayton, The Barrons’ Wars, in the reign of Edward the second. With England’s Heroical Epistles (London,
1603), Sonnet 12. This is possibly written about Sir Henry Goodere’s daughter Anne, a woman he had been courting,
or the countess of Pembroke. Anne Lake Prescott, “Drayton, Michael (1563–1631),” Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, (Oxford University Press, 2004); online edn, May 2016. All spelling and capitalization has been
modernized throughout the dissertation.

2
This dissertation seeks to explore the experiences of mad people in early modern
England, as well as discursive representations of the mad. References to madness were readily
available in poetry, song, art, the theater, political tracts, legal statutes, epistemological treatises,
and even in watermarks (see Figures 1 and 4). Mad people were physicians’ patients, the devil’s
victims, clergymen’s sinners, and philosophers’ subjects. And the mad were, most importantly,
people—people with agency who historians have striven to let speak for themselves since Roy
Porter’s groundbreaking article, “The Patient’s View: Doing
Medical History from Below.”2 But, as Alexandra BacopoulosViau and Aude Fauvel elucidate, this has resulted mainly in
edited autobiographies, in which “some scholars seem to
assume that the patient’s voice is always de facto interesting, by
paying little or no attention to methodological implications.”3 I
hope to avoid this by studying the “evolution of those
Figure 1: Foolscap watermark
detail on a political pamphlet, The
opinion is this: that resistance may
be used, in case our religion and
rights should be invaded (1689).
Shakespeare Folger Library MS
L.f.530.

discursive, institutional, or social processes that shape
representations of illness and broader healthcare systems.”4
Though historians have studied madness from the

eighteenth century to the present, there is still much to learn about early modern perceptions of,
and reactions to, mental disorders. I argue that madness serves as a lens for examining the
diagnoses and treatment of diseases that contemporaries believed altered the body and mind as
well as the legal repercussions of abnormal behavior, and the use of corporeal rhetoric in
Roy Porter, “The Patient’s View: Doing Medical History from Below,” Theory and Society 14, no. 2 (1985): 176.
See, for example, Katherine Hodgkin, ed., Women, Madness and Sin in Early Modern England: The Autobiography
of Dionys Fitzherbert (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Katherine Hodgkin, Madness in Seventeenth-Century
Autobiography (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Allan Ingram, ed., Voices of Madness: Four
Pamphlets, 1683-1796 (Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1997).
4
Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau and Aude Fauvel, “The Patient’s Turn: Roy Porter and Psychiatry’s Tales, Thirty Years
On,” Medical History 60, no. 1 (January 2016): 11-12.
2
3

3
political culture. Madness as a lens is significant because in differentiating between madness and
sanity, contemporaries drew clear boundaries between acceptable, or “normal” behavior, and
unacceptable, or “abnormal” behavior, that was specific to seventeenth-century English culture
and society. It is therefore an avenue into understanding how contemporaries sought to maintain
order during the tumultuous seventeenth century.
In studying the diagnoses and treatments of diseases that altered the body and mind,
contemporaries negotiated between the boundaries of madness and sanity in familial and
community relationships, their choice of medical practitioner, their conception of the mind-body
relationship, and the interplay between natural and supernatural beliefs in medicinal practices. In
negotiating the boundaries between madness and sanity in gender relations, the law, and political
culture, contemporaries utilized representations of the mad such as “Tom of Bedlam” and “Mad
Bess,” who were recognizable characters in poems, riddles, and ballads. Representations of the
mad and madness itself formed discursive elements in philosophy, religious nonconformity,
gendered language, legal statutes, personal acts of parliament, inquisitions of lunacy, the
symbolism of “undress” or nakedness, and in political propaganda meant to delegitimize
opposing parties. Therefore, the ways in which contemporaries recognized, interpreted, and
managed madness provides insight into acceptable and unacceptable behavior within English
society.

4
Sources relating directly to madness exist in much smaller quantities before the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Family or community-based care was the norm before
public institutions for the insane were founded specifically for that purpose (see, for example,
Lady Granny in Figure 2). The only public hospital for
the insane available in the seventeenth century was
Bethlem Hospital, though entrepreneurs founded a few
private madhouses during the last half of the
seventeenth century. With no bureaucratic system of
recordkeeping, source limitations seemed to restrict
historians to the period starting a century and a half
later when public asylums were built. Moreover,
asylum records of the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries contain the scandalous stories of inhumane
treatment and restraint that draws (and drew) public
Figure 2: Upon Lady Granny in her
supposed grandure. John Savage (British,
active 1688-1700). Reproduced by kind
permission of the Harvey Cushing/John
Hay Whitney Medical Historical Library.

attention and interest.5 As a result, scholars’ work,
except for Michael MacDonald’s Mystical Bedlam (a

micro-history of the physician Richard Napier) and Roy Porter’s Mind Forg’d Manacles (which
focuses more on the eighteen century), have not undertaken an extensive study of madness in
seventeenth-century England.

5

See, for example, Peter Eigen, Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-Doctors in the English Court (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1995); Steven Cherry, Mental Health Care in Modern England: The Norfolk Lunatic Asylum/St.
Andrew’s Hospital, 1810-1998 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2003); Anne Digby, Madness, Morality, and Medicine:
A Study of the York Retreat, 1796-1914 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Leonard D. Smith,
‘Cure, Comfort, and Safe Custody:’ Public Lunatic Asylums in Early Nineteenth-Century England (London: Leicester
University Press, 1999); William Llywelyn Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy: A Study of Private Madhouses in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).

5
There is still much to explore. As R.A. Houston unequivocally states as recently as 2014,
“The historiography of early modern psychiatry has proceeded piecemeal through multiple
contributions . . . much more is still to be done.” Indeed, most surveys “deal largely (and briefly)
with the period after 1800 and early modern Britain still lacks an in-depth analysis of writings
about ‘disorders of consciousness and conduct.’”6 Similarly, Porter laments that the “Tudor and
Stuart epochs remain curiously ill-researched as a whole” as “most histories pick up the story
from the years around 1800.”7 I intend to remedy this by investigating a variety of sources from
1603 to 1714, including manuscripts, parish records, land commissions, autobiography, spiritual
biography, criminal cases, political pamphlets, doctors’ notes, medical guidebooks, art and more.
A study of madness in England is critical to understanding medicine during the century
that preceded the era of the asylum and the modern development of psychiatry. The shift from
locating madness in demonic possession and humoral imbalance to chemicals and the nervous
system during the seventeenth century is reflected in today’s psychiatry. More importantly,
Stuart-era madness is crucial in understanding contemporary culture. Mad men and women
affected and were affected by the English cultural landscape, including the values, power
hierarchies, and acceptable behavior of the time period. Madness, lunacy, idiocy, and hysteria
were pervasive in the English vernacular. Lady Macbeth, having gone mad, tried fruitlessly to
rinse the imaginary blood from her hands in William Shakespeare’s Macbeth, and half a century
later the Ranters, political radicals of the English Civil War, were nicknamed the “Mad Crew.”
This discourse was constantly changing. Roy Porter notes that the significance of “mad
language” underwent a significant transformation: “In the Renaissance, mad language had been

Rab Houston, “A Latent Historiography? The Case of Psychiatry in Britain, 1500-1820,” The Historical Journal 57,
no. 1 (March 2014): 290, 305-306
7
Roy Porter, Mind Forg’d Manacles: A History of Madness from the Restoration to the Regency (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987), viii, 3.
6

6
judged revelatory about the body politic or the cosmos, transmitting divine or diabolic messages.
By contrast, Enlightenment auditors evaluated such talk as imparting messages about the
individual psyche and personality.”8
Beyond language, madness was an important epistemological tool for theorizing
relationships between the body, mind, and soul. How was knowledge acquired? Where was the
mind located? Could madness be treated? When history and psychiatry are examined together,
“we delve deeply into all aspects of human life: mind and body, emotions and experiences,
thoughts and moods, the self and others, lay and expert opinion, health and illness, science and
society, what’s normal and what’s abnormal, and even liberty and compulsion.”9 Rab Houston
expands on this in his book Madness and Society: “Deviant acts and modes of thought may have
been disruptive but, by challenging people’s ideas of the ordinary, they helped to shape it. . . .
Thus, because of the oppositions it elicited, studying madness tells us at least implicitly and
sometimes explicitly about understandings of sanity and about the fundamental structures of
normal society. People tended to see normal roles manifested in abnormal behavior.”10
On a macro level, the histories of madness and psychiatry are relevant to us all. We have
yet to fully solve the question of “how do our minds work?” Psychology classes are offered in
high schools, and many of us turn to psychiatry for help with life’s burdens, just as people did in
the seventeenth century. Indeed, “we live in pervasively secular societies in which people are
preoccupied as never before with the self and in which psychology, in its myriad manifestations,
is seen as the most appropriate instrument for exploring that self and the best means for

Roy Porter, “The Historiography of Medicine in the United Kingdom,” in Locating Medical History: The Stories
and Their Meanings, ed. Frank Huisman and John Harley Warner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2004), 204-205.
9
“Psychiatry and its subject,” podcast audio by Rab Houston, History of Psychiatry in Britain from 1500, July 8, 2016,
https://soundcloud.com/user-516743905.
10
Rab Houston, Madness and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 1-2.
8

7
ministering to its ills.”11 Frank Huisman and John Harley Warner echo this sentiment: “the lived
reality of illness experiences and management, of health seeking and disease avoidance, gives
our subject a universal intimacy and immediacy.”12 Mental disorders are unique illnesses in that
they transcend place and time. From ancient Hippocratic texts and temple medicine to twentiethcentury psychiatry and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (first published
in 1952), diseases of the mind have remained relevant as people tried to understand madness’s
origins and cure.
Yet, conceptions of mental disorders, despite their transcendence of space and time, were,
and are, constantly in flux. Its genesis, treatment, and moral stigmas were unique to each
society’s definition of rational and irrational, normal behavior and abnormal behavior. Thus, this
study fits into a much larger narrative of societal, political, religious, and gendered responses to
madness, while simultaneously bringing to light the intellectual, cultural, and societal history of
seventeenth-century England from a different perspective.
The histories of madness and psychiatry form branches on a much larger tree of the
history of medicine in the United Kingdom. Historians of medicine now recognize that for too
long “‘traditional’ medical history” was trotted out “as a simplistic foil,” the purpose of which
was to create the illusion of “theoretical and historiographical novelty.” Medical historiography
began at the turn of the nineteenth century, after which “there was no single ‘medical history’
transcendent over time but rather many different histories of medicine that were debated in
specific times, places, and communities.”13 Beginning in the 1960s, historians challenged the
linear Whig notion of progress from ignorant and superstitious medical practitioners to

11

Roy Porter and Mark S. Micale, eds., Discovering the History of Psychiatry (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), 14.
12
Huisman and Warner, Locating Medical History, 18.
13
Huisman and Warner, Locating Medical History, 2, 4.

8
empirically grounded physicians. Porter attributes this change to new diseases cropping up
during the latter half of the twentieth century, such as AIDS, which “have challenged the
progress saga . . . as an inevitable result, the history of medicine itself has been problematized.”
In the wake of this change, two major developments took place. First, the founding of the
Society for the Social History of Medicine in 1970 brought together young historians, social
scientists, and left-leaning health professionals in the UK. Its publication, Social History of
Medicine, is still in circulation today. Second, the Wellcome Trust (founded in the nineteenth
century) took the history of medicine from retired physicians and placed it in the hands of
academics, providing the history of medicine with “a proper academic footing” in the Wellcome
Institute for the History of Medicine at University College London (1968-1999). Within the
hands of scholars, the history of medicine expanded beyond doctors and hospitals to the
interactions between disease and society and between the physical and the cultural, particularly
in the publication Medical History (also still in circulation). This dialectic prompted historians to
study medicine over the longue durée, with an emphasis on gradual change over time rather than
a sudden change from supernatural beliefs to a rational scientific method. The historiography of
psychiatry also benefited from classes, lectureships, and publications through the Wellcome
Institute, primarily during the 1980s.14
The historiography of psychiatry in England followed a similar trajectory as that of
medicine and has evolved since the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in the last twenty-five
years. Beginning in the 1950s, historians such as George Rosen and Kathleen Jones “blended the
social history of medicine with an optimistic view of the role of social policy.”15 These early

Porter, “Historiography of Medicine,” 195.
R.A. Houston, “A Latent Historiography? The Case of Psychiatry in Britain, 1500-1820,” The Historical Journal
57, no. 1 (March 2014): 292.
14
15

9
historians incorporated social context into their histories of medicine and viewed social policy as
largely beneficial to those suffering from madness. Historians of the last quarter century have
found the historiography of mental disorders before and during the 1960s to be problematic for
two main reasons. First, they were often written by psychiatrists rather than historians, and
second, they overemphasized a dramatic change between a period of immoral treatment of the
mad and modern, and therefore moral, psychiatry. In so doing, these “psychiatrists-cum-amateur
historians” invariably created their own historiographical hagiographies.16 Houston evaluates
psychiatrists as historians: “at their crudest, clinicians’ potted histories summarize a transition
from cruel incarceration to humane institutionalization, or a movement from superstition and
ignorance to rational medical science . . . these uncritically triumphalist or teleological narratives
primitivize earlier periods, presenting them with a mixture of horror and indignation.”17 Andrew
Scull is equally critical in his assessment of mid-twentieth-century historiography, stating
“psychiatry was here cast as a morality tale, a movement from the dark period . . . through a
drawn-out struggle in which the steady application of rational-scientific principles by people of
good will produced halting and irregular but unmistakable evidence of progress towards humane
and effective treatments . . . a process supposedly culminating in our present state of grace.”18
Similarly, Porter chastises “in-house” histories, which “have typically been ‘Whiggish,’ in the
sense of openly and unashamedly examining the past in the light of present knowledge, offering
anachronistic retrospective diagnoses and interpretations of past events, handing out praise to
progressive ‘heroes’ and blame to reactionary ‘villains,’ and seeing the treatment of the mad as

This phrase is from Scull, “A Quarter Century of the History of Psychiatry,” 240.
Houston, “A Latent Historiography,” 291-292.
18
Andrew Scull, “Psychiatry and its historians,” History of Psychiatry 2, no. 7 (1991): 239-240.
16
17

10
the story leading—often triumphantly—up to a supposedly enlightened and progressive
present.”19
Problems arose from psychiatrists’ teleological historiographies of the mid-twentieth
century. They tended to be overly optimistic about the progress of the psychiatric profession and
did not take into consideration forces outside the medical field, such as social, cultural,
economic, and political influences. Works written by professional historians tended towards
teleology, such as Kathleen Jones’s Lunacy, Law, and Conscience, 1744-1845: The Social
History of the Care of the Insane (1955) and Albert Deutsch’s many publications. But there were
exceptions, such as Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine’s Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry,
1535-1860 (1963), an edited volume of published primary sources. Hunter and Macalpine
created this volume because they were “hoping to get the present in perspective by tracing the
problems of the past and how modern views and trends developed.”20 The book contains
excerpts from divines, philosophers, physicians, humanitarians, psychiatrists, lawyers, and
politicians with introductions and biographical information from Hunter and Macalpine. The
sources from British archives, including the National Archives, Lancashire Country Record
office, and Bedfordshire and Luton Archives, are especially useful.
By the 1960s and 1970s, anti-psychiatric, revisionist historians and sociologists such as
Michel Foucault, Erving Goffman, Ronald Lating, Thomas Scheff, and Thomas Szasz began to
regard the history of psychiatry as a method of social control designed to repress deviancy in
society.21 Szasz is well known for his criticism of the foundations of psychiatry (despite being a
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psychiatrist himself) and for his books The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and The Manufacture
of Madness (1970). Goffman, a sociologist, called the modern mental hospital a “total
institution” in his Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates
(1961). R.D. Laing, a psychiatrist, wrote that all mental illnesses were “a diagnostic designation
arbitrarily fixed by society and confirmed by psychologists” in The Divided Self: An Existential
Study in Sanity and Madness (1965). But Michel Foucault’s book, Madness and Civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965), remains the most influential and widely read of
the anti-psychiatric books.22
Foucault’s theories have been problematic for historians. He lacks evidence to support his
historical arguments, and they are often generalized rather than historicized. H.C. Erik Midelfort
asserts, “for historians committed to recapturing the texture of the past, the complexity, variety,
and competition of various discursive practices in the past, Foucault’s work is a radical and
dramatic simplification, a reduction of whole generations, countries, and disciplines to symbolic
markers in a moral game whose object is the destabilizing of the present.”23 Similarly, Houston
writes, “most historians stand back from Foucault (‘an unreadable fraud,’ according to one
respondent), noting how his narrative of separation and anathematization belies the early modern
emphasis on reintegration and cure, and how medical knowledge is not solely produced by
doctors or in asylums.”24 Nevertheless, his observation that there was a shift in attitudes toward
madness during the “classical age” is useful, and reminds the historian that the history of
madness is far from a progressive march toward humane care.
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Foucault begins his work during the Renaissance. The “Ship of Fools” had became a
motif of literature and iconography as madmen symbolized the “great disquiet” that overcome
Europe at the end of the Middle Ages (See Figure 3). Yet, in writing and on the stage, madness
unveiled the truths to which reason was blind: “in a comedy where each man deceives the other
and dupes himself, the madman is comedy to the second degree: the deception of deception; he
utters, in his simpleton’s language which makes no show of reason, the words of reason that
release, in the comic, the comedy.” In Shakespeare’s tragedies, madness continued to reveal
truths: a woman’s conscience cognizant of its
impending punishment (as in Lady Macbeth), and
death as the only solution to separation between
lovers. Even when brought on by appearances,
illusions, or false impressions—what Foucault
deems a deprivation “of its dramatic seriousness”—
madness continued to clarify in early seventeenthcentury narratives.25
Contrast this with the classical age, the
period Foucault terms the “Great Confinement.”
During this time, madmen were sequestered in
hospitals, bridewells, workshops, and madhouses
with criminal indigents, particularly following the
founding of the Hôpital Général in Paris in 1656. In
these places designed to ameliorate economic crisis,
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Figure 3: Frontispiece of Navis Stultifera or
“Ship of Fools” referenced by Foucault. The
poem was first written by Sebastian Brant and
published in 1494, though Mary Gale translated
and illustrated this manuscript of the poem in
1696. The pen-and-ink drawing that was used as
the cover is dated 1508 (possibly from an
Alexander Barclay translation). Newberry
Library MS folio Y952.B733.
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madness became inextricably tied to bourgeois disdain for lack of work, immorality, and social
disorder. Madness’s “otherness” became solidified. It was not due to the madman’s irrationality
that segregation was necessary, but rather “because he crosses the frontiers of bourgeois order of
his own accord, and alienates himself outside the sacred limits of its ethic.”26 Thus, though labor
and its imperviousness to idleness was the crux of confinement, the bourgeoisie and monarchy’s
power to fuse moral obligation and civil law through physical constraint would lead to
eighteenth-century madhouses designed specifically for the insane, and later, asylums.
The relationship between reason and unreason (madness) began its slow disintegration in
the early houses of confinement. This separation began because madness was unique in its feral
nature, “as if madness, at its extreme point, freed from the moral unreason in which its most
attenuated forms are enclosed, managed to rejoin, by a paroxysm of strength, the immediate
violence of animality.” This animal nature made madmen, in theory, inhuman. They were
incapable of emotions or bodily discomfort (for example, extreme cold) and unable to restrain
their own passions. For this reason, Foucault argues that houses of containment were neither
concerned with medicine nor curative measures during the eighteenth century, but rather
physical restraint.27 As other forms of unreason moved from “the spectacle of the scaffold” to the
panopticism of the prisons, madness remained “pure spectacle,” worthy of “the attention and
curiosity of a frivolous, irresponsible, and often vicious public,” even in containment.28 Madness
served as a warning about the dangerous path of a sinful life. No longer associated with the
divine madness of the Renaissance (a pure connection with God), madness in the classical age
was associated with the Fall, in direct opposition to God. Despite its distinctiveness within

26

Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 58.
Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 70, 72, 75.
28
The “spectacle of the scaffold” and panopticism are references to Foucault’s most prominent work: Discipline and
Punish. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1975).
27

14
unreason, madness’s escape from the scaffold and containment in the madhouse ensured that it
could only ever be understood in relation to unreason. “Unreason was [madness’s] support,”
explains Foucault, “or let us say that unreason defined the locus of madness’s possibility.”29
The eighteenth century was one in which medical practitioners associated madness with
uncontrolled passions and delusions in its various forms: mania, melancholy, hysteria, and
hypochondria. Doctors thought that physical cures and treatments were necessary to cure the
internal, moral aspects of madness. This often resulted in what we would today call physical
abuse, though there was logic behind each method of codification, purification, immersion, and
restriction of movement.30 While nineteenth-century reformers touted “moral therapy” in
asylums designed specifically for the cure of the mad (in order to, of course, contrast their
methods of treatment from the barbarous eighteenth-century doctors), Foucault argues that these
asylums were actually more harmful due to the threat of physical punishment. This ever present
threat engendered fear and guilt in patients, who were subject to the gaze of doctors and the
public. “The absence of constraint in the nineteenth-century asylum is not unreason liberated,”
insists Foucault, “but madness long since mastered.”31 Therefore, behind the Great Confinement
and the birth of the asylum was an unequal relationship of authority between those who
controlled categories of knowledge or Reason—the bourgeoisie and monarchy—and those
whose Unreason left them powerless.32
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While Foucault applies his theories to all of Europe, it is questionable whether they work
outside of France. In his article “Foucault’s Great Confinement,” Porter writes that Madness and
Civilization was “the most penetrating work ever written on the history of madness,” and
“Foucault was right to perceive that the history of madness cannot be understood without
tackling the history of reason.” However, according to Porter, the Great Confinement did not
occur in England until the early 1800s, if it occurred at all. Instead, he clarifies that only 5,000 to
10,000 mad people were confined in England by the early nineteenth century. As such, the
confinement process of lunatics in England was “gradual, localized, and piecemeal.”33 While
Porter agrees with Foucault’s assessment that the Enlightenment likened the madman to a wild,
inhuman beast, another contemporaneous understanding of lunacy was that madmen simply
“reasoned wrongly.” This Lockean vision of madness (discussed further in Chapter 2) from the
late seventeenth century demonstrates, according to Porter, that a tendency toward moral therapy
began earlier in England.34
Despite discrepancies in Foucault’s sociological theories about madness and the antipsychiatric movement—both of which may have slowed the historiographical trajectory of
madness and psychiatry—works written by psychiatrists and sociologists in the 1960s advanced
the historical discipline. Scull argues that contrary to stalling the history of mental disorders, the
anti-psychiatry movement was “clearly of considerable importance in provoking a broader
interest in the history of psychiatry—helping to persuade a whole generation of younger
professional historians . . . that madness deserved a fresh look; that its history could constitute a
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serious intellectual subject, one worthy of sustained attention and investigation.”35 This was
particularly true for the revisionists of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Social historians’ revision of the teleological histories of madness and psychiatry were
“equally Manichean” in their approach. Rather than viewing the asylum as the pinnacle of
Enlightenment rationality, the revisionists portrayed it as “a fatally mistaken and profoundly
repressive institution,” which was an “equally one-sided view.”36 Porter and Mark Micale opined
that revisionism’s “demystification of Whig idealizations have often only generated ‘heroic’ neoMarxist and Foucauldian remystifications.”37 Revisionists viewed the asylum as an institution
meant to normalize behavior. Notable revisionist works include David Rothman’s The Discovery
of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (1971), Klaus Doerner’s Bürger
und Irre: Zur Sozialgeschichte und Wissenschaftssoziologie der Psychiatrie (1975), Robert
Castel’s L-Ordre psychiatrique: L’âge d’or de l’aliénisme (1977), and Andrew Scull’s early
work Museums of Madness: The Social Organization of Insanity in Nineteenth-Century England
(1979).38 In the vein of anti-psychiatry, these “historically-minded sociologists” described the
history of treatment of the mad “in terms of the politics of professionalisation, the labelling of
social deviants, and the rise of hegemonic means of their ‘social control’ through strategies of
‘medicalisation’ and ‘psychiatrisation.’ The modern capitalist state, it is claimed, attempts to deal
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with threats to its own smooth operation by minimizing the use of direct force.”39 In addition to
this narrow view, Porter and Micale claim that the revisionists were as biased as the Whig
histories they sought to replace, particularly in terms of their political agendas.40
Despite problems within revisionist historiography, social historians positively
contributed to the history of psychiatry in several ways. All of them brought the history of
madness back into the historical discipline (as opposed to psychiatry, sociology, and amateur
history). It was now regarded as a serious subject matter, one necessitating professional
scholarship. They also engaged with a broader array of source materials, grounding their work in
historical evidence rather than theory. In addition, these historians broadened the field by
covering longer periods of time and placing national developments in comparative contexts.41 As
Porter eloquently states, “there has undoubtedly been real gain in getting away from the notion
that insanity is simply a narrow, internal medical problem which has been solved by the
advancement of scientific knowledge, and in increasingly recognising, instead, that the
expression and recognition of insanity are socio-culturally relative, changing greatly down the
centuries.”42
The work of post-revisionists in the late 1980s and 1990s fall somewhere between the
Whig histories of the 1950s and 1960s and the revisionist histories of the 1970s and 1980s. Postrevisionists questioned the “broad-brush analysis of structures and discourse,” and instead
focused on a more nuanced and complex picture of the history of madness and psychiatry.43
Post-revisionism is marked by careful archival work, “steady expansion of the topical, the
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temporal, and even the spatial dimensions of the subject,” and a reexamination of the older Whig
histories in order to “establish the extent and richness of pre-Foucault historical writing about
psychiatry, and to break down the artificial, value-laden bifurcation between medical and
nonmedical scholarship.”44 We are perhaps most indebted to the works of Andrew Scull,
Michael MacDonald, Roy Porter, and R.A. Houston for their post-revisionist works on early
modern madness and psychiatry.45
Roy Porter was one of the leading scholars of English madness when the historiography
of psychiatry entered post-revisionism. Porter, William Bynum, and Michael Shepherd led the
way in cultivating the “new discipline in the history of psychiatry” at the Wellcome Institute in
the early 1980s. In his book Mind Forg’d Manacles: A History of Madness in England (1987),
Porter seeks to understand how society viewed insanity during the seventeenth century from the
Restoration in 1660 to the Regency. Porter’s conceptualization of madness is compelling.
“Lunacy was unbound,” he explains, “never confined exclusively to a charmed circle of
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meanings, never simply a slur or a nosological niche. It maintained its vernacular currency.”46 In
this eloquent statement, Porter manages to describe the extreme complexity of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century cultural understandings of insanity. Contemporaries’ views of madness
depended on overlapping factors that infused the word with multiple meanings, including
culture, literature, religion, law, and politics. Thus, from descriptions of lunacy the historian can
extrapolate much more, such as how doctors viewed the body and the mind, the beginnings of
psychiatry, and the transitions in treatment of madness. Despite his unmistakable contribution to
the history of madness, Porter acknowledges his reliance on secondary research, and his focus
remains in the second half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century.
One of the only scholars to explicate perceptions of madness during the early seventeenth
century is Michael MacDonald. In his book Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in
Seventeenth-Century England (1981), he laments, “like the buried remains of ancient nomads,
the sources for the study of insanity before the age of asylums are scattered and hidden in
unlikely places.”47 Still, MacDonald manages to write a micro-history about an astrological
physician, Richard Napier, who treated insane and troubled patients over the course of his life.
Through coroners’ inquests, court records, diaries, plays, popular literature, and medical and
religious treatises, MacDonald successfully demonstrates that it is possible to acquire
information about madness during the early modern era through manuscript writing. MacDonald
also notes that madness was an integral part of early modern English culture: “by the early
seventeenth century the language of madness had become rich and pervasive; words and phrases
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about insanity were part of the common coinage of everyday speech and thought, negotiable
everywhere in England and not restricted to a small circle of medical and legal experts.”48
But while the post-revisionist history of psychiatry in Britain has advanced and expanded
over the past twenty-five years to include more archival analysis (including case records and
patient experience, individual institutions and figures, a focus on the linkages between family,
community, and the asylum, and studies of gender and sex), temporal expansion of the history of
psychiatry into the early modern period has remained, for the most part, stagnant.49 The
exception is monographs based around one type of madness, such as hysteria, melancholy, and
enthusiasm. This study includes them all.
Each chapter of this dissertation draws methodological inspiration from different
scholars, but at its core, this is a cultural history of madness in early modern England. Mary
Fissell’s essay, “Making Meaning from the Margins: The New Cultural History of Medicine”
(2004) has been influential in this respect. Her title is particularly apt. How do we make meaning
of madness at a time when one’s medical records were not kept, except perhaps for wealthy
patients? When there was not an asylum record stating a patient’s reason for admittance,
treatment, and discharge? We do this by drawing upon the cultural contexts surrounding
medicine and madness. Fissell’s definition of the “new cultural history of medicine” is an
intersection of culture and medicine:
I argue that the core of cultural history is its attention to the making of meaning—
to how people in the past made sense of their lives, of the natural world, of social
relations, of their bodies. This definition suggests that meaning is not inherent,
that it does not reside within a text or a practice, waiting to be called on. Meaning
is not uniform or transhistorical or even apparent. It must be made, and ‘making’
is not an easy or simple process; it admits of struggle, perhaps even of contest.
Meanings that are made can be unmade and remade…Cultural history can be
48
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understood as an attempt to take some of the methods and questions of intellectual
history (Why did he think that? Where did she learn this?) and apply them to
members of social groups whose thoughts had not previously been considered of
historical interest.50
Fissell identifies three aspects of the new cultural history that are most pertinent to historians of
medicine. First, utilizing microhistory and ethnography to fill gaps in the past based on historical
context. Second, recognizing that social categories are constantly changing and subject to
negotiations. Third, acknowledging the importance of rhetoric, or the importance of “the medium
as well as the message.”51 Fissell’s definition of the New Cultural History is one I will be
incorporating throughout this dissertation.
Houston’s message of context is equally important in the methodology of this
dissertation. While we must acknowledge that madness and its many forms (hysteria,
hypochondria, melancholy, etcetera) were mind- and body-altering illnesses, their meanings
were never static. “Because madness . . . is quintessentially a social illness rather than a mere
biological fact,” Houston explains, “it must be understood in social terms relevant to the period
in which a person lived. Although much of reality we perceive is socially constructed, it is hard
to distinguish its profound relativity and human origin.”52 If we recognize that madness varies
depending on time and place, we may also posit that studying madness will reveal much about
that particular time and place. In this case, seventeenth-century England.
This is therefore a history concerned with both the micro and macro aspects of everyday
life—micro in that I will be examining the body and mind in the first part of the dissertation, and
macro in that I will also be analyzing the socio-cultural aspects of madness. Where possible, the
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voices of the mad will be represented, but for the most part this is a history about the ways in
which madness was described, interpreted, and utilized by contemporaries to understand unusual
and unorthodox behavior. Unfortunately, with this much
information to cover, some aspects of madness must be
omitted, such as an in-depth analysis of the manifestations
of madness in phenomena such as fanaticism, witchcraft,
astronomy, or astrology, except where directly applicable.
Moreover, I cannot possibly cover all the treatments
available for mental disorders (alchemy, for example) in
detail. Finally, I will be avoiding a history of
“psychiatry,” and “psychology” which I define as a
modern profession developed in the late-nineteenth and

Figure 4: Foolscap watermark detail on
blank sheet (c. 1640). Folger
Shakespeare Library MS L.f.169.

twentieth centuries, though I may occasionally refer to treatment of mental disorders as
“psychology” or “psychological.”53 I will instead focus on mental disorders recognized by early
modernists, including lunacy, idiocy, distraction, brainsickness, melancholy (and its several
variations, including erotomania and religious melancholy), hypochondria, hysteria,
Greensickness, and The Suffocation of the Mother.54 I have chosen to cover the entirety of the
Stuart era so that change over time may become apparent, particularly before, during, and after
the Restoration.55
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This dissertation consists of five chapters in addition to an introduction and conclusion.
The first part of the dissertation is composed of two chapters that cover the physiological aspects
of madness: how contemporaries, confronted by a wide range of symptoms, attempted to
diagnose, categorize, and treat patients suffering from mental disorders. These two chapters
explore Max Weber’s theory of disenchantment, which I argue began earlier than the 1660
Restoration. Chapter one, “Body, Mind, and Soul: The Origins of Madness in a Supernatural
World,” examines the efforts of divines, physicians, barber-surgeons, philosophers, and
apothecaries to identify the root(s) of madness. According to some, madness arose from natural
sources: the body, soul, mind, or passions. According to others, supernatural forces, including
God, the devil, witches, and magicians, were behind the behavior of mad patients. As I argue in
this chapter, most early modernists believed both origins were equally plausible, though there
was a steady adoption of natural treatment throughout the Start era. The second chapter,
“Exorcisms, Medicine, and Recipes: The Treatment of Madness Within Political, Religious, and
Medical Rivalry,” furthers the argument that disenchantment with supernatural theories of
madness began earlier and occurred slower than historians have previously contended. I examine
supernatural treatments of madness, including exorcism and religious therapies, and natural
treatment, including humoral balance, moral philosophy, natural history, and institutional
treatment. The gradual adoption of natural treatment must be considered within two key
contexts: Anglican disdain for Puritan and Catholic magic (e.g. exorcism) and the medical
rivalry between university-trained physicians and empirics.
The second part of the dissertation is composed of three chapters that examine the
meanings of madness in the law, gender relations, and political culture. “Legally Mad: Lunatics,
Idiots, and Property, 1540-1660” delves into the laws and regulations that affected a person
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declared either a Lunatic or an Idiot, their statuses as wards of the state, and their abilities to
manage their own estates.56 In particular, I examine the Interregnum and how communal
definitions of insanity are reflected in legal inquisitions of lunacy and idiocy. Moreover, I
conclude that the trajectory of the Court of Wards and Liveries reflected the fiscal problems of
the early Stuarts. The fourth chapter, “Mad Men and Women: A Comparative Study of Gendered
Mad Diseases” investigates the specialized diseases with which women were diagnosed (e.g.
Hysteria, Greensickness, Suffocation of the Mother). I also explore how gender relations and
stereotypes shaped diagnoses of madness, descriptions of symptoms, and treatment regiments as
contemporaries transitioned from Galen’s one-sex model of the body to two different, but
functionally compatible anatomies during the seventeenth century. I argue that regardless of the
diagnoses, the symptoms and treatment of women’s madness drew upon the growing realization
of the importance of the womb, which reinforced gendered rhetoric and stereotypes. In the final
chapter, “Language and Meanings: Rhetoric of the Body and Madness in Political Culture,” I
analyze references to mental disorders in cheap print and pamphlets during the Civil War and
Interregnum and utilize the Ranters as a case study. This chapter demonstrates that mental
disorders were not simply diseases of the mind and body—they were used as discursive tools in
political culture.
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I conclude with another Michael Drayton sonnet, one which hints at how the mentally
disordered were treated, as well as the difficulty of identifying those who could reason and those
who could not:
…Then fools and children fittest to go together;
He still as young as when he first was borne,
No wiser I, then when as young as he,
You that behold us, laugh us not to scorn,
Give Nature thanks you are not such as we;
Yet fools and children sometimes tell in play,
Some wise in show, more fools in deed, then they.57
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PART I: ORIGINS AND TREATMENT OF MADNESS
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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 provide an overview of Stuart-era madness in a literal sense (as
opposed to discursive meanings in Part II). They cover the relationship between body and mind,
the origins of madness within the body, and the practical treatments that clerics, physicians,
women at home, and medical practitioners attempted. Multiple theories arose for dealing with
this puzzling disorder, which men and women attempted to understand. Moreover, they struggled
to reconcile ancient Galenic theory with the dissections they saw before them. Part I focuses on
madness in the microcosm, that is, on the ways in which contemporaries theorized about the
nuances and etiology of madness. They attempted to organize the functions of organs, humours,
faculties, vapours, and spirits into a cohesive system that explained the human body and mind, or
in the case of madness, why the body and mind ignored the norms of society. Satan’s work on
the body was also problematic, as he encouraged religious melancholy and took advantage of
guilty consciences. Therefore, in these chapters I will explore the origins and treatment of
madness, challenge the theory of rapid “disenchantment” in seventeenth-century England, and
argue that natural, or secular, explanations of madness were widely available much earlier than
the historiography suggests.
In order to gain a firmer grasp on the context of early modern madness, we must look at
the nosology of madness in earlier periods. In the following few pages, I provide a brief
summary of madness in early Judaism, the Ancient world, and Medieval Europe.
A note on terms: Delirium” and “madness” were general terms, while “mania,”
“melancholy,” and “frenzy” were the three most common types of madness. “Lunacy” and
“Idiot” were more often used in legal contexts, but were also used in non-legal writing.
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Nosology of Madness from Early Judaism to the Early Modern Period
Supernatural and natural origins of madness can be traced back to the Israelites and the
Old Testament and through the Greco-Roman Period and Middle Ages in the West. For the most
part, what we know about the history of madness in the Hebrew tradition comes not from
medical texts but from the fields of politics, religion, and anthropology.1 The two best examples
come from the Hebrew Bible: Saul and Nebuchadnezzar. Yahweh punished the first king of the
Israelites and the king of Babylon for disobeying Him, and thus Hebrews believed madness was
caused by possession of evil spirits sent from God. Israelites also recognized madness in
prophets, as exemplified by the biblical Jeremiah. Prophets “acted as emissaries of the divine,”
and as a result, some were seen as “divinely inspired,” while others were simply mad.2
In the ancient Greco-Roman world, possession by evil spirits continued to be a source of
madness, but natural causes for mental disorders became viable possibilities as well.3 In the
Hellenistic world, the gods often meddled in human affairs and could bring about madness in
humans if they were displeased. Literary expressions of madness included moral flaws, human
ineptitude, divine election, and possession of strong emotions.4 This is especially evident in the
Homeric works The Iliad and The Odyssey, in which humans interacted with, and were aided by,
the gods in war. Because the gods were inextricably linked to all aspects of Greek culture, we
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may presume that Greeks and Romans also believed that the gods and/or demons might cause
madness (indeed, Herodotus writes of this in his Histories). However, Andrew Scull asserts that
while poetic and dramatic works of the period “must resonate with and be comprehensible to the
audience, they may be far from a reflection of the man in the street’s beliefs and attitudes.”5
Indeed, many medical texts sought to distance themselves from metaphysics and the
aforementioned themes of poetry and drama.
Medical texts, though less widespread, were more influential than other aspects of
madness in ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Chiara Thuminger explains that ancient
medicine emphasized a materialistic view of the “human mind-body unit.” Madness was
considered a bodily illness to be cured through natural means. This is especially true of the
Hippocratic Corpus of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, which was exclusively based on
naturalistic and corporeal symptoms and treatments of diseases. Thumiger identifies a conscious
effort to separate and define a “professional and intellectual position” in the Hippocratics; they
believed doctors must be designated from those who espoused metaphysical ideologies.6
Hippocratics went so far as to describe metaphysical beliefs as ignorant and superstitious in On
the Sacred Disease (400 BCE). They distanced themselves from metaphysics and demonology,
which was the purview of what Scull describes as a “rival school” of healers: temple medicine.
The Greeks traveled to temple medicine shrines to be healed by local gods and to increase their
good fortune. Scull states that unsurprisingly, tension arose between temple medicine—which
viewed illness as the gods’ punishments—and Hippocratics—who grounded pathologies within
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the body, particularly in cases of mental diseases.7 Thus, ancient Greco-Romans sought to keep
naturalistic and supernatural causes of madness separate.
Based on the theories of Hippocrates (460-370 BCE) and his followers, the Hippocratic
texts posited that the body was a system of four humours (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black
bile) that interacted with one another and with the outside environment. Men and women’s
humours were balanced differently, as women were considered more wet and cold. The humoral
system supported mental disorders specifically arising from the uterus, such as hysteria (I will
discuss this further in Chapter 4). Within the Hippocratic Corpus, there were five main theories
of the mind that arose from humoral imbalance. The first and most famous theory of the mind
was “encephalocentrism,” meaning that the brain was the seat of judgment, knowledge, senses,
morality, and emotions. The other four theories placed the center of mental life in air/pneuma,
blood (“haematocentrism”), upper organs (“enterocentrism”), or the soul/psyche.8
“Encephalocentrism” would be an important aspect of theories of madness during the Middle
Ages and early modern period.
Plato (428-348 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE) emphasized the role of the body in the
genesis of disease, but they added morality to the equation. Though mania was divinely inspired
in Plato’s Phaedrus, he recognized a damaged body and ethical flaws as the main components
affecting “diseases of the soul” in his work Timaeus. Thus, posits Thumiger, diseases of the soul
were a result of physiological impairment and moral deficiency, one which education could
improve.9 Aristotle similarly theorized that physiological impairment and moral corruption
would lead to a person’s mental impotence. Furthermore, he wrote that reason and intellect
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separated the soul of man from the soul of animals. Aristotle identified the heart, not the brain, as
the source of judgement, perception, and emotions.10 Both formed part of the “hydraulic model,”
in which the immaterial soul transferred its intentions to the physical body through pneuma (air,
which had a small amount of material). Pneuma was located in the heart (according to Stoics) or
the brain (according to Hippocratics).11 As will be seen, Medievalists would debate the seat of
the mind as being either of the brain or the heart.
Galen of Pergamon (129-210 CE) built directly upon the Hippocratic Corpus and
popularized the humoral theory of the body. Though he is most remembered for humoral theory,
he also combined ethical reflections and physiology in his writing of two different theories. In
Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixtures of the Body, Galen conceived that a diseased
body resulted in mental problems beyond a cure. As a result, physiological problems, such as
fever or stomachache, might lead to certain mental disorders. His second theory (which seems to
contradict the first) was detailed in The Diagnosis and Treatment of the Affections and Errors
Peculiar to Each Person’s Soul. Here he wrote that the sources of mental disorders were not the
body but rather strong emotions, such as anger or grief. The title implies the possibility of
recovery in the word “treatment,” and his philosophy about the balance of the body would be
extraordinary influential during the Middle Ages and in early modern England.12 Ancient writers
posited both supernatural and natural origins of madness, though for the most part they remained
separate.
Supernatural and natural explanations for madness became inextricable during the
Middle Ages, in large part due to the spread of Christianity. Jesus had cast out lunacy and
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possession in the New Testament (as described below), and as Christianity gradually overtook
Barbarian religions in the Roman Empire, reformed pagans and Christians increasingly blamed
demons and Satan for their psychological impairments. In the Middle Ages, the causes of
madness were not mutually exclusive, and could includie the body, the mind, demonic
possession, and divine providence. Within the Christian paradigm, the physically disordered
were in danger of possession, while their soul and body might also be used by God for
punishment or correction.13 Medievalists harkened back to the Stoic hydraulic model during the
Early Middle Ages in order to explain how the material body could be manipulated by a
metaphysical soul. Following this model, the immaterial soul was not in danger because demons
could not enter the soul. This provided comfort to the afflicted and allowed them to remain
members within the church, as later reinforced by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1257 CE).14
Possession took place when demons entered the body of a human and was then able to control
the mind. The hydraulic model was particularly influential among Anglo-Saxons Britons.
The theory that the soul was in danger of possession by demons gained traction during
the eighth and ninth centuries. During this time, St. Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430 CE) model of
the soul resurfaced, which stated that the soul was an “incorporeal entity, without physical
location, and possessing the faculties of reason.”15 But if the soul was completely separate from
the body and the seat of reason, what did this imply about the soul of one who was overtaken by
madness? The soul was now in danger of demonic possession and the passions of the corporeal
body, and it became more difficult to differentiate between madness and demonic possession as
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they were often accompanied by the same symptoms. Because violent madness utilized the
language of demonic possession (“victims were ‘seized’ or ‘tormented’ by demons”), insanity
and demonic interference could be indistinguishable.16 Thus, demonic possession remained a
plausible origin of madness throughout the Middle Ages, one which would continue into the
early modern period.
A renewed interest in Hippocratic and Galenic medicine arose during the eleventh
century with the rise of the university and the formation of medical guilds. Interactions with the
East in the Crusades brought Galenic texts back to the West, which were subsequently translated
into Latin.17 The humoral model became the basis of health and disease, and was part of an
influential work widely read in the High and Late Middle Ages: Canon of Medicine by the
Persian Avicenna (980-1037 CE). He proposed that the brain was cold and moist, and therefore it
was damaged by heat (the reason fevers often accompanied madness). He divided the brain in
three sections: the front was responsible for imagination, the center for rationality, and the back
for memory. Madness came about when there were abnormalities in one of these three areas of
the brain.18 Once again, madness was located in a tangible part of the body.
Medieval madness therefore arose from both natural and supernatural origins. These were
not conflicting theories as Christianity pervaded all aspects of life, including medicine.
Constantinus Africanus’s (d. 1098) Liber Pantegni exemplifies the amalgamation of demonic
and bodily factors in the origins of madness. Frenzy was caused by hot brain abscesses, often
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yellow bile. Mania was caused by demonic possession or excessive diet. And melancholy
resulted from excess bile moving from the stomach to the brain.19 By the Late Middle Ages,
mentions of demonic possession began to decrease in official records, though beliefs in its
possibility continued. Moving into the early modern period, I identify two important legacies
regarding the origins of madness from the Ancient and Medieval eras. First, supernatural and
natural origins of madness were equally viable. Second, philosophers, divines, and medical
practitioners acknowledged several possible relationships between the body, mind, and soul, and
therefore were far from settled on the seat of reason and reason’s corruption: madness.
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CHAPTER 1: BODY, MIND, AND SOUL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS
IN A SUPERNATURAL WORLD

There is a double madness, corporal and spiritual. The object of the former is
reason: of the latter, religion. That obsesses the brain, this the heart. That expects
the help of the natural physician, this of the mystical . . . The morally-frantic may
be mad with reason, never with religion.
—Thomas Adams, Mystical Bedlam, Or the World of Mad-men (1615)1
Melancholy, one of the two main forms of madness in seventeenth-century England
(mania was the other), was an elusive disorder that concerned physicians, theologians,
philosophers, and poets.2 Its symptoms were debilitating. Victims suffered from “anguish and
vexation of the spirits, any ways opposite to pleasure, mirth, joy, delight.” Those diagnosed with
melancholy were “dull, heavy, sad, sour, lumpish, ill-disposed, solitary, or in any way moved or
displeased.”3 What did contemporaries believe the origin of such a devastating disease to be?
Early modernists hypothesized a plethora of causes. Robert Burton, divine, academic, and author
of The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), identified supernatural interference, bad diet, passions
and perturbations of the mind, and accidents as all potential reasons for the onset of melancholy.
Thus, this mental disorder could have been caused by forces ranging from God and the Devil to
“bad air” and the “force of imagination.”4 Citing the ancients and the Bible, Burton warned, “the
devil reigns, and in a thousand several shapes . . . by many temptations and several engines he
seeks to captivate our souls. . . . Sometimes he tempts by covetousness, drunkenness, pleasure,
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pride, &c. he studies our overthrow and seeks our destruction.”5 Yet, the source of melancholy
could also be as mundane as a poor diet. Burton wrote that meat and drink “causes melancholy,
as it offends in substance or accidents, that is, quantity, quality, or the like.”6
Burton’s writing demonstrates that contemporaries found both supernatural (God, the
devil, witches, fairies, etc.) and natural (humoral imbalance, imagination, emotions, fear, grief,
etc.) phenomena to be possible catalysts for the onset of madness, and that “supernatural” and
“natural” did not neatly align with “metaphysical” and “material.” Throughout this chapter and
the next, I demonstrate that most English early modernists believed both supernatural and natural
origins for madness were plausible, and that they often determined the genesis and treatment of
mental disorders on a case-by-case basis. This is because early modernists lived in a world
different than ours: a supernatural world. Witchcraft was a legitimate affliction, demons could
cause erratic behavior, and God could speak through humans in mystical revelation or prophecy.
Still, change was afoot. For a variety of reasons, such as the Protestant Reformation,
religious politics, and scientific progress, “disenchantment” with the supernatural was slowly
growing. Max Weber describes disenchantment, or receding magic- and supernatural-based
understandings of the world, when he writes that “the fate of our times is characterized by
rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment’ of the world.”7
Pieter Spierenburg’s modernized definition of disenchantment describes secularization as a
process that was “related to a decrease in the power and influence of the representatives of
religion” and concerned “a diminishing of the religious content of world view and ideology,”
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(more on Weber and Spierenburg below).8 In other words, disenchantment described a process
during which supernatural and “superstitious” understandings of the world, and the influence of
the religious leaders who disseminated them, decreased.
Scholars of early modern English madness have located disenchantment among elites
after the Civil Wars and Restoration of 1660. Roy Porter, the seminal historian of English
madness, writes that after the Civil War there was “a sea-change of consciousness synchronous
with such fundamental developments as the rise of mechanical science, the progress of material
civilization, and the extension of man’s dominion over Nature” and “a massive naturalization of
the understanding of insanity.”9 Similarly, Michael MacDonald writes, “after the English
Revolution, “the governing classes embraced secular interpretations of the signs of insanity and
championed medical methods of curing mental disorders.”10 Roger French and John Wear
dedicate an entire edited volume to The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,
emphasizing a paradigm shift “in the second half of the seventeenth century” when “many
people saw God as the giver of laws of nature rather than of the divine Providence of the earlier
century. The soul was a rational faculty rather than a vehicle of divine inspiration. The new
intellectual climate was rational, optimistic and deistic.”11 It is certainly true that after the
outpouring of radical religious beliefs from 1640 to 1660, élites, in distancing themselves from
the folklore of the lower classes, supported the rise of medical psychology.12 The next two
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chapters, however, demonstrate that physicians, divines, and scientists were already beginning to
oppose supernatural understandings and treatment of lunacy in the first half of the seventeenth
century. Thus, I also argue that the waning of supernatural understandings of madness, or the
disenchantment process, began earlier and occurred more gradually than previous scholars have
asserted.

1.1 Contexts: Early Modern England’s Supernatural and Natural World
Early modern English men and women lived in a supernatural world. Monstrous babies,
witches’ sabbaths, divine intervention, folklore, magic, miracles, and demons in disguise were
possible, particularly among the lower classes. Supernatural phenomena could be positive—as in
mystical experiences, white magic (which was curative), and alchemy—or they could be
negative—as in a devil encouraging self-murder, a child bewitched, or disease brought about by
sin. The legacy of medieval demonology endured into the early modern period. Moreover, in the
face of death, disease, and famine, people sought supernatural explanations for their misfortunes
in the absence of medical evidence.13
Demoniacal possession was a particularly vicious affliction that was capable of derailing
the minds of sane people. There was a dramatic increase in the number of possessions during the
Protestant and Catholic Reformations, as, according to Brian P. Levack, “both reformations
urged the cultivation of personal piety” in the late sixteenth century.14 Along the same lines,
MacDonald posits that after the turbulence and confusion of the English Reformation in the
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sixteenth century, humanist intellectuals and religious zealots reexamined and critiqued
traditional codes of conduct, while Puritan clergymen feared abnormal behavior for which they
had no organic or physical explanation.15 The belief in the veracity of possession continued
throughout the seventeenth century in narratives of wild, uncontrollable behavior that only
ceased with exorcism or religious therapy.
Understanding demonic possession becomes more complicated when it is coupled with
natural illnesses. Some physicians, philosophers, and clerics theorized that mental disorders were
caused by natural illnesses, which were in turn caused by possession. Thus, insanity could be
both natural and supernatural, a result of possession as long as the devil worked through natural
means. In other words, Satan could cause a humoral imbalance, which would in turn lead to
melancholy. Possession, religious melancholy, and divine madness, were all types of madness
thought to arise from the devil’s manipulation of the natural body. Though families were
reluctant to admit demonic possession had taken hold of their loved ones, most physicians were
open to the possibility of possession when they could not find natural reasons for mad
behavior.16 Defining a boundary between demonic and medical nosology was nearly impossible,
and early modernists often accepted both explanations for the onset of disease. Madness could
have been caused by a great many factors depending on the discretion of the author.
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1.2 Supernatural Origins
I have established that it is impossible to separate supernatural and natural causes of
madness. Divines were willing to seek medical explanations when they could not cure with
exorcisms or moral philosophy, and doctors and scientists did not exclude demoniacal possession
or sinful conduct as the catalyst for madness when medical treatment failed. However,
contemporaries did distinguish between the two in their writing. In this section, I explore the
three most prominent supernatural causes of mania and melancholy: demonic possession,
religious melancholy, and divine madness. These incitements fell under the purview of the devil,
God, or both. I seek not to theorize the “actual” causes of what contemporaries perceived as
demoniacal possession (be they mental illness, physical illness, group mentality, or a cultural
script).17 Instead, I aim to investigate supernatural explanations for mental disorders in early
modern England when the intervention of Satan or God was thought to have caused mania or
melancholy.
The theory of demoniacal lunacy was widespread among Christians before the Protestant
Reformation, and among Puritans, sectarians, and Catholics throughout the seventeenth century.
Puritans, who ascribed superstition and miracles to popery, accepted that demonic possession
was possible and exorcism a viable solution. In addition, supernatural explanations were useful
for contemporaries, especially when dealing with a “mental disorder that had no organic or
physical basis.”18 Regardless of the origins, demonological madness was a clear concern for
clerics and the victims of lunacy.
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Those who described demonic possession often alluded to the satanic possession of a
lunatic son from The King James Bible. Matthew 17:14-17:21, Mark 5:1-5:20, and Luke 8:268:38 contain the story of a lunatic boy possessed by a devil and subsequently cured by Jesus:
14 :And when they were come to the multitude, there came to him a certain man,
kneeling down to him, and saying,
15: Lord, have mercy on my son: for he is lunatic, and sore vexed: for ofttimes he
falleth into the fire, and oft into the water.
16: And I brought him to thy disciples, and they could not cure him.
17: Then Jesus answered and said, O faithless and perverse generation, how long
shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? bring him hither to me.
18: And Jesus rebuked the devil; and he departed out of him: and the child was
cured from that very hour.
19: Then came the disciples to Jesus apart, and said, Why could not we cast him
out?
20: And Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief: for verily I say unto you,
If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain,
Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be
impossible unto you.
21: Howbeit this kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.19
For those who lacked faith, sinned, and avoided prayer, lunacy brought on by possession of the
devil could not be cured except through exorcism. Indeed, insanity itself was a sign of demonic
possession, and contemporaries only needed to reference the biblical passages to support their
suspicions of satanic involvement in spiritual or mental illness. Andrew Boorde’s chapter on the
danger of demoniacs to themselves and to others referenced this biblical chapter as well. “This
matter does pass all manner of sickness” the physician and suffragan bishop of Chichester
warned, “and is a fearful and a terrible thing to see a devil or devils should have so much and so
great a power over man as it is specified of such persons diverse times in the gospel, especially
in the ix Chapter of Mark.”20 The impact of these biblical verses cannot be overstated.
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Throughout the early seventeenth century, sermons referenced this passage as a powerful
example of lunacy as a form of demoniacal possession and a metaphor for losing faith.
A notable example of this biblical reference is in William Gouge’s The Whole Armor of
God: Or, A Christian’s Spiritual Furniture, to Keep Him Safe from all the Assaults of Satan
(1619). The Puritan clergyman prefaced The Whole Armor of God by stating that he was “moved
to annex a treatise” concerning sin, in order that Satan could not “take advantage upon weak
consciences.”21 In a section titled, “Of the extent of Satan’s power,” Gouge described the
extraordinary and terrifying power of the Devil to change the weather, possess humans, and drive
people to insanity. The devil could “do anything whatsoever in the compass of nature,” “cause
tempests and storms,” “trouble the seas,” and “cause earthquakes.” More distressingly, the devil
“can enter into them, and make them with violence rush and run headlong here and there: he can
cast them into the fire and water, grievously vex and torment them, and inflict diseases upon
them; he can possess them, make them lunatic, dumb, deaf, blind; make them foam and roar
out.”22 The devil’s ability to “cast them into the fire and water” echoes Matthew 17:15, “Lord,
have mercy on my son: for he is lunatic, and sore vexed: for ofttimes he falleth into the fire and
oft into the water.”23 Indeed, the scripture seemed so reliable as to provide instructions for
discerning the difference between those who were truly possessed by the devil and a counterfeit
hoping to avoid punishment for a crime he or she committed.
Richard Bernard, a Church of England clergyman, wrote A Guide to Grand-Jury Men
(1627) in order that juries would be able to determine whether a person was imitating demonic
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possession in cases of witchcraft. For guidance, Bernard turned to the Bible and referenced the
devil’s role in lunacy:
But now if he or she counterfeit: diabolical practices of persons bewitched and
possessed; then are the Gentlemen to acquaint themselves with the true signs of
such as be possessed, so to discover the dissembler; and according as I find in
holy scripture, they be these:
I. An extraordinary strength, accompanied with exceeding fierceness, to be able to
pull chains in sunder, and to break fetters in pieces, to cut themselves with stones,
to tear off their clothes, & to go naked; to run into solitary and hideous places, and
not to be tamed: Here is a Devil, Mar. 5.4.5. Luk. 8.29
II. When one is suddenly taken up, and thrown with violence…Luk. 4.35.
III. When one is Lunatic, taken often and cast into the fire, or water to be
destroyed, Math. 17.15. Mar. 9.22.
IV. When one wallows, foams, gnashes with his teeth, is rent and thrown to and
fro, and withal pines away in body, as in Mar. 9.18.20.24
Bernard’s description and direct reference to scripture demonstrates the longevity of these
passages and the association in English people’s minds of demoniacal possession with lunatics.
Interestingly, Bernard did not deny that natural diseases could play a role in the actions of those
possessed (see below). He warned that “even a counterfeit may have some natural disease upon
him or her, and make advantage thereof, adding their own juggling tricks thereto.”25 However,
those natural diseases were separate from the symptoms of demonic lunacy.
Other clergymen used the story of the lunatic son to emphasize the necessity of faith in
Jesus. In his sermon, the Church of England clergyman Thomas Fuller preached, “as the father of
the lunatic child cried out, Mar. 9.24. Lord I believe, help my unbelief; so may the best of us all,
when we come to communicate, call out with tears, Lord I come with knowledge, help my want
of knowledge.”26 Similarly, the Puritan Arthur Hildersam lectured that “Christ is as able to heal
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our souls as our bodies . . . all bodily diseases were alike to him, he could as easily cure a leper,
Luke 17.14, or one that was lunatic, Matth. 4.24, or one that was born blind, John 9.32, as one
that had but an ague.”27 The Anglican clergyman, Nehemiah Rogers, compared sinners to
madmen, who “foam at the mouth, their talk is idle and beastly, savoring neither of wit not
honesty; sparkles of hell come forth from their lips, whereat the Devil kindles fire of
dissention.”28 But demonic lunacy was not limited to passages in the Bible and church sermons.
Victims of demonic lunacy were thought to exist within English society.
Indeed, for some in early modern England, the absence of supernatural, demonic
possession indicated a forged illness rather than a mental disorder. Those who were not
possessed by the devil but had symptoms of madness were thought to be faking their ailments.
No other explanation seemed plausible. As a result, contemporaries worried about “counterfeit
demoniacs” who might feign possession in order to gain pardon for an offense. These pretended
demoniacs needed instruction, and who could better provide guidance than a cleric? John
Darrell, a Church of England divine, was convicted for teaching William Sommers how to
“counterfeit possession” in 1602.29 His ability to “dispossess” Sommers in 1597 had led to
Darrell’s appointment as preacher at St. Mary’s in Nottingham, but the town was skeptical of
Darrell’s ability to exorcise Sommers, especially given that Anglicans discouraged exorcism.
After Sommers confessed to counterfeiting (while also, confusingly, claiming that his confession
was brought about by demonic possession), Darrell was convicted and put in prison for one year.
Darrell wrote A True Narration of the Strange and Grievous Vexation by the Devil (1600)
in defense of his actions, and referenced demoniacal lunacy several times as evidence that
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demonic possession was possible. First, he described the biblical passage of the lunatic son and
his father. Then, Darrell found a way to support the existence of demonic lunacy and the practice
of exorcisms while simultaneously chastising superstitious “miracles.” He suggested that
madness was not the work of the devil, “but a disease, as is the lunacy, palsy, etc.” For even once
a cleric attempted the miraculous cure of exorcism, it was possible that “men still are sick . . .
and some are lunatic.”30 In his defensive writing, Darrell hoped to convey three ideas: that
demonic possession existed, that it was more a disease than a miracle, and that Puritan concerns
about possession and exorcisms were valid. The skepticism surrounding Darrell’s trial in the
form of opposition treatises (see Chapter 2) and his tracts on possession suggest that
disenchantment in England was underway.
Another type of forgery was possible when accused witches pretended to be suffering
from a natural mental disorder. In A Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft (1608), a Church
of England clergyman, William Perkins, set out to discern between true witches (those possessed
by the devil) and melancholic persons. Because their behavior was so similar, it was difficult to
distinguish between them. Still, the madness within witches was caused by a supernatural force:
Satan. People became witches not through humoral imbalance, but rather the devil’s seduction
played out in several ritualistic behaviors (including a disguise, sexual relations, and the “devil’s
mark”). Perkins reiterated this point, “for first, our witches are as wise and politic, yea as crafty
and cunning in all other matters, as other men be; whereas brainsick persons troubled with
melancholy, if their understanding be distempered in one action, it will be faulty likewise in
others, more or less.”31 Perkins’s ultimate goal was to prevent the equivalent of an insanity
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defense in cases of demonic possession. For, if a man confessed to robbery or murder and was
convicted, his friends could simply say “this man hath a crazy brain, and is troubled with
melancholy.” Consequently, the judge would grant an acquittal, when actually, “the truth is, it
was not he, but the devil who himself committed the murder, and made him think he did it.”32
What we may draw from Perkins’s warnings is that while possession may not have caused
madness itself, it certainly caused mad behavior.
Still, supernatural causes of insanity were a valid possibility in manifestations of
madness. In his Second book of the breviary of health (1587), Boorde wrote that there were four
types of madness: mania and melancholia (natural disorders), and Demoniaci and lunaticus
(arising from the devil). Those unfortunates inflicted with Demoniaci were “he or they the which
be mad and possessed of the devil or devils, or else to hurt and kill any other thing, therefore let
every man beware of them, and keep them in a sure custody.” Boorde referenced the Bible and
his own experiences to support his claim that demoniacal madness existed. During his first trip to
Rome, a German gentlewoman, possessed by devils, was put into a pillar outside of St. Peter’s
chapel.
This woman was put into that pillar within the iron gate, and after her did go in a
priest, and did examine of the woman under this manner, in the Italian tongue.
‘Thou devil or devils, I do abjure thee by ye potential power of the Father & of
the Son our Lord Jesus Christ’…but I did not hear that I was afraid to tarry any
longer, least yet the devils should have come out of her, and to have entered me.33
Boorde therefore reinforced the Biblical version of the demonic cause of madness in his
eyewitness account. He also expressed an accompanying fear that he might be possessed, just as
the hogs were when the devils were cast out of the lunatic son in the Gospel.
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Thomas Adams, the Puritan author of Mystical Bedlam: Or, the World of Madmen
(1615), also wrote about natural disease and supernatural possession as causes of madness in his
sermon. Adams considered natural and supernatural causes to be two separate phenomena, as
demonstrated in his quote that opened this chapter. Spiritual madness affected the heart’s three
virtues: knowledge, faith, and affections. Adams used simile to explain spiritual madness: “As
corporal madness draws a thick obfuscation over their lights, so spiritual corrupts and perverts
them: that as they are strangers to heaven, quod intellectum, so as last, they become fools in
natural things, quoad rationem. As the apostle plainly [said] even as they did not like to retain
God in their knowledge, so God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are
not convenient.” If by chance his description of spiritual madness was unclear, Adams
summarized his point: “they that forget God, shall forget nature.”34 This threat was extremely
frightening, as for some English men and women, demoniacal madness seemed the most
plausible explanation for their woes.
Burton did not shy away from supernatural explanations for melancholy. All madness
brought about by the devil came from God’s permission for the punishment of sin. Devils were
dangerous for many reasons, as “we find by experience, that they can hurt not our fields only,
cattle, goods, but our bodies and minds . . . many think he can work upon the body, but not upon
the mind. But experience pronounces otherwise, that he can work upon body and mind.” Devils
were therefore extraordinarily menacing. They could manipulate not only the body, a more easily
treatable form of insanity, but also the mind. Many divines of the period, such as Perkins,
subscribed to the idea that the devil could approach his victims through disguise or by
manipulating the victims’ senses so that he or she saw not the devil, but a friendly figure. But the
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devil was not able to tempt everyone. Rather, he struck those who he sensed had weakness of
conscience and spirit. According to Burton, melancholics were most susceptible: “Of all others
melancholy persons are most subject to diabolical temptations and illusions, and most apt to
entertain them and the devil best able to work them. But whether by obsession, or possession, or
otherwise, I will not determine, it is a difficult question.”35 Religious melancholy is described in
detail below.
Demoniacal possession, in cases of madness or witchcraft, was certainly feasible
according to some physicians. H.W. Herwig, M.D. attributed the causes of madness mainly to
natural forces: humours, passions, and inflammation of the brain. However, there was always
room for the possibility of invisible “spirits in nature” to conjure insanity. Herwig did not hazard
a guess at how these spirits caused madness, but postulated their existence in The art of curing
sympathetically, or magnetically (1700). “It is very probable, then, that something supernatural is
the cause of madness,” he argued, “for it is impossible that by nature, a human body, for the most
part consisting of an icy substance, should endure the most frozen cold of the winter without
being frozen.”36 The belief that mad people could endure extreme exposure was common. As
such, Herwig’s suggestion was not outside the realm of possibility.37 Another physician, Doctor
John Cotta, urged victims to consult physicians to determine mad behavior’s origins. “The
possibilities of those which are here produced, beside the unsustained credit of the author, is
pertly confirmed by the Holy Scripture, where, in the lunatic the devil manifested himself by
actions, only proper and appropriate unto the power of a spirit.”38 Cotta had also read about a
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man who experienced demoniacal possession, “wherein he uttered and revealed things hidden,
and of profound science and revelation, not only above the pitch and power of natural capacity,
and the forgery of feigned ecstasy.” But Cotta warned that a physician was the only qualified
person to judge whether a person was suffering from a natural disease or demonic possession.
For, “In the time of their paroxysms or fits, some diseased persons have been seen to vomit
crooked irons, coals, brimstone, nails, needles, pins, lumps of lead, wax, hair, straw, and the like,
in such quantity, figure, fashion and proportion, as could never possibly pass down, or arise up
through the natural narrowness of the throat.”39 Indeed, his description of the symptoms of
demonic possession was so fantastical and violent, that having a physician on hand would have
been imperative.
Religious melancholy was brought about by a clash between God and the devil for the
victim’s soul inside his or her body. The battle was a common occurrence considered “spiritually
healthy,” for to break free from the devil’s snare was a Calvinist sign of predestined salvation
(more on this in Chapter 2). The experience was, nevertheless, terrifying, and melancholy’s
association with Satan was so strong it was frequently called the “Devil’s bath.” The salvation
process itself was often described in the brutal terms of a battle between God and the Devil for
the victim’s soul.40 George Gifford, a Church of England clergyman, described this struggle in
his Dialogue concerning witches and witchcrafts (1593). In a Socratic dialogue between the
characters Daniel and Samuel (who fears that he is bewitched), they reveal Satan’s role in
witchcraft, the existence of witches, and witches’ roles as vessels for the devil. This dialogue led
to a discussion between Daniel and M.B. (a schoolmaster) about demonic madness in nonwitches, for “there be two kinds of madness, or being out of their right mind, the one for matters
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of this world, the other for things spiritual and heavenly.” Daniel began by chastising M.B.’s
ignorance in not knowing that there were multiple origins of madness: “Doth not the holy apostle
say that because men receive not the love of the truth, God will send them strong delusion to
believe lies…and what is that, but that Satan shall seduce, elude, and bewitch their minds, to
make them believe that they worship and follow God, when they worship and follow him?” M.B.
ultimately conceded that the devil was able to “seduce and bewitch men’s minds.41
Adams also wrote about religious melancholy in detail, although he termed it “spiritual
madness.” In spiritual madness the heart became obsessed with religion and God’s existence.
Adams warned his flock about the devil’s attempts to sway souls to his side: “the devil aims at
the heart…the heart he desires, because he knows, God desires it: and his ambition still inclines,
intends his purposes and plots, to rob God of his delight.” The struggle between God and the
devil for the soul affected the victim’s understanding, will, and reason.42 The principal avenues
through which religious melancholy entered man was ignorance of the way of the Lord,
unfaithfulness to God, perverse affections, devotion to sensual pleasures, pride, lust, hypocrisy,
amorousness, usury, ambition, drunkenness, idleness, blasphemy, lying, nosiness, flattery,
ingratitude, anger, envy, contention, impatience, vainglory, and schism. Men and women
strengthened the devil in his battle against God with these sinful behaviors.
Burton emphasized this battle in terrifying language. “When false gods, or that God is
falsely worshipped,” he warned, it is “a miserable plague, a torture of the soul, a mere madness,
religiosa insania.” For Burton, religious melancholy fell under the purview of love melancholy
because it was the absence of love for God that brought about this distemper. Those who
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prioritized worldly possessions, glory, idolatry, and a false knowledge of God and his secrets
(particularly in prophets and sectaries), would find their soul in danger. These values indicated
that the soul was ripe for the devil’s taking. He attempted to seduce those whose love for God
was lacking through superstition, which he propagated in politicians, statesmen, priests, heretics,
blind guides, imposters, and pseudo-prophets. With weak consciences, the devil and his minions
easily won souls, “for the common people are as a flock of sheep, a rude illiterate rout, void
many times of common sense, a mere beast, bellua multorum capitum, will go wheresoever they
are led.”43 This internal battle materialized in outward signs of melancholy and madness:
ignorance, madness, despair, and folly.
Richard Gilpin, a nonconformist minister and physician, utilized the metaphor of war to
convey the turmoil within man that accompanied spiritual sadness in Demonologia Sacra. “Our
heart is the stage upon which this felicity (as to the application of it) is transacted: upon this little
spot of Earth, doth God and Satan draw up their several armies; here doth each of them show
their power and wisdom . . . here are skirmishes, battles, and stratagems managed; that man then
that will not concern himself in his inquiries, how the matter goes in his own heart.”44 These
conjure the visuals of war as God and Satan drew up armies, fought skirmishes, and carried out
battles, all within the soul of man. Under these conditions, it is no wonder a human would be
reduced to madness. Satan had several maneuvers to gain the upper hand in these battles,
detailed in Part II Chapter 8. “These spiritual sadnesses are troubles raised in the mind, relating
to the conscience, and spiritual state or condition of men,” warned Gilpin. Three indications of a
troubled conscience were doubt about salvation of one’s soul, doubt about regeneration, and
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immoral actions despite salvation. Another of Satan’s strategies was to find someone already
suffering from melancholy, for “melancholy affects both head and heart, it affords both fear and
sadness, and deformed, misshapen, delirious imaginations to work upon…the ideas of the brain
are monstrous appearances, reflected from opaque and dark spirits, so that Satan hath no more to
do, but to suggest the new matter of fear.”45 In this manner, religious melancholy could be
cyclical. Concerns about salvation caused melancholy, melancholy left one open to the wiles of
Satan, and Satan caused madness.
Religious melancholy did not require a battle for the soul; it could arise from a guilty
conscience. A guilty conscience in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a serious concern.
It weighed heavily on the minds of those who believed they were damned. For Calvinists, a
guilty conscience was even worse, for it was a signal that they were not among God’s Chosen.
Timothy Bright, a physician to St. Bartholomew’s Hospital and subsequently an Anglican priest,
readily accepted that humours could cause melancholy. In fact, 36 of the 41 chapters in A treatise
of melancholy (1586) concerned melancholy as arising from vapours and sanguine or choleric
humours. But there were other possibilities, as melancholy could be caused by “a certain fearful
disposition of the mind” arising from a conscience overtaken by the guilt of sin.46 Unlike natural
melancholy, which produced changes in physical appearance, supernatural melancholy involved
“the fancy overtaken with tasty fumes of melancholy, and the whole force of the spirit closed up
in the dungeon of melancholy darkness, imagine all dark, black and full of fear, their hearts are
either overtender and rare, & so easily admit the passion, or over-close of nature serve more
easily to imprison, the cheerful spirits the causes of comfort to the rest of the body.”47 Bright
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reinforced that this was the worst misery that could befall man, one in which God’s vengeance
and wrath continued into the afterlife.
A century later, physicians and ministers still identified the troubled conscience as a
cause for melancholy. The physician David Irish wrote that “melancholy Christians” suffering
from “a distressed conscience” agonized from a guilty soul (as opposed to overzealous passions,
from which his other mad patients suffered). “For Satan tempts us in the very utmost recesses of
our hearts; for he being a spirit, it is not to be doubted that he hath a spiritual access into our
spirits to trouble them, and disorder their operations by a spiritual or subtle conference.”48 Irish’s
Levamen Infirmi (1700) paralleled Richard Baxter’s contemporaneous The signs and causes of
melancholy (1716). “With some their melancholy being raised by crosses or distemper of the
body, or some other occasion, doth afterwards bring in trouble of conscience,” Baxter began.
“With others, trouble of mind, is their first trouble, which long hanging on them, at last doth
bring the body also into a melancholy habit.”49 Baxter was a Presbyterian minister ejected from
the Church of England after the 1662 Act of Uniformity and was well-versed in the spiritual
afflictions that caused melancholy madness. These included love of earthly pleasures over
submission to God and ignorance and uncertainties about sin, salvation and the salvation of
others.50 In these many examples, we see that doctors and clerics alike recognized the battle
between God and Satan, as well as a guilty conscience, as catalysts for the onset of religious
melancholy.
Divine madness was closely related to religious melancholy. This higher form of
madness may be traced back to Hebrew prophets and Greek philosophers who wrote that,
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“madness might represent another possible way of ‘seeing:’ Bacchic, erotic, creative, prophetic,
transformational.”51 With the spread of Christianity came the possibility of divine madness,
which was a conversion experience in which “the soul broke loose from the Augustinian prisonhouse of the flesh, winning transcendence through faith or grace.”52 Rather than punishment,
Jeremy Schmidt explains that Calvinist theology considered despair a favor bestowed by God as
a spiritual exercise.53 Calvinists believed in double predestination—that they were fated by God
to either be saved or damned. Far from a “free pass” to behave as they wanted (after all, they had
no control over their salvation), Calvinists anxiously searched for signs of God’s Grace. One of
these signs, in addition to the capacity for hard work and a moral life, was madness through
oneness with God.
Divine madness obtained a negative connotation through the term “enthusiasm,” adopted
during the English Civil War and Commonwealth. Antinomian faiths (such as the Ranters, Fifth
Monarchists, and Quakers), female prophets, and non-clerical preachers considered their
unconventional behavior to be an enhanced form of divine madness. They spoke in tongues,
screamed, and fell into trances to obtain holiness and revelation. However, Church of England
leaders and the elite, suspicious of the raptures of sectarians, began to denigrate their behavior
and labelled it “enthusiasm” in the religious politics of the Civil War.54 Enthusiasm represented
the fantasy or imagination of lunatic people seeking to justify their break from orthodoxy. This
shift from divine madness to enthusiasm will be more thoroughly examined in Chapter 5.
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These examples demonstrate the pervasiveness of supernatural and demoniacal
understandings of lunacy in England during the early seventeenth century. But supernatural and
natural understandings of madness were not mutually exclusive. Most people who were exposed
to natural or medical explanations of lunacy did not dismiss demonic possession; rather, they
accepted an amalgamation of supernatural and natural beliefs and treatments. Many, especially
of the lower class, continued to believe in supernatural powers throughout the eighteenth
century. Most of the authors I referenced, such as Adams, Boorde, and Burton, acknowledged
both natural and supernatural origins as plausible and determined that the origins of madness
could only be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, there were learned and elite people who
found supernatural and natural beliefs to be incompatible. Elites, physicians, Anglicans, and
herbalists began to assert that lunacy and madness were diseases of the mind and body, rather
than of the spirit. The waning of demoniacal lunacy and the growth of natural explanations for
madness during the early seventeenth century indicated the beginnings of disenchantment.

1.3 Conceptualizing the Body, Mind, and Soul in the Early Modern World
Although the many theories of mind that preceded the early modern period may seem
confusing—including the hydraulic, Augustinian, and humoral model—the seventeenth century
brought about more complex theories which both drew on ancient ideas and added to them. Early
modernists did not reach a consensus on the relationship between body, mind, and soul, or
whether the mind and soul were material or immaterial, organic or inorganic. They differed on
exact definitions of the humours, spirits (corporeal vapors of the soul, not spiritual), and nerves,
and what each of these did. Burton, for example, wrote that although most agreed with
Aristotle’s organic version of the soul, “many doubts arise about the essence, subject, seat,
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definition, and subordinate faculties of it.”55 However, a general trend during the seventeenth
century was physicians’ and scientists’ gradual move from a humoral theory of the body to a
neurological theory of the body.
Two phenomena with which early
modernists struggled was the relationship between
body and mind and whether the mind was material
or metaphysical. René Descartes’s (1596-1650)
theory of dualism (now known as “Cartesian
Dualism”) dismantled the ancient and medieval
concept of mind-body corporeality. However, they

Figure 1.1: “The Nervous System:
Diagram of the Brain.” From René
Descartes’s De Homine (French, 1662).
Drawing.

did interact in the pineal gland: the mind was responsible for intelligence and the body for senses
(Figure 1.1). Because the mind and body were only connected through God, “the implication of
Descartes’s ideas was that the mind was inherently rational,” though immaterial, “and that
insanity must therefore be somatic; in other words, originating in the body. This opened up the
treatment of madness to medical practitioners, while leaving the ‘immortal soul’ or the ‘irrational
soul’ untouched.”56 In his The Passions of the Soul in Three Books (1650), Descartes explained
how the body and soul (mind) were separate, for “I consider that we observe not anything which
more immediately agitates our soul, than the body joined to it.” The function of the soul or mind
was to produce “our thoughts,” including “actions of the Soul” and “passions,” while the body
was responsible for the senses and motion (both inward and outward). To understand all of this,
Descartes wrote, “it is necessary to know, that the soul is really joined to all the body, but it
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cannot properly be said to be in any of the parts thereof . . . because it is One, and in some sort
indivisible by reason of the disposition of the organs.”57
Descartes’s philosophy was compatible with Hippocratic-Galenic humoral theory, which
still dominated the medical field and located the origins of disease in the four humours of the
body and the six “non-natural” factors (including food and drink, environment, rest and
wakefulness, exercise, evacuation, and emotions). Each of the humours were associated with an
organ of the body and an element. Blood was warm and moist and associated with the heart and
air. Yellow bile (also referred to as “choler”) was warm and dry and associated with the liver and
fire. Black bile (also called “melancholy”) was cold and dry and associated with the spleen and
earth. The last humour, phlegm, was cold and moist and associated with the brain and water.
These four humours needed to be in balance so that one would remain healthy. Each person had
their own healthy balance or proportions of humours (complexions or temperaments) which
determined their personality and dispositions. A disproportionate mixture was called a
“distemper.” Humours also interacted with the non-natural factors in the prevention and
treatment of disease, thus Vivian Nutton opines Galenic theory “offered an apparently
convincing explanation that linked together both man and macrocosm.”58 Depending on the
medical practitioner or philosopher, the body might have a combination of spirits (natural, vital,
or animal) that were expressed from the blood as instruments of the soul.
The soul, and its interactions with the body and mind, became central in determining the
onset and treatment of disease in the seventeenth century. This theory followed the Hellenistic
Stoic position that “the emotions are the soul’s disease because they consist of judgements of
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good and evil not in accordance with reason.”59 Burton, who opened this chapter, was one of the
most prominent proponents of moral philosophical therapies. He recognized the potential for the
soul’s passions and appetites to bring about melancholy. “As the body works upon the mind,” he
explained, “by his bad humours, disturbing the spirits, sending gross fumes into the brain; and so
per consequens disturbing the soul, and all the faculties of it, with fear, sorrow &c. which are
ordinary symptoms of this disease.” Thus, the soul’s passions, including sorrow, fear, shame,
envy, hatred, anger, misery, covetousness, love of pleasure, and egoism could affect the mind
and in turn the body, the result of which was the symptoms of madness. The soul’s passions were
communicated to the imagination in the brain, which were then communicated to the heart
through spirits that “withal draws with it other humours to help it: so in pleasure concur great
store of purer spirits, in sadness much melancholy blood, in ire, choler . . .” resulting in an
imbalanced body.60 No man or woman was safe from this type of madness, for “just as the mob
threatened the breakdown of law and order, so madness would shatter the individual when
inflamed appetites, fanned by imagination, rebelled, usurped Reason’s office, and became ruling
passions.”61
Paracelsus (Swiss physician, alchemist, and astrologer, 1493-1541) and Johannes
Baptista van Helmont (Flemish chemist, physiologist and physician, 1579-1644) influenced a
more personal nosology of diseases—one which emphasized the individual patient—and a
movement of medicine away from the humoral model toward chemical and neurological
interpretations of the body. Paracelsus theorized that bodies were composed of the chemicals
mercury, sulfur, and salt, and diseases came from chemical impurities within the body. He based
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his work on observation and experiment, which led to “specific rather than symptomatic therapy”
and meant that “therapeutics rather than nosology was at stake.” In other words, Paracelsus
advocated a more individualized observation of patients driven by bodily chemical components.
Along similar lines, van Helmont wrote a chemical interpretation of the body, which combined
mysticism and the mind into one governing principle.62 This harkened back to hydraulic
interpretations of the body. Mind and body were connected, but through chemicals.
Paracelsus and van Helmont’s contributions would influence the three great British
physicians in the history of mental disorders during the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries: Thomas Sydenham (English, 1624-1689), Thomas Willis (English, 1621-1675), and
William Cullen (Scottish, 1710-1790). Each contributed to the medical field and the nosology of
mental disorders in unique ways. While Sydenham accepted that diseases and their treatment
were best understood through a balance of humours, he added a clinical element to diagnoses. In
other words, he believed in trying different treatments, observing the results, and deriving
nosology from those evaluations. Recognizing the need for experimentation in somatic diseases,
Sydenham built on the humoral model while allowing for generalized treatments that had been
successful on repeated attempts.
Willis and Cullen were largely responsible for budding neurological explanations for
madness and other diseases. The neurological approach fit well with the hydraulic model in that
the body and mind were directly connected through nerves. Willis’s An essay of the pathology of
the brain and nervous stock (1684) described motion, which was “to wit, spontaneous, and
merely natural, the instinct of this is derived from the cerebel[lum], but of that from the brain,
but both through the pipes of the nerves, as it were the channels, both to the muscles, and also to
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the fibers.”63 In his description of convulsive distempers, such as epilepsy, fevers, and hysteria,
Willis repeatedly localized the sick brain and the nerves as root causes (though he does mention
that imploring the help of God never hurt). Thus, Willis “recognized the difference between the
symptoms of gross brain disease and those of mental illness . . . for this reason he is often
credited with having first equated mind disease with brain disease.”64 Willis was the first to
provide a chart of the brain, and in so doing reinforced the brain as the seat or faculty of the
mind.
Though Cullen’s work is outside the timeframe of this project, it is important to
acknowledge his role in the gradual transition from humoral to neurological nosology of disease.
Building upon Willis and Sydenham, Cullen introduced the term “neurosis,” to describe “a
disease of the nervous system involving sensory motor alterations.” For Cullen, mental problems
reflected nervous impulses, which were too strong or weak”65 The publication First lines in the
practice of physic (1784) includes a section on neuroses, wherein Cullen defined insanity as a
type of delirium or false judgment that derived from both “an affection of the mind” and “a
certain state of our corporeal part.” He continued, “it may be observed, that the different state of
the motion of the blood in the vessels of the brain has some share in affecting the operations of
the intellect.”66
The examples above demonstrate that the relationship between mind, body, and soul
remained complex and uncertain during the early modern period. Philosophers, physicians, and
scientists did not come to a consensus about the nosology and genesis of madness, though they
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all built upon the work of their predecessors and, for the most part, continued to acknowledge
supernatural origins as conceivable.

1.4 Natural Origins
As the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries progressed, doctors, philosophers, and
Church of England hierarchy increasingly sought non-supernatural explanations for mania and
melancholy. While some preachers continued to believe that the devil caused natural and
supernatural diseases, prominent physicians argued that, excepting a few unusual symptoms,
possession could be dismissed as a feasible cause of insanity.67 This meant that in some cases,
supernatural and natural causes of mental disorder did not overlap—they were mutually
exclusive. Moreover, in some cases, madness was seen as wholly outside the supernatural realm.
In this section of the chapter I will examine those authors for whom madness was, in most cases,
a natural occurrence. I will focus on the three main types of madness as defined by physicians:
frenzy (an inflammation of the brain accompanied by fever), madness or mania (raging and fury
without fever), and melancholy (a delirium of sadness and fear without a fever).68
This section is divided by the origins of mental disorders: miscellaneous natural forces,
humoral imbalance, the soul or passions, and the mind. It is important to note that authors
sometimes used “mind” and “soul” interchangeably as they were more concerned with the locus
of the disease and the quickest treatment, though I will discern between the two where possible.
In examining writing wherein natural phenomena were thought to be the root cause of madness, I
demonstrate that disenchantment began earlier than 1660 in England. I also provide an overview
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of changing opinions about specific causes, as we move from non-possession, to humours and
bodily spirits (the soul), and towards the mind as the cause of mental disorder.
King James I and IV was personally motivated to differentiate between demoniacal
madness and natural diseases. Between 1590 and 1592, James, as King of Scotland, was
entangled in the North Berwick Witch Trials. During the trials, the supposed witches confessed
to cursing (soon-to-be) Queen Anne’s ship en route from Denmark, as well as the ship in which
James and Anne returned to England.69 After the trials, he wrote his book, Daemonologie (1597),
in which he distinguished between those who were possessed (identified by the mark of a witch)
and those with natural diseases. His book is laid out in the form of a dialogue. Philomathes asks,
“whereby shall these possessed folks be discerned from them that are troubled with a natural
frenazy or mania?” Epistemon responds: “I account the one of them to be the incredible strength
of the possessed creature…the next is the broadening up so far of the patient’s breast and belly,
with such an unnatural stirring and vehement agitation within them . . . The last is, the speaking
of sundry languages . . . and that with an uncouth and hollow voice.”70 Thus, although James
believed in witchcraft, he maintained that witchcraft and demonic possession were separate from
“natural” madness.
A notable skeptic of demonic lunacy was Reginald Scot, a writer who opposed French
philosopher Jean Bodin’s treatises on the devil’s possession in cases of witchcraft or madness.
Scot’s The Discovery of Witchcraft (1584) sought to disprove the existence of witchcraft. He also
questioned biblical descriptions of demonic possession. Scot speculated that the biblical Woman
of Canaan (Matthew) was not describing her daughter’s literal possession by the devil, but rather
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a disease. He argued that the phrase “vexed with a devil” was a colloquialism meant to describe
an illness, not actual possession.71 In outlining the everyday nature of references to the devil and
possession, Scot also noted the conflation of demonic possession and lunacy: “As touching those
that are said in the gospel to be possessed of spirits, it seems in many places that it is indifferent,
or all one, to say; he is possessed with a devil; or, he is lunatic of frantic; which disease in these
days is said to proceed of melancholy.”72 Scot had taken his argument a step further than King
James, and was skeptical that demonic possession was even possible. He serves as an early
example of the growing skepticism, or demystification, which would gradually influence most of
England.
A more secular framework was not limited to philosophers or physicians. Anglicans
sought to disassociate themselves from radical Protestants and Catholics by dismissing demonic
possession, demoniacal lunacy, and exorcisms.73 John Darrell (discussed above) is an apt
example of a Puritan preacher who claimed to disdain magic and miracles but performed
exorcisms to save victims of demonic possession. In response, Anglican preachers John Deacon
and John Walker wrote A Summary Answer to all the Material Points in Any of Master Darrell
His Books (1601) in the form of a dialogue. When Exorcistes stated that supernatural effects
imply supernatural causes, Orthodoxus vehemently disagreed, using lunacy as an example.

Those your supposed supernatural effects (namely rending, foaming, crying
aloud, leaving for dead, and so forth) they may, and do oftentimes arise from
sundry mere natural diseases: I mean from melancholy, from mania, from lunacy,
from frenzy, from the epilepsy, from the mother, from convulsion, from cramps,
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and such like. And therefore (from these so uncertain effects) you cannot certainly
conclude such certain essential possession of Devils.74
This is an indication that disagreements about demonic possession and demoniacal lunacy could
occur between nonconformists and members of the Church. “Paradoxically,” MacDonald
adroitly notes, “the Church of England became the champion of secular interpretations of mental
disorder.” The debate between Darrell, Deacon, and Walker demonstrates the skepticism that
was beginning to develop during the seventeenth century.75
This disbelief in supernatural madness was not limited to demonic possession. Bernard
cautioned against mistaking madness (a natural illness) for witchcraft. His A Guide to grand-jury
men (1627) is in direct contrast with that of Perkins, who two decades before had warned against
witches deliberately masquerading as mentally disordered. Though he knew witches existed,
Burton drew a line between supernatural witchcraft and natural diseases from which erratic
behavior could have originated. “As the body is metamorphosed into such strange shapes, so in
some diseases . . . is the mind transported into visions and apparitions: so as sometimes they will
complain of witches and devils.” As such, Bernard acknowledged the difficulty in discerning
between madness and witchcraft, and he advised that Jury-men in trials must use caution in
jumping to the conclusion that witchcraft was afoot. For example, a gentleman’s daughter in
Warwickshire was acting in a strange manner, including shaking, violent movement of her head,
staring and rolling her eyes, and falling into trances. While a jury might have decided she was
guilty of witchcraft, this gentleman’s daughter was treated by a physician: “These and other
particulars [of behavior] are mentioned,” Bernard began, “yet the causes natural, and natural
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means were used by him, and at length, by the benefit of the Baths she was cured.” In another
case, a poor boy of Northamptonshire raged violently. His parents determined that he was
bewitched and sent for a wise woman who could not cure him. Instead, a doctor found the cause
to be natural (worms) and he made a full recovery.76 Bernard exemplified the beginnings of
disenchantment. Supernatural causes of madness remained a possibility throughout the
seventeenth century, but natural causes were becoming more feasible. So much so, that grand
jury-men in trials were cautioned against quick verdicts of possession and witchcraft.
Though Boorde believed in demonic possession as a cause of madness, and indeed had
witnessed a woman in Rome possessed (see above), he defined “mania” as a natural disorder in a
different chapter of his book. “Mania is the Greek,” he explained. “In Latin it is named Insania,
or Furor, in English it is named a madness or woodness like a wild beast.” But mania did not
come from the Devil. It was derived from an imbalance of humours or corrupt blood in the head
or brain. Likewise, melancholy arose from the body or the soul; there was no mention of the
devil. He wrote that the melancholic disease either came from the “evil melancholy humuor,” a
stubborn heart, or excessive passion. He warned, “running too far in fantasies, or musing or
studying upon things his reason cannot comprehend, such persons at length will come and be
very natural fools.”77
Physicians who subscribed to the humoral system almost exclusively referenced natural
causes for frenzy, melancholy, and mania. Humours might cause the disease itself or cause
spirits to travel to the brain, which in turn might cause inflammation of the brain and then
madness. This is just one example. The following physicians identified a variety of routes that
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led from humours to madness, but they all have one commonality: a recognition of distempered
humours as the catalyst for madness.
In Walter Bruele’s encyclopedic Praxis Medicinae, or the physician’s practice (1632),
mania arose from a “hot distemper of the brain,” which in turn was caused by several possible
humoral inconsistencies in dried melancholy, over-burned yellow choler, or boiling blood.
Although “true frenzy is an inflammation of the brain . . . bringing with it a sharp fever, doting,
and alienation of the mind,” under the subsection “the causes,” Bruele lists “too much blood,”
“burnt choler,” and “dryness.”78 Similarly, while “some principal faculty of the brain is hurt” in a
melancholy state, it is the melancholy humour which caused madness. There were three kinds of
melancholy: an abundance of melancholy in the brain, an abundance of melancholy in the veins,
or hypochondriacal melancholy.79 In these scenarios, Bruele listed distemper or inflammation of
the brain as the final cause of frenzy, madness, and some cases of melancholy. However, the
origins of these problems were in the humours. A physician writing later in the century echoed
Bruele’s hypotheses. In his Sickman’s rare jewel (1674), B.A. wrote that melancholy—the
disorder—emerged when melancholy—the humour—“hath exceeded nature’s and its own
bounds, then by reason of putrefaction and inflammation, all things appear full of extreme fury
and madness.”80 Like Bruele, a disturbed brain was the result of an unsettled humour.
The eminent physician Nicholas Culpeper also wrote that melancholy, madness, and
frenzy derived from humours. Nathanial Brook published Culperer’s school of physic
posthumously in 1659, and a second edition in 1678. According to Culpeper, melancholy “is a
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kind of doting, without a fever arising from such malign and melancholic humours which disturb
the seat of the mind . . . and over-cloud the brain.” Hypochondriacal melancholy began in the
“over-boiling” of blood in the stomach or a distemper of the liver or spleen. Madness likewise
“doth chiefly arise from the distemper of the brain, from hot or melancholy humours, so much
sometimes dried up, as to turn to black choler; sometimes by yellow choler over-burnt, or the
boiling of blood.” Finally, frenzy was “an alienation of the mind with disquietness, without an
imposture of the brain, and it doth follow a fever caused by blood or choler.”81 Culpeper
reinforced the notion that the alienation of the mind began with a humoral imbalance.
Herwig and Irish supported the ancient theory that madness began in the humours, though
each physician found other natural causes as well (see below). Herwig and Irish briefly
mentioned supernatural origins in their work, but for the most part, they advocated a humoral
approach to disease. Irish asserted that, “the melancholy passion is a doting of reason,
occasioned by vain fear, procured by the prevalence of the melancholic humour.” This excess of
melancholic humour came about through poor diet, perturbation of the mind, the temperature of
the air, and the quality of living.82 Though Herwig noted the “part affected” in melancholy
madness was the brain, he cited several humours from which melancholy might have had its
origins: blood, choler, and the melancholy humour. As for madness, it “owes its original, either
from an intemperate heat of the brain without matter, or from matter extremely burnt, that is, hot
blood, yellow choler roasted, or not duly boiled, or putrid or burnt melancholy.”83 Additional
examples of humours as origins would become repetitious, but from the aforementioned
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examples, it may be observed that throughout the Stuart era, physicians agreed upon the
paramount role that the humoral system, a natural system, played in the onset of madness.
Physicians also referenced overactive passions within the soul as natural causes of
madness. Excessive passions, the imagination, and fantasies corrupted reason in the brain. One
of the strongest proponents of this theory was Burton, who found that the passions of the mind
and soul were the strongest cause of melancholy, “forasmuch as this malady is caused by
precedent imagination, and the appetite, to whom [corporal] spirits obey, are subject to those
principal parts, the brain must needs be primarily misaffected, as the fear of reason, and then the
heart, as the fear of affection.”84 In other words, certain temperaments, passions, or wills of the
soul could, through corporeal spirits, negatively affect the brain or heart. These passions included
sorrow, fear, shame, envy, hatred, ambition, covetousness, too much study, self-love, and love of
pleasure.
Doctor James Ferrand was well acquainted with love and its effect on madness when he
wrote Erotomania, or, a treatise discoursing of the essence, causes, symptoms, prognostics, and
cure of love (1645). The modern definition of erotomania is the obsessive, delusional belief of
being secretly loved by someone while denying all evidence to the contrary. In the ancient and
early modern periods, it meant the exact opposite: a disease caused by awareness of unrequited
love.85 In a chapter entitled “Whether in love-melancholy, the heart, be the seat of the disease, or
the brain,” Ferrand recognized that many people believed their heart was the afflicted organ in
unrequited love, and thus one might sway towards an Aristotelian interpretation of love
melancholy. Ultimately, he sided with physicians, who concluded that “fear is the perturbation or
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distemper of the mind, caused by the apprehension of some evil,” and “seeing that fear and
sadness are the effects of the imagination that is depraved, and the characters of love
melancholy; we may safely conclude, that it is caused, and hath its seat in the brain, as well as
the imagination.”86 Based on other physicians of the time, this occurred when the soul, finding
itself in a situation of unrequited love, would have passed Animal or Natural spirits through the
blood to the brain, thereby connecting body and soul and ultimately distempering the brain.
For Thomas Tryon, passions and desires of the soul were the greatest cause of madness.
Perhaps this is not surprising given that his specialty in physic was dreams (he had his first
mystic experience through dream). Madness began with passions and, in a series of steps, ended
with a wayward soul, wreaking havoc. Passions such as love, hate, grief, covetousness, and
despair stirred up the humours, which in turn destroyed the “inward senses of the soul.” As a
result, the soul lost its “distinguishing property:” in other words, its self-control. The soul
became “unbounded” and “unchained,” free from reason.87 In madness, “the soul is unclothed,
and all its fantasies and imaginations become as it were substantial onto them.” Mad people thus
had not substantially changed. Instead, their soul, having repressed their reason, unleashed their
savage natures and desires.88
Doctor Irish also identified wayward passions as the origin of extreme cases of madness.
Fear, love, ambition, covetousness, care, study, agony, fear, wrath, ambition, love, pride, care,
and shame all had the potential to overtake a person’s soul. The consequences were devastating:
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The soul is so busy within, that it does not attend to what is of less concern
without…sometimes they are as savage as wild beasts, their eyes look stern, big,
and attentive, and they are ever contriving some mischief, because the animal
spirits pass furiously through the brain, by reason of which they are sometimes so
mad as to reproach and curse themselves and others, at such times they ought to
be fettered.89
These examples demonstrate that humours were not the only natural causes of madness,
melancholy, and frenzy. One might be overcome by their own imagination, so much so that a
visceral response stirred up enough corporal elements to affect the brain. William Salmon
reinforced this in his 1707 publication Praxis Medica: “The part affected, is the brain, without all
doubt, because the principal functions of the soul are hurt, viz. imagination and judgment; and
the seat of the disease seems to be al the pores of the brain, because in them the animal spirits are
lodged.”90
At the turn of the eighteenth century, some physicians began to posit that the mind alone
could bring about madness, a concept closer to modern definitions of insanity. This concept is
found in the works of John Headrich and William Salmon, although only in a sentence here or
there. The paradigm began to shift from humours and spirits to the nervous system with Thomas
Willis, who, as stated above, is credited with equating mind disease with brain disease in his two
important works: An essay of the pathology of the brain and nervous stock (1681) and Two
discourses concerning the soul of brutes, which is that of the vital and sensitive of man (1683).
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Willis proposed that people have two souls,
one of which was corporeal: the mind. He also
localized nervous diseases in the brain through
dissection and experiments (see Figure 1.2).91 Upon
examining the brains of mad people postmortem
and discovering no pathological distempers, he
theorized that animal spirits/the mind, which were
previously thought of as vapors distilled in the
brain to control sense and motion, were actually

Figure 1.2: “A new anatomy of the human
brain.” The “nervous tracts” are shown under
“D.” Thomas Willis, Two discourses
concerning the soul of brutes (London, 1683),
44.

“conducting agents.”92 In other words, he differentiated between fluid animal spirits and solid
nerves that were conducted by animal spirits. Thus, the soul connected the body and mind
through the nervous system.93 As we have seen, physicians and scientists had posited for some
time that, despite different root causes (humours, the soul, the mind), the final step in the
causation of madness was distemper of the brain. Willis cut out the middle man, so to speak, in
his connection between nerves and animal spirits/the mind within the brain. In his description of
nerves, he showed convulsive motion to be “twofold, to wit, spontaneous, and merely natural,
the instinct of this is derived from the cerebellum; but of that from the brain, but both through the
pipes of the nerves, as it were the channels, both to the muscles, and also to the fibers.”94
Moreover, he theorized the madness began in the brain when the Animal Spirits became
distempered. The mad experienced animal spirits
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endued with a notable mobility or unquietness; which, for that reason, being
stretched form the brain on every side, both in its compass and in the nervous
system, and being from thence perpetually reflected, produce unbridled fantasies,
and almost never interrupted, and also great and perpetual inordinations, both of
the sensitive and loco-motive function.95
Willis’s complex theories were central to the conclusion that the mind had become central to the
origins of mental disorders.

1.5 Conclusion
Burton exemplified the typical mindset behind determining the origins of madness in
seventeenth-century England. Multiple causes were plausible, and he did not rule out any
particular possibilities. Still, the above analysis demonstrates a gradual movement toward
disenchantment during the Stuart era, one which was slow but steady. Physicians, those who
espoused Anglican theology, and (as we will see in Chapter 3) those involved in the legal
jurisdiction of the mad, slowly left behind the supernatural in favor of empirical evidence and
diagnoses.
This change did not happen as suddenly as historians have asserted. Puritan clergymen
still believed in supernatural causes of disease and disorder in the eighteenth century, though the
Civil War and Restoration certainly accelerated elite disenchantment. As Scull explicates, “The
place of madness in European civilization in the years before the dawn of the long eighteenth
century is thus a complex one. . . . insanity was still viewed in many quarters as a consequence of
supernatural forces.”96 One need only look at Irish’s Levamen Infirmi (1700) to see the continual
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threat of spiritual possession. The next chapter continues to question the teleology of
“disenchantment” from the other side of the coin: treatment of madness.
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CHAPTER 2: EXORCISMS, MEDICINE, AND RECIPES: THE
TREATMENT OF MADNESS WITHIN POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND
MEDICAL RIVALRY

What Homer our great grandfather did vomit,
We licking up, turn sucking poets from it:
Doctor, if this be my fate, when I spew,
That lapping curs rise, all lampooning you;
Your physic you must save, and past all hope,
With crocus metallorum buy a rope.
—James Carkesse, “To Mr. Doctor, on giving him a vomit” (1679)1
Historians of early modern English science, medicine, and gender are familiar with the
story of Mary Glover, the 14-year-old bewitched by Elizabeth Jackson in 1602. Glover
experienced fits, was irresponsive to pain, and showed signs of demonic possession. When
Jackson was accused of witchcraft and went to trial, the physician Edward Jorden testified that
Glover was not possessed; rather, she suffered from a natural disorder that he could not identify.
In his 1603 treatise A Brief Discourse of a Disease Called the Suffocation of the Mother, Jorden
clarified the origins of Glover’s illness: Suffocation of the Mother, which arose from the womb
and caused “perturbations of the mind. . . . For seeing we are not masters of our own affections,
we are like battered cities without walls, or ships tossed in the sea exposed to all manner of
assaults and dangers, even to the overthrow of our own bodies.”2 Nevertheless, the jury found
Jackson guilty. She was sentenced to imprisonment, although she seems to have escaped this
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through royal pardon. Glover continued to suffer until a group of Puritans performed an
exorcism. The demon was finally vanquished.3
On the one hand, Jorden’s diagnosis was a step toward disenchantment of medical
practitioners’ treatments, a move supported by the Church of England. This may have provided
reassurance for patients who appeared to be possessed, as they were probably not damned but
more exactly suffering from a natural disease.4 Hunter and Macalpine note that “the case is
historic because Jorden’s evidence is the first verbatim record of an English physician’s defense
of a witch and probably also was the first occasion on which a psychiatric specialist gave
evidence at a criminal trial.”5 On the other hand, Jorden had resurrected an ancient, genderspecific mental disorder that allowed physicians to place the womb at the center of women’s
mental disorders (see Chapter 4). He recommended natural treatment, including sitting up,
adhering to a restrictive diet, and avoiding sweet smells, although he conceded that prayer might
help. Jorden also opined that should a patient recover through the use of charms, amulets,
incense, or holy water, it was not due to their supernatural powers. Rather, recovery was due to
the patient’s renewed confidence or positive thinking. The methods behind Jorden’s treatment
appear to be supported by reason, experience, and a disbelief in the power of Papists “who are
ready to draw forth their wooden dagger” at any sign of distemper.6
However, the context of Jorden’s decision to whole-heartedly support natural treatment
was more complicated. That Glover was suffering from some type of madness was clear, but
why did Jorden decide that it was a madness arising within her body, a natural cause that
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required physical treatment rather than exorcism? Upon closer inspection, Michael MacDonald
pinpoints several events and political connections that explain Jorden’s decision in Witchcraft
and Hysteria in Elizabethan London: Edward Jorden and the Mary Glover Case (1991). The
memory of the arrest and trial of Puritan exorcist John Darrell (mentioned in the previous
chapter) and subsequent publications against him, including A Discovery of the Fraudulent
Practices of John Darrell (1599) still hung heavily in the air. Deacon was tried before the High
Commission, which included the Archbishop of Canterbury, John Whitgift, Bishop Richard
Bancroft, and two other anti-Puritans. Moreover, the Church of England, in dismissing exorcism
as magic and reminiscent of Catholicism, supported natural treatment of mental disorders.
Finally, Jorden did not write A Brief Discourse without prompting. He had been commissioned
by Bishop Bancroft after Glover’s dispossession (the same man who would later support James
I’s dismissal of Puritan demands at the 1604 Hampton Court Conference). Thus, immediate
political and religious contexts influenced Jorden’s diagnosis of mental disorders as requiring
natural treatment.7
In this chapter I seek to provide an overview of the treatments of mental disorders
available to early modern English men and women during the Stuart era. Simultaneously, I
explore the contexts in which decisions about treatment were made as exemplified by
MacDonald’s analysis of Jorden’s motivations. I argue that religious tensions between
Protestants and Catholics and Anglicans and radical Protestants, along with conflicts between
clergy and physicians, and among physicians themselves, provided the political, religious, and
economic context behind the treatment of madness advocated by divines, philosophers, and
physicians. These contexts were more influential than any medical or scientific “advances.” In
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addition, I continue my overarching argument from the previous chapter: medical practitioners’
disenchantment with the supernatural began much earlier than the 1660 Restoration.
At the dawn of the Stuart era, Bethlem Hospital was the only institution for the treatment
of insanity. Bethlem was founded in 1247 as the Priory of St. Bethlehem to support the crusades.
By the early sixteenth century, the hospital was beginning to specialize in the treatment of the
insane. Although Bethlem was an institutional option for treatment, it had less than 30 beds in
1600, and the number of beds had only increased to 100 by 1700. Private madhouses began to
spread during the late seventeenth century, but these were designed for elites who could afford
private care. Municipal asylums in major cities were not founded until the late eighteenth
century, and the foundation of public county lunatic hospitals was not compulsory until 1845.8
As a result, families of the lower classes who desired institutional care for their loved ones had
few options until the late eighteenth century.
Care most often took place in domestic settings, including families of origin, a family in
the parish (boarded out), infirmaries, private madhouse (often a person’s home), or in a
workhouse, poorhouse, or jail. The predominant trend throughout medieval and early modern
Europe was for mad people to remain in the parish, overseen by family, friends, neighbors,
clergy, charity volunteers, and local government officials.9 MacDonald explains that the Tudor
and Stuart government largely left the care of the mad to families as it was more economical,
instead preferring to help through the Court of Wards or parishes.10 The Court of Wards will be
discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter, so I focus on parish care here. Care through
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the parish which came in the form of donations, almsgiving, and most importantly the parish
Poor Laws.
The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 required each parish to be responsible for the care and
support of people “deserving” of welfare. This included young orphans, the elderly, and the
mentally or physically handicapped. The Poor Law consolidated earlier poor relief legislation
and mandated the Poor Rate: a tax set each year by parish authorities on the property of wealthy
inhabitants to provide such necessities as food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare. Under the Poor
Law, money raised by the Poor Rate went towards “outdoor relief.” Outdoor relief aided those in
the community who could not support themselves, almshouses, and the few patients in Bethlem
hospital (admittance to almshouses and Bethlem was voluntary—hence still under the umbrella
of “outdoor” relief). Money raised by the Poor Rate also went toward building workhouses and
providing the materials for those who worked there. The able-bodied poor were required to enter
workhouses to receive “indoor relief,” and the harsh work served as a deterrent from taking
advantage of the system.11 The Poor Law did not provide relief to the “idle poor” and vagrants
who were instead sent to Houses of Corrections. Pauper children were assigned to apprentices.
Because mad people mainly received outdoor relief, they were highly visible in the
community and were associated with a variety of stereotypes that were further cemented in
literature and art. The most common stereotype was the violent mad man or mad woman.
Without the capacity for reason, the insane were considered raging, wild beasts who rebelled
against social order, destroyed property, and often went without clothes. The stereotype of nudity
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reflected medical beliefs, as medical practitioners,
particularly asylum physicians, believed the insane were less
susceptible to harsh weather. Lack of clothing also mirrored
economic limitations, as parishes fell short in providing
clothing. The correlation between tattered clothing or nudity
and insanity resulted in “literary constructions,” that “helped
Figure 2.1: James McArdell, Madness,
1760. Reproduced by kind permission
of the Harvey Cushing/John Hay
Whitney Medical Historical Library.

to establish key signifiers of (un)dress as key, recognizable
ingredients of representational madness and its theatres”
according to Jonathan Andrews.12 Figure 2.1 for example,

highlights a woman, most likely in Bedlam or a private madhouse, covered only in a sheet. Other
stereotypes were ungovernable passions (e.g. laughing fits, mood swings) and distracted or lightheaded behavior, often manifested in speech without meaning or logic. Suicide was also linked
with madness.13

2.1 Contexts: Religious and Medical Conflicts
Conflict between religious divines had plagued the treatment of mental disorders and
other illnesses since the Reformation. The Reformation took magic or miracles (clergymen could
arrange miracles through their roles as intermediaries between God and people) out of religion,
(which was dependent upon God’s grace as He could choose to answer prayers).14 This of course
threatened the power of the Catholic Clergy, and they were motivated during the Catholic
Jonathan Andrews, “The (Un)dress of the Mad Poor in England, c. 1650-1850. Part I,” History of Psychiatry 18,
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Reformation to promote exorcisms. MacDonald notes that the Catholic Clergy were “especially
active as exorcists, staging spectacular dispossessions that dramatically confirmed the authority
of their church. . . . The propaganda element was very prominent in these rituals.”15 Most
protestant reformers objected to exorcism as treatment because it was not sanctioned in the
Bible. As a result, exorcism increasingly became a source of tension between the Church of
England’s hierarchy and Puritans, who supported exorcism, toward the end of Elizabeth’s reign.
Puritans continued to practice exorcisms in order to dispossess people and treat mad
behavior. MacDonald explains, “like all Protestants, the ‘Puritans’ eschewed the allegedly
‘magical’ forms of exorcism practiced by the Catholics in favor of prayer and fasting which,
according to Protestant sensibilities, was considered the only correct way of dealing with
demons.”16 But how could Puritans practice exorcism without tacitly sanctioning Catholic
magic? They found a loophole in the Scripture. After Jesus cast out the devil from the lunatic
boy in Mark 5:1-5:20, the apostles asked Jesus why they were unable to help the boy themselves.
Jesus replied, “This kind can come forth by nothing, but by prayer and fasting.” In other words,
Puritan clergymen separated themselves from Catholics but also adapted exorcism to Protestant
doctrine.
The Church of England did not approve of Puritan exorcisms. Demonic possession was
certainly possible, but the Church of England’s position was that the devil caused natural
disorders to be treated by natural means. Indeed, Anglicans sought to disassociate themselves
from radical Protestants and Catholics by dismissing demonic possession, demoniacal lunacy,
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and exorcisms.17 Paradoxically, argues Philip Almond, Anglican divines had become a “wedge
of secularism between papists and Puritans” and “the champion of secular interpretations of
mental disorder.”18 The tensions between Anglicans and Puritans only increased at the beginning
of King James I’s reign. The 1604 Hampton Court Conference between the King (supported by
Whitgift and Bancroft) and the Puritans resulted in the James’s dismissal of Puritan demands
with the famous line “No bishop, no King!” This reiterated the anti-Puritan, anti-exorcism stance
of both Church authorities and the government. MacDonald writes that “Anglican propaganda”
distinguished between demonism and medical thought, thereby encouraging contemporaries to
believe that demoniacs were mentally disordered (not deluded or acting).19 Therefore, we cannot
look at exorcism, or anti-exorcism treatments for mental illness without considering these
religious tensions. These conflicts continued throughout the Stuart era, peaking during the Civil
War. At that time, not only was exorcism denounced, but divine madness became a form of folly
(more on this in Chapter 5).
Though there was much debate surrounding the validity of exorcism and its biblical
sanctity, there was another type of religious therapy sanctioned by Reformed divines: spiritual
consolation and guidance. The Calvinist doctrine of double predestination demanded that people
consistently find evidence of God’s Grace in their lives.20 One of the ways this was achieved was
through a conversion experience, which often was precipitated by melancholy (recall religious
melancholy from the previous chapter). The “culture of despair,” a phrase coined by historian
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John Stachniewski, was “informed by a long theological and spiritual tradition going back to the
letters of Paul that stressed the need for sorrow for sin, even desperation over salvation, as
crucial in the turn away from reliance on the self towards the acceptance of God’s grace.” Those
seeking salvation could no longer rely on good works, and despite the terrifying experience of
religious melancholy, it was encouraged by ministers as part of conversion.21 Consequently,
treatment for mad behavior logically fell to the clergy. Furthermore, physicians often called upon
divines to supplement their physiological regiment. Theologians thus provided consolation and
cure of religious despair.
The second context vital to understanding madness during the Stuart era was the enduring
battle for monopoly over treatment among medical practitioners and between medical
practitioners and clergymen. Most physicians were willing to work alongside divines in curing
their patients and vice versa. This was, after all, a religious society in which disease was often
perceived as a sign from God or Satan. Still, medical doctors had to wage a three-front war
against folk medical practitioners, clergymen, and within the profession itself. They constantly
disparaged the work of lesser medical practitioners, such as witches performing curative white
magic, cunning men and women, and alchemists. To gain footing, physicians used Calvinist
theology to their advantage. Following Calvinist doctrine, they denied the ability of the Catholic
Church or priests to miraculously cure victims of insanity.22
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Paradoxically, physicians attributed their healing power to God in advertisements for
physic. One physician wrote that his remedies came about “under God,”23 while another wrote
that she was able to cure diseases particular to the
female sex “through God’s Assistance.”24 Before
describing all the patients Mrs. Mary Green had cured,
she was sure to mention that they were done “through
the Blessings of God.”25 One physician was so grateful
to work as a vessel for the Lord’s work, that he titled his
advertisement “Nothing Without God.”26 Clearly some
of these medical practitioners believed their work was a
role sanctioned by The Almighty. Still, these were
advertisements, and anyone selling their services could
Figure 2.2: The Infallible Mountebank, Or
Quack Doctor, 1620. Reproduced by kind
permission of the Harvey Cushing/John Hay
Whitney Medical Historical Library.

have no better endorsement than Our Lord and Savior.
Professional jealousies and disputes also arose

within the vocation itself, as academic physicians, empirics, and quack doctors vied for patients.
The “quack” or “fraud” doctor was a common archetype in early modern England (see Figures
2.2 and 2.3). The seventeenth century was a time of crisis and reform for licensed physicians, as
within and outside the profession critics lampooned their obsession with money, their
prioritization of education over experience, their monopoly over the medical profession, and
their general distaste for basic medicine. Historians have, for the most part, concentrated on the
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conflict within the medical profession over licensing, competition for patients, the difference
between city and provincial practitioners, and the division of labor or specialization.27
Patients were active consumers in a public medical market, and they, along with other
critics, were free to denounce physicians as quacks or lionize their efforts as doctors. The poet,
Nicholas Breton, for example, did not mince words when he described “an unworthy physician”
in his England’s Selected Characters (1643): “He is a plain kind of Mountebank, and a true
Quacksalver, a danger for the sick to deal withal, and a dizard in the world to walk withal.”28
Criticism within the profession could be even
more severe. Doctors with diplomas criticized
physicians either unlicensed or without
university training. They were referred to
disparagingly as “empirics” (so named because
they valued experience over logic or ancient
teachings, though in reality they could have had
extensive education). “A number of our folly
Quack-salvers, are so ignorant of this skill, that
they know not whether anatomy be a man or
woman, a horse or a cow,” wrote Francis
Herring, fellow of the College of Physicians.
“And yet it is as possible, for him to be a
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physician, that never knew or saw dissections, as for him to be a good carpenter, that never saw a
house, or a good mariner that never set eye on a ship in his Life.” Herring detailed what he
believed to be the three steps of an uneducated quack: first, to win over his patient, second, to
improve his reputation, and third, to tell tall tales of his miraculous power to cure even the direst
of ailments. The victims of these tricks were the ever-trusting, simpleminded patients who were
“unacquainted with these quaint devises.” 29
Physicians with university training who belonged to the College of Physicians did not
escape the accusation of “quackery” either. In A Character of a True Physician (1676), R.
Fletcher described collegiate physicians as swindlers, who, in partnering with apothecaries,
extorted the most money with the least amount of effort. According to Fletcher, apothecaries
prescribed more medicine at higher costs than was necessary, doled out counterfeit medicines,
and incorporated cheap rather than effective ingredients. In not making their own medicines,
Fletcher argued that university-trained physicians were the true quacks who were harming, rather
than helping, their patients. These doctors had more education than experience, and as a result
represented “the misery of our schools and academies, that the one teach barely words, and the
other bare notions. . . . Away then with all those foolish, though specious pretenses and
curiosities, by which a man is never the nearer any practical verity.” In perhaps the greatest insult
an Englishman could hurtle in a staunchly Protestant kingdom, Fletcher asked “do not you boast
and cry, we are the learned College, we have diplomas, and we have been dubbed doctors, we
have Galen and Hippocrates? Are you not as the Pope, to compel all Men to obedience to
you?”30 Clearly, the notion of quackery was up for debate. Even those with years of formal
education could not escape the accusation.
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University-trained physicians and empirics were not only the doctors charged with
malpractice. Anonymous pamphlets ridiculed the lowest form of medical practitioner: the
“pretender.” True pretenders did not receive any form of training, either in school, in an
apprenticeship, or in a guild. They were the worst sort of human being, one who tricked sick and
dying people into spending what little money they had on useless medicine and false
instructions. The author of The Quacks Academy; Or The Dunce’s Directory (1678) provided a
satirical “how-to” for quacks to trick their patients. “We have thought fit to unfold the whole
mystery; as ‘tis this day practiced with so much profit and applause,” he explained to the reader,
as though he hoped to instruct future pretenders. “Draw near then with attention, all you decayed
Ragamuffins of the town; you by whose dullness no mechanic mystery but scorns to be
mastered.”31 He ends the short pamphlet by teaching pretenders how to diagnose and prescribe
medicine. They must write two lists, one of common distempers, and the other of different
medicines. Then, they must roll a dice on each paper to determine which disease to assign and
which medicine to prescribe. The author of The Character of A Quack-Doctor (1676) was even
harsher in his criticism. He described the Quack-doctor as begotten “in an illegitimate
copulation, betwixt ignorance and impudence, an heterogeneous jumble of the dregs of
Galen...his brain-pan is stuffed with antimony and vitriol.”32
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Advertisements indicate how medical practitioners wished to be represented, or
perceived, by their patient consumers and the public in general. These advertisements reflected a
desire to be chosen over other doctors, and recognizable patterns emerge in reading these
advertisements. A license, if it existed, was mentioned first, followed by a list of what diseases
he or she was capable of curing, patient testimonials, the doctor’s location, and their ability to
cure even if the patient had previously been turned away or “given over” by another doctor.
Doctors were quick to comfort their readers in advertisements. As we have seen, a common
criticism of physicians’ malpractice included quacks or pretenders who took on patients knowing
that they would not be able to cure them. Thomas Saffold was aware of these problems when he
wrote of himself, “He doth very seldom or never fail to give to any person diseased a true
account of the nature of any disease afflicting any part afflicted, and if curable or not, and if not
curable he will not take them in hand.”33 Another advertisement read “He will not promise more
than he can perform, but will confirm in actions what he related in words. . . .Therefore come to
me for your own good, and lose not this Bill, lest you be deceived by those that pretend so much
and do so little.”34 Even patients who had been turned away because of complex illnesses were
guaranteed a cure. Mrs. Mary Green promised, “She never undertook any, but whom she hath
perfectly Cured; even those, who have been given over by their Doctor and surgeons.”35 Another
licensed physician assured that he would not be “taking any money till the Patient be perfectly
cured,” thereby acknowledging the common complaint that practitioners took money from
patients that they had hardly treated.
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Advertisements were written to create a clear divide between quacks and genuine
practitioners. One advertiser wrote that he had not planned to continue advertising his service,
and only did so “to oppose those late upstart pretenders, and prevent the ruin of such as labour
under this disaster.”36 A foreign physician pleaded in his advertisement, “though the world is
daily pestered by unskillful pretenders to physic, who infatuate the people with their printed
papers, wherein they pretend to perform matters beyond reason, as well as their own capacities;
yet it ought not to render the skillful and judicious unworthy of esteem, though they make
themselves known by printed bills, after the same matter.”37 It is evident that physicians were
aware of their tainted reputations.
Advertisements also demonstrated doctors’ understanding of what contemporaries hoped
a well-meaning physician would do. This type of physician, wrote an practitioner, “doth cure so
privately, and so secretly” and “desires nothing for her pains, till she hath perfected the cure.”38
Another wrote that he was so consumed with his patients’ welfare that he prided himself on “not
taking any money till the patient be perfectly cured,”39 while another promised that he would
perform a cure “for as small charge, with as great secrecies, and in as short a time, as can in
reason by any be expected.”40 Thus, doctors, both licensed and unlicensed, were adept at
acknowledging the accusations lodged at practitioners. They were also mindful of what their
public wanted to read in order to engender confidence in physicians’ abilities to cure.
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2.2 Supernatural Treatment: Exorcism and Religious Therapies
Exorcism was a controversial means of treating possession and madness. Because the
hierarchy of the Church of England and Crown disdained the magical implications of exorcism,
we do not have quantitative information on how often they occurred. Exorcism was the most
extreme curative effort and often the last resort. In his research, Philip Almond found over 100
references to exorcism between 1550 and 1700, though due to their controversial nature, they
were not advertised and the numbers were likely higher. What is certain, is that “the discourse of
possession was a common feature of the elite and ‘popular’ grammar of the supernatural in early
modern England” (see Figure 2.4, in which a devil leaves a possessed woman).41 Almond
explains that early modernists recognized three causes of possessed behavior: genuine
possession, fraud, or a natural illness.42 Richard Baddely’s The Boy of Bilson (1622), for
example, chastised priests for attempting to perform an exorcism and the boy for “counterfeiting
himself possessed of the devil.”43
In the case of Joan Drake, exorcism was
recognized as the proper course of treatment. The
gentlewoman was suffering from melancholy,
which Mr. Dod, a Puritan divine, determined was a
natural disease accompanied by diabolical
possession. Her experience was representative of
Figure 2.4: Frontispiece, The evil spirit cast-out
(1691).
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the therapies Puritan ministers used in religious melancholy, “the aim of which was not as much
to cure melancholy as to place the demonic utterances and beliefs of the melancholic in a
theological context that disarmed their despairing effect.”44 Drake’s problems began in the 1620s
when her jealousy over the devoutness of her neighbors turned into melancholy. Satan took
advantage of her weakened state and possessed her, driving her mad with nightmares and
temptations “to have driven her unto final despair.”45
Mr. Dod provided a variety of religious counseling and a Puritan form of exorcism to
cure Drake. Dod reminded Drake that it was impossible, according to Reformed theology, for the
Devil to know who God had predestined to salvation and who He had predestined to damnation.
The divine continued to refute the lies of the devil while addressing “many of the possible
ground of her fears that she is damned, convincing her that she had not sinned against the Holy
Ghost; that her alleged indisposition to godliness was no sign of damnation; that only the use of
the means—prayer, preaching communion—revealed one’s estate” and to depend on God.46
Drake sang hymns and heard sermons, and Dod attempted to eliminate her demons through
vigils and fasts, refraining from any type of exorcism that smacked of Catholicism. The patient
slowly recovered from her spiritual crisis, though she never recovered physically.
For Protestant divines who discouraged and disapproved of exorcism, treatment for
madness involved both spiritual and natural elements. Recall that Calvinists encouraged a
religious conversion experience, and as such religious melancholy was considered healthy.
Religious therapies included consolation by divines, repentance, and spiritual meditation.
Divines provided comfort “by assuring the patient that he was not damned, that the Gospel
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declared God’s promise of salvation for the repentant.”47 Victims were also told that they were
“participating in the work of salvation” through their despair.48 The physician Timothy Bright
offered spiritual consolation in A Treatise of Melancholy (1586). “I pray you,” he implored,
“consider God’s mercies of old, and the former experience of his favour, and those holy
testimonies of election which you have in times past made plentifully show of.” Bright
challenged his readers to question whether sufferers were truly facing God’s anger or if they
were facing the (less troublesome) feeling of temptation by Satan. Bright encouraged victims of
melancholy to face these temptations because in them there was hope through affliction and
conversion. “You have no cause in this sort to fear . . . but that these molestations and terrors,
which you now endure are temptations, rather for your farther good and profit, then grounded
resolutions.”49 In these ways, Bright provided spiritual counsel for the treatment of melancholy.
In the following five chapters, the doctor gave instructions for curing the physical aspects of
melancholy, including strict regiments of diet, drink, sleep, as well as bleeding and purging to
balance humours.
Dionys Fitzherbert provided a first-hand account of her mental and spiritual breakdown.
She was a lady-in-waiting at several aristocratic households in her twenties (c. 1600) when she
began to believe Satan had attacked her for her worldly pleasures. She envisioned a spiritual
battle for her soul (religious melancholy), which manifested itself in physical symptoms. She
became delirious, confused, disturbed, and was at times rendered speechless or blasphemed
uncontrollably. Once her physical ailments recovered but her delusions remained, her family sent
her to live with a physician (referred to in her writing as “Doctor C.”). In their home, the
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physician’s wife (“Mistress C.”) provided spiritual comfort and therapy while Doctor C. attended
to her symptoms through natural methods.
Fizherbert’s manuscript reveals a deeply troubled woman fearful of God’s punishment.
She accounted her ailments to the “vain pleasures my age was subject to” and sinful behavior.
This tormented her, and she described her mind as “fully possessed” with thoughts of her sins
and hypocrisy. She worried for God’s punishment of her soul, as well as the shame she felt
before her caretakers.50 Once in the doctor’s home, Fitzherbert found some relief through
interactions with Mistress C. Together they read the bible, prayed, and had Godly conversations.
Doctor C. simultaneously provided physical treatment. “They kept me somewhat dark, plying me
with physic,” but the doctor was praised for his work “in purging by his skillful potions those
pestiferous humours which came of so many deadly conceits, the least of which had been able to
kill a far stronger constitution.” Though her spiritual terrors continued, “they did bind my
hands,” and “had some to watch me day and night . . . but that did astonish me the more,
especially when Doctor C. ministered physic to me, much to my dislike, thinking it was all in
scorn of me.”51 The impression Fitzherbert leaves is one of deep confusion; while Doctor C.
treated her she believed she was being punished. Mistress C. provided comfort by reminding
Fitzherbert that their efforts were not meant to hurt her, but to help her. While both spiritual and
physical treatment were utilized, the physician kept to natural treatment, while Mistress C. took
on the traditional female role by providing spiritual comfort.
Richard Baxter, a Presbyterian minister ejected from the Church of England after the
Restoration, wrote several “directions” for friends of those suffering from religious afflictions in
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The Signs and Causes of Melancholy (published posthumously in 1716). His first direction in
ending the patient’s torments and reaching conversion was to focus on God rather than earthly
matters. Then, the victim was to be patient and embrace all trials and tribulations as part of
God’s plan. Melancholics were to love God above all else, and avoid feelings of fears and
doubts, for “God hath not put the joy or grief of our hearts in any other man’s power, but in our
own. It is we therefore who do ourselves the greatest mischief.”52 They would learn this, and the
importance of Heaven and God for contentment, through study of the Catechism and principles
of religion. The sadness that accompanied melancholy would be alleviated through recognition
that God had predestined all that will happen: “His will is still the same and unchangeable; and
therefore will not disquiet you by mutations. He knows the End at the Beginning.”53 For
Presbyterians such as Baxter, treatment still remained within the Church through spiritual
consolation.
Timothy Rogers believed that melancholy could not be treated without the aid of both
physician and divine. Rogers’s advice for those with melancholy was deeply personal, for the
nonconformist minister had suffered from the disease himself. In A Discourse Concerning
Trouble of Mind (1691), he wrote that melancholy could arise from excess black bile or a
troubled conscience (religious melancholy). Rogers warned that a minister, though helpful with
the soul, would overlook the body, while a physician would examine the body without
considering the soul. Therefore, he “would never have the physician’s counsel despised, nor the
labor of the minister neglected; because the soul and body dwelling together” required
therapeutics for both.54 Nevertheless, all remedies were to be undertaken “in the fear of God,” in
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order that the spiritual methods of cure be effective. In terms of religious therapy, this included
prayer, study of the Scripture, fasting, and spiritual counsel. Once a patient was endowed with
these religious therapies as a base, he or she could also be helped by compassionate, empathetic,
cautious, and upbeat friends.
These examples demonstrate that although exorcism was an option, the politics of the
Church’s stance against miraculous treatment meant that fasting, prayer, and spiritual
consolation were more common recommendations for religious melancholy. Exorcism was still
an option but rarely publicized. This had less to do with disbelief in Satan’s ability to possess
bodies and more to do with the Church of England’s politics. To exorcise was to sanction
Catholic doctrine, an identity associated Spain, the exile and execution of Protestants during
Queen Mary I’s reign, the Spanish Armada of 1588, and the Gunpowder Plot of 1605.

2.3 Natural Treatment: Humours, Chemicals, Natural History, and Moral Philosophy
Just as natural origins in the humors, soul, passions, and the mind were conceivable
throughout the Stuart era, so too were treatments. In this section, I describe four natural courses
of treatment, bearing in mind that medical practitioners usually recommended a combination of
these options: correction of humoral imbalance (bleeding, purging, vomits), natural history
(botany and anatomy), moral philosophy, and institutional treatment in a madhouse. While
exploring these various treatments, we must keep in mind the contexts in which they were
pursued: the Church of England’s disapproval of exorcism and competition among medical
practitioners.
Galen’s humoral model was still the dominant medical theory at the start of the Stuart
era. This was in line with the view of body and mind as integrated (though for those who
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subscribed to Cartesian Dualism, some dimensions of mental health were inorganic or
immaterial). The English approached medicine by trying to “understand and assist natural forces,
rather than trying to control or change them.” Most often the way to balance humours was
through clysters (which evacuated the bowels), blood-letting, and vomits. These were
“aggressive” methods that “depleted elements in the body held behind illness.”55 It was not
uncommon for Galenic theory to be recommended on its own or with other remedies.
The physician Walter Bruele offered a plethora of evacuants and prescriptions designed
to help those suffering from mania, frenzy, and melancholy in his Praxis Medicinae (1632).
Bruele began with a general regimen for victims of mania. It included strict regulations for the
temperature of air, diet, and drink.56 Following these instructions, Bruele provided many
directions on emptying blood to balance the humours using horseleeches, creating strengtheners,
and inducing sleep. Most of his writing explained where and how to properly let blood. If there
was hot blood, the Saphena vein should be opened first, then a vein in the shoulder, then in the
forehead. He also offered comfort and mendicants in various forms, including drink, potion, pill,
electuary, ointment, and bath. This is evidence not only of an early publication in which a doctor
offered solely natural treatment, but also that doctors offered many possible treatments in their
desire to monopolize the field. His prescriptions supported the growing interest in natural history
during the seventeenth century.57 The receipt for a clyster for melancholy, for instance, included
beets, mallows, violets, mercury, and hops to start.58

“Holistic and ‘Heroic’ Remedies,” podcast audio by Rab Houston, History of Psychiatry in Britain from 1500,
September 20, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/user-516743905.
56
Walter Bruele, Praxis Medicinae, Or, The Physician’s Practice (London, 1632), 103-104.
57
Harold J. Cook, “Natural History and Seventeenth-Century Dutch and English Medicine,” in The Task of Healing:
Medicine, Religion, and Gender in England and the Netherlands, 1450-1800, ed. Hilary Marland and Margaret Pelling
(Rotterdam: Erasmus Publishing, 1996), 253.
58
Bruele, Praxis Medicinae, 30.
55

96
Nicholas Culpeper’s therapeutic regimens for mad disorders were meant to balance the
humours but did not involve any vomits, clysters, or bloodletting. The physician and astrologer
counterbalanced the humoral qualities of each illness in order to reach the necessary equilibrium
of the body. In Culpeper’s School of Physic (published 1678, though died in 1654), melancholy,
a dry and cold humour, was treated with moisture. “The air where the patient resides must be of a
wholesome smell, moist and temperate,” he insisted, “his diet moist, but of good juice, easy of
digestion. Let him drink white wine, and exercise himself moderately.”59 Similarly, Culpeper
attributed madness to melancholy humours/black choler (dry and cold) or yellow choler (dry and
hot). Therefore, he prescribed moisture and liquids: “The air the person lives in must be
temperate, his diet liquid broths and moisteners of the body, his drink barley water, by no means
wine, except his disease came by fear, moderate exercise, more than usual sleep, strangers must
not see him.”60 He was an eclectic physician, whose book includes entire chapters on herbs,
chemicals, astrology, surgery, blood-letting, and diet.
Daniel Oxenbridge’s medical notes provide concrete examples of balancing humours
without the use of supernatural treatment. Oxenbridge’s General Observations and Prescriptions
in the Practice of Physic (1715) described a particular case of madness and the natural remedies
prescribed to an upper-class woman who required bleeding, vomiting, and medicine applied to
her head:
Mrs. Miller, aged 24, a Cloth-worker’s wife, was mad for two years, though she
took many remedies…After a common Glister, I bled her plentifully in the
cephalic Vein, on both arms, at the saphena in both feet, at both the salvatellas, in
the forehead, under the tongue, and by leeches to the hemorrhoid vein. I made her
drink much cider made fresh in the house, with apples and water…after the
general evacuation, once in three or four days, I either bled her or vomited her
strongly, or purged her…she would vomit 12 times, and purge two or three times
downward…After she was generally thus evacuated, I shaved off all the hair of
59
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her head, and used a stillicidium daily to her head of warm water, wherein the
herbs Rosemary, Sage, Lavender, Betony, &c. were boiled, and she keep cloths
wet in the same about her head…other opiates she used inwardly…as Laudanum
Paracelsi sometimes or lettuce boiled and sweetened with sugar.61
Notably, Oxenbridge treated physical symptoms with organic treatments. Both the “bleeding”
and “purging” were well within the norms of humoral healing. Additionally, his treatment
utilized rosemary along with various herbs and plants. While Oxenbridge utilized familiar
remedies, a complex and multipart treatment similar to that of Mrs. Miller was most likely
limited to the privileged classes. Oxenbridge described another woman, Goodwife Jackson, as a
woman of “burnt high-coloured sanguine complexion, black Hair,” and “12 Years since fell
mad.” Jackson’s station determined Oxenbridge’s approach to her treatment: “being poor, I gave
her of Glass of Antimony a Scruple in Beer, each other Morning for 14 Days . . . not omitting
Bleeding and Sleepers.”62 Despite the lower quality of treatment, Oxenbridge noted that the beer
and bleedings cured Jackson.
Oxenbridge treated his patients with a combined regimen of blood-letting, purges,
vomits, and natural science, a revived discipline that was becoming increasingly standard in the
treatment of illness. A doctor who embraced innovative methods of cure perhaps gained an edge
over other physicians. Harold J. Cook observes that in the seventeenth century there was a “new
appreciation for . . . describing the world, of trying to establish the facts of both natural events
and natural things, the facts in all their empirical detail,” which accordingly had “enormous
consequences for academic medicine and many other disciplines.” Francis Bacon was doubtless
the most influential proponent of natural history in England, but one of the prominent names in
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this field was a physician discussed in the last chapter, Thomas Willis. Willis was integral to the
discovery of the nervous system and the Sedleian professor of natural history at Oxford. Cook
observes that natural history was the “big science” of the period “in terms of the number of
people and amount of people devoted to it,” such as Willis. He concludes this based on the
number of botanical gardens, “collections of curiosities,” and anatomy theaters that cropped up
during this period in universities and among private people.63
The use of empiricism, with its stress on the tangible rather than theoretical, and on
observations and experiments in botany, anatomy, and medicine, did not sit well with universitytrained physicians. Natural history nevertheless grew within the context of competition with
physicians, even as the Crown, Church, and College of Physicians disdained any science learned
outside intellectual establishments. Consequently, proponents of natural history “had to rely on
mutual encouragement to sustain their work.”64 Nevertheless, these medical practitioners,
divines, and anatomists forged on, emphasizing the natural treatment of disease and mental
disorders.
Many medical treatises and homecare advice manuals relied on botanical concoctions for
natural treatment. William Langham, who identified himself as a “practitioner in physic,” wrote
The Garden of Health in 1597.65 His subtitle laid out his purpose in writing the book: to describe
the use of plants “in medicine for the health of man’s body, against diverse diseases and
infirmities.”66 Throughout the book, Langham listed various plants and their specific uses. He
recommended that users of Crowfoot “bind it with a red thread about the neck in the wane of the
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moon in the first part of or both for the falling sickness & lunacy.”67 Pellitorie or Magistrantia
were also useful for helping a victim of lunacy. Langham recommended, “for the palsy, choler,
grief of the stomach, woman’s grief, headache, ache of the sides, back and reins, the lunacy, and
all other sicknesses, drink three spoonful of the fine powder of it with mulse [boiled wine with
honey].”68 Readers were also instructed to combine the juice of the Pennyroyal plant with
vinegar, and insert the mixture into the nose “against the frenzy and lunacy.”69
Similarly, two early seventeenth-century anonymous tracts recommended wildling tree
bark and rosemary for victims of lunacy. A Closet for Ladies and Gentlewomen (1608)
prescribed the stalks of wildling trees “to heal children of the lunatic disease, which happens
unto them by reason of a worm with two heads that breeds in their bodies.”70 This was rather
unorthodox, as most people ascribed lunacy to the Devil, the humors, or the nervous system. The
unusual theory was accompanied by an unusual treatment. The recipe included stalks of a
wilding tree, roots of Gentian and Pyome, and mirth finely stamped into a powder. This powder
was then applied to the mouth of the child, through which the worm would emerge.71 Another
natural treatment for lunacy utilized rosemary. The writer(s) of the one-page broadsheet Use of
Rosemary in Diseases (1615) explained that rosemary, when mixed with wine, could cure many
distempers, including melancholy, lunacy, vertigo, and apoplexy, and “other infirmities that
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come to the head by reason of humidity and coldness.” 72 The use of rosemary and the reference
to “humidity and coldness” suggests the author(s) were familiar with Galen’s theory of humors.
Because fever often accompanied insanity, coldness was thought to rebalance the humours.
The use of natural treatments and plants continued throughout the first half of the
seventeenth century. The herbalist John Gerard’s Herbal or General History of Plants (1597)
was reprinted in 1633. Gerard wrote that “the flowers of Borage comforts the heart, purges
melancholy, and quiets the frantic or lunatic person.”73 John Parkinson, King Charles I’s
herbalist, recommended Plantains as useful against lunacy as they were considered “cold and
dry” against the humid symptom of lunacy. Parkinson suggested that the juice of a Plantain,
“mixed with the oil of Roses and the temples and forehead anointed herewith, eases the pains of
the head proceeding from heat, and helps frantic and lunatic persons very much.”74 While these
natural solutions to lunacy coexisted with supernatural treatments (exorcism, prayer, fasting),
they formed the foundations of disenchantment that was beginning to occur during the early
seventeenth century.
Homemade recipes and medicines were an indispensable component in the prevention
and treatment of different forms of madness. In the last twenty years, historians such as Margaret
Pelling, Jennifer Stine, Elaine Leong, Sara Pennell, Anne Stobart, and more recently Seth
LeJarq, have brought home remedies and recipes to the fore. Whereas domestic life was largely
ignored in past historiography as outside the “medical marketplace,” these historians have
demonstrated that the early modern home was integral to medicine and health.75 Whether recipes
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were copied from physicians’ published remedy books, such as William Langham’s The Garden
of Health (1597), or women and men created their own recipes and passed them from generation
to generation, one common theme in recent historiography has emerged: household medical
practices belong “within the medical economy and narratives of early modern health care.”76
Domestic recipes were the first option most households pursued when seeking to treat an
illness. In her study of Elizabeth Freke’s early eighteenth-century inventories, Leong found that
of the 70 episodes of sickness, the family only sought outside practitioners 21 times. This
suggests that “home-based medicine constituted the bulk of health care in this period” and elite
women (and sometimes men) spent “considerable time” in collecting recipes and making
medicines.77 These recipes were not just the first course of action, but rather a practical means to
avoid invasive medical procedures, particularly surgery.78 Recipes’ importance is indicated by
their passage from generation to generation, involvement of the whole household, and work
“across spatial, geographical, and temporal boundaries.”79 Recipe books could also be purchased
from reputable physicians (who recommended certain ingredients to benefit families in need) or
quacks (whose recipe books were glorified advertisements to sell their medicines).
There were three main benefits to treating mental disorders and other illnesses at home.
First, they were less expensive to produce over time. Second, the quality of medicine was
ensured. And third, their formula could be customized to the individual patient. The ingredients
were usually a combination of herbs, spices, sweeteners, and alcohol derived from ingredients in
the garden or purchased from London markets or grocers. They were made with a variety of
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techniques, such as distillation, boiling, stepping, and long-term storage. In terms of mental
illness, the herbs and spices most commonly utilized were rosemary and nutmeg. Freke had in
her possession “eliza sallutas,” a common “cure all” that treated, among many other ailments,
melancholy and Greensickness (a female-specific madness I detail in Chapter 4).80 What follows
is an overview of manuscript recipe books that span from the beginning of the Stuart era through
1700, all with recipes for mental disorders.
A 1606 book of medicines compiled by Mrs. Corlyon contained a recipe for “a special
drink for those that be given to melancholy and weeping.” Her recipe was comprised of claret
wine, sugar, rosemary flowers, and cinnamon. These ingredients were picked, boiled, skimmed,
and simmered in a complex recipe that was meant to be taken “with a little claret wine after
meat, and when you go to bed.” Her recipe for “a medicine or syrup to open the pipes to comfort
the heart and to expel the melancholy” was more complex, and reveals the many steps and
patience required to prepare a successful recipe:
Take a quart of honey, and put it into a wide-mouthed glass, add thereto so many
of the flowers of rosemary, as you can moisten therein, by stirring them well
together, then set it in the sun 2 or 3 days, and as the honey waxes thin with the
heat of the sun, so stuff it full with the flowers, this do so long, as there arises any
moisture to cover your flowers, and when your honey being thoroughly melted in
the sun in this sort, will contain no more flowers, then being very well stirred
together, set it in the sun to distill together, the space of four months, and it will
be like a conserve [preservative]. You must turn your glass oftentimes, that all
sides may take the sun alike. And when you have thus do then keep it for your
use. And when it is a quarter of a year old, then take thereof every morning, the
quantity of a walnut, and you shall find the operation thereof to be very
effectual.”81
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An anonymous seventeenth-century book of receipts (meaning “formula” in contemporary
vernacular) included a similar recipe for convulsive fits, excessive passions, and melancholy.
The author combined herbs, flowers, wine, sugar, and cherries. “Fits” were also a medical
disorder which could be linked to boughts of insanity.82 The recipe mixed bruised cherries, claret
wine, balm, rosemary, nutmegs, cinnamon, and rosewater, all of which was warmed and emptied
into a glass of “white sugar candy.”83 The recipe directed patients to take the medicine with the
syrup of clove gillyflowers or syrup of violets.
Some medicines were applied to the body with syrups or ales rather than taken orally.
Margaret Baker’s formula for frenzy, written around 1675, advised to first let blood from a vein
and then “shave the head and anoint it with the oil of roses or else wash the head with rose water
and vinegar.”84 Baker’s book of recipes is unique in that she included the causes of the diseases
she sought to medicate. Margaret Wentworth’s Receipt Book (ca. 1675-1694) likewise
prescribed a medicine for fits that was to anoint the head.85 Instead of rose water and vinegar,
Wentworth’s concoction included ground ivy (called “alehoof”), wine, and salad oil. The recipe
immediately following her medicine to cure fits, “to make an ordinary cake,” signifies the close
correlation of food and medicine in the early modern period.
Though many prescriptions for madness contained similar ingredients and complexity,
the ingredients could be unorthodox and the instructions brief. The Cookbook of Constance Hall
(1672) contained a simple procedure for curing convulsive fits: “Take rosemary stamp it strain it
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give it in a spoonful of beer before the fit or now.”86 The combination of ivy and ale was also a
simple solution for frenzy. A book of receipts which was given to me by several men for several
causes, griefs and diseases, contains a lengthy receipt that included some unusual, though not
unheard of, ingredients. For convulsive fits, the compiler listed the dried placenta of a male
child, a thimble of a dead man’s skull, rhubarb, and powder of brimstone and cork. 87 Placenta,
skull, and brimstone may seem like uncommon ingredients, but the author included the phrase
probetum est, which meant “it has been proved.” This was one of many “efficacy phrases” that
accompanied recipes, which, according to Stein LeJarq, assured the reader that the recipe had
been tested and that the results were positive.88
Though this is a small sampling, these manuscript recipe books reveal three important
aspects of domestic medicine.89 Boosted by natural science, treatments utilizing plants, herbs,
syrups, alcohol, and other organic ingredients were an acceptable and dependable means of
curing different types of madness. Second, despite disapproval from royal and academic
institutions, empiricism thrived not only among medical practitioners but also in the home.
Finally, natural treatment of fits, melancholy, frantic behavior, and frenzy were widely
established long before the supposed sea-change in beliefs about the supernatural after the Civil
War and Restoration.
While many different ingredients were utilized in the therapeutics of mania and
melancholy, Paracelsus’s proposal that bodies were made up of chemicals rather than humours
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also influenced physicians, divines, and botanists. Paracelsus identified three chemicals that
made up the body: mercury, sulfur, and salt. Thus, Geo. Hartman, a self-proclaimed “Phylo
Chemist” provided recipes for vomits, purges, and pills that utilized these three main chemicals
in The Family Physician (1696). His encyclopedic book described illnesses with many options
for recipes to be made at home. For instance, instructions to create a vomit for mania or madness
guided the manufacturer to “take Sulphur of antimony from eight grains to ten, cream of tartar
half a scruple; mix them by grinding them together, and make a powder to be taken in a spoonful
of broth, or panada, or it must be given craftily, and the person not knowing it, put it in a crust of
white bread to be taken in broth or milk: let
it be repeated once in four days.”90 Note
that Sulphur is the top ingredient. He also
provided recipes by Thomas Willis, Sir
Theodore Mayorn, and Sir K. Digby.
John Headrich combined the new
emphasis on chemicals with surgery (see
Figure 2.5 for a depiction of surgery for
madness). He vehemently argued that the
strongest treatments against madness were
chemicals poured into holes in the body or
chemicals that removed the flesh (both
“surgical cures,” though the first was for
Figure 2.5: Feeling: Cure of Folly, seventeenth century.
Reproduced by kind permission of the Harvey
Cushing/John Hay Whitney Medical Historical Library.
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Another option was the application of chemicals externally on the skin (a “physical” cure). The
chemist edited a book of medicines invented by his former employer, Dr. Richard Russel, and his
brother, Dr. William Russell, entitled Arcana Philosophica, Or, Chemical Secrets (1697).
Headrich wrote that a viable prescription for the cure of madness included a combination of salamoniac, aquasortis [Nitric Acid], and mercury. This chemical mixture produced a less invasive
surgical cure: it “takes away, and removes the skin only, that the flesh under it may be left bare.”
Headrich assured that “these operations are sufficient for taking off any skin from the flesh: and
the blood which flows out in this excoriation, doth also help much to diminish the madness.”
Headrich’s defensive tone throughout his book implies that he and other chemists were actively
fighting to prove their worth amongst medical practitioners disapproved of this relatively modern
course of treatment. In curing madness, Headrich insisted that neither diet nor exorcism were
legitimate remedies. According to him, the ancient cure did not work and exorcism was faked by
divines who used natural remedies but “then they glory they have cast out the Devil.”91 Chemists
also competed against pretenders, whose false chemistry, when it inevitably failed to cure,
tarnished the reputation of true chemists.
Thus far it seems that natural cures for madness included a combination of ingredients
and purging, vomiting, or bleeding, but these were not the only options. Natural treatment also
came in the form of moral philosophical therapy, which was a means to tame and control the
passions of the soul. It derived from the ancient Stoic position “that the emotions are the soul’s
diseases because they consist of judgements of good and evil not in accordance with reason.”
The solution was “the ideal of constantia through rational self-discipline” that resurfaced during
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the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.92 Medical practitioners who advocated moral philosophy
played the parts of moralist and physician, believing that “disorders of the mind” could “be
remedied through philosophical reflection and practice.” Because the soul and body interacted,
medicine was required for the physical, organic causes of melancholy, while moral philosophy
was necessary for the soul’s passions. As such, moral therapy provided “a context in which the
melancholy [and mania] was seen less as embodiments of incorrigible unreason than as people
struggling towards peace of mind, self-possession, and . . . healing.”93 For those who practiced
moral philosophy, managing the soul’s unyielding passions, whether they be love, jealousy,
anger, or vanity, was the key to taming mad disorders.
Physicians commonly combined moral philosophy with humoral balance. Philip
Barrough subscribed to the traditional Galenic method in The Method of Physic (1583). Because
melancholy was a dry and cold humour, patients were to use “wine that is white, thin, and not
very cold,” and avoid wine that is “thick and black.” Barrough also recommended the patient be
bled to rid the body of melancholic blood unless it had reached the brain, in which case the
patient needed a “moist diet of good juice” and bathing.94 In addition, he endorsed treatment that
would soothe the passions of the soul and promote peace of mind. He prescribed exercise,
reading, and walking in “places pleasant and green,” as well as sailing. Furthermore, patients
might enjoy “a bath of sweet water,” excess sleep, and “moderate carnal copulation.”95
Barrough’s suggestions are compatible with modern psychotherapy, though at this time they
would have been part of restoring balance to the mind and soul.
Schmidt, Melancholy and the Care of the Soul, 20, 30. Though moral philosophy may have been a form of “neostoicism,” contemporaries did not use this word and often kept religious therapies of the tormented soul and moral
therapies of the passionate soul separate (though there was certainly some overlap).
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Robert Burton utilized a combination of therapies to treat his patients in The Anatomy of
Melancholy (1624), including moral philosophy, bleeding and purging, and empiric medicine. Of
the roughly 144 pages dedicated to the “The Cure of Melancholy,” Burton spent no less than 86
of those pages on moral philosophical treatment designed to balance the emotions and passions
of the soul. He addressed many distressing situations that might bring about melancholy,
including a deformed body, poverty, servitude or imprisonment, strong emotions (such as grief,
envy, hate, ambition, and egotism), and abuse. He suggested proper diet and exercise, fresh air,
and staving off nightmares. In addition, he recommended talking with friends about grief,
enjoying music, and focusing on happiness through the help of “merry company.” Though the
rest of the partition describes treatment through physicians, medicine, purging, and surgery, it is
worth noting that he dedicated over half of this section’s content to natural methods that did not
involve physical alterations to the body.
Even those physicians who focused on anatomy, the nervous system in Thomas Willis’s
case, incorporated moral philosophy in their work. In Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of
Brutes (1683), Willis recognized the main symptoms of melancholy were idle talking, fear, and
sadness. As such, the first attempt at healing ought to be of the soul, for “the soul should be
withdrawn from all troublesome and restraining passion.”96 That meant approaching the patient
with “pleasant talk, or jesting, singing, music, pictures, dancing, hunting, fishing, and other
pleasant exercises,” along with traveling, changing surroundings, and planting gardens. These
changes in behavior and adjustment of the soul could, Willis explained, be all that was needed to
rid a patient of melancholy.
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The moral philosophical therapy of madness, however, was not always a simple matter of
willpower. Schmidt writes that “moralists viewed the task of philosophy as one of disengaging
the individual from patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior that seemed, as emotions often do,
to be involuntary, spontaneous, natural reactions, outside the effective jurisdiction of the will,”
and that is exactly what Willis sought to do in the case of mania.97 Within a “house convenient
for the purpose” (i.e. an almshouse, poorhouse, or madhouse), a mad man “may be in some
manner kept in, either by warnings, chiding, or punishments inflicted on him, to his duty, or his
behaviour, or manners.” Willis continued, “by this means, the corporeal soul being in some
measure depressed and restrained, is compelled to remit its pride and fierceness, and so
afterwards by degrees grows more mild, and returns in order.”98 Altering the inclinations of the
soul was considered an effective meanings of treating madness.
In rare instances, the mad were treated in an institution designed for their custody and
treatment. Throughout the seventeenth century, the only public hospital for the insane was
Bethlem Hospital, nicknamed Bedlam (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). For the privileged members of
society, private madhouses in domestic
settings slowly emerged after 1660 run by
clergymen, self-styled healers, and
entrepreneurs. There, patients received
therapies tailored to the individual patient
and how much they were willing to pay.
Figure 2.6: The Hospital of Bedlam. L’Hospital de Fou.
Thomas Bowles (British, 1712-1767). Reproduced by
kind permission of the Harvey Cushing/John Hay
Whitney Medical Historical Library.
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Private madhouses were few and far between
in the Stuart era, and only those with means
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were admitted. While private madhouses and the “trade in lunacy” (the phrase for those profiting
from the unfortunate circumstances of lunatics) proliferated in the eighteenth century, Bethlem
remained the foremost institutional recourse for families financially unable to care for their mad
relatives. It was not until 1845 that Parliament ordered the provision of public asylums
mandatory in every county.99
The history of Bethlem Hospital is fraught with
contradictions, and these are reflected in the historiography:
“what clearly emerges is that there are many sides to the
polemic surrounding the history of Bethlem. . . . While
Bethlem has served as a paradigm of historical immutability
in attitudes to and treatment of the insane, this monolithic
vision of the institution’s history is misleading.”100
Historians, such as the authors of The History of Bethlem,
attribute Bethlem’s negative reputation in the seventeenth
and early eighteenth century to records (visitors’
observations and the damning Privy Council commission of
Figure 2.7: Bedlam. From Jonathan
Swift’s A Tale of a Tub (1704).
Reproduced by kind permission of the
Harvey Cushing/John Hay Whitney
Medical Historical Library.

1631 that led to Keeper Helkiah Crooke’s dismissal) and the
historiographical teleology of nineteenth-century reformers

who tended to superimpose the deplorable findings of the 1815/1816 Parliamentary Madhouse
Committee over the entire history of the hospital’s existence.
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Perhaps the greatest contradiction
comes from the fact that Bethlem Hospital was
overwhelmingly a charitable organization, but it
was run by Governors who sought the social
cachet, material benefits, patronage, and
professional recognition that came with their
positions. Sources of income for patients
included the Elizabethan Poor Law,
contributions from the mayor, sheriffs, or
chamberlain, benefactors, almsgivers, and
Bethlem precinct rentals. Whether it was to

Figure 2.8: A Visit to Bedlam, 1794. Richard
Newton (British). Reproduced by kind permission
of the Harvey Cushing/John Hay Whitney Medical
Historical Library.

provide their patients with better conditions or unadulterated greed, the Governors of Bridewell
and Bethlem often resorted to raising money in ways that were hurtful to the mentally
disordered. One of the ways Governors raised money was by encouraging persons of quality to
visit the hospital (See Figure 2.9).
People visited Bedlam for religious reasons (to see the results of immorality), out of
curiosity, and, frequently, for entertainment. They were greeted by the intimidating “Brainless
Brothers” statutes, “Melancholy” and “Raving” (Figure 2.8). Travels in London (1710) presented
Bethlem as a fashionable place for foreigners to visit, and A Description of Bedlam (1722) was
subtitled An account of its present inhabitants, both male and female. . . . Taken from their own
mouths, and published for universal instruction and entertainment, a clear indication of the
intent behind the publication. Wealthy families visited as part of weekend entertainment until the
late eighteenth century. The contemporary moral philosopher Thomas Tryon acknowledged
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Bedlam as “a notable monument of charity” but begged the Governors to end unrestricted
visitations for the patients’ sakes. “First,” he explains, “ ‘tis a very indecent, inhumane thing to
make, as it were, a show of those unhappy objects . . . to the idle curiosity of every vain boy,
petulant wench, or drunken companion.” And second, visitors’ incessant questions caused calm
patients to fall into raving, cursing, and swearing at which point a vicious cycle emerged in
which the visitors’ laughter at the patients’ agitated behavior caused them to become more upset
and violent.101
Most of what we know about Stuart-era medical treatment at Bethlem Hospital comes to
us through the Keepership of Helkiah Crooke (1619-1633) and the subsequent Bethlem
Physicians: Othewell Meverall (1634-1648), Thomas Nurse (16481667), Thomas Allen (1667-1684), Edward Tyson (1684-1708), and
Richard Hale (1708-1728).102 Crooke was the last royal of Bedlam,
after which the Governors of Bedlam and Bridewell elected
physicians for the primary care of patients. Before Crooke’s dismissal
Figure 2.9: “Raving,” one
of the two “Brainless
Brothers” featured at the
entrance of Bedlam
Hospital. These stone
sculptures by Caius
Gabriel Cibber (1676) are
now on display in the
Bethlem Museum of the
Mind.
Museumofthemind.org/uk
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in 1633, patients were primarily “treated” through constraint, solitary
confinement, and beatings, though “ad hoc treatments with medicine
did occur.”103 Through a series of missteps, Crooke inadvertently
raised the concerns of the Privy Council, who, upon ordering two
Commissioners to examine Bedlam, found evidence of Crooke’s
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mismanagement in the form of inaccurate accounts, extorted fees from patients, and money from
gifts meant for patients.
After Crooke’s dismissal, succeeding physicians more or less continued with evacuative
treatment, balancing humours through bleeding, purging, and vomiting. However, there were
some innovations in treatment over the years. Nurse began a sub-committee to identify “idiots”
(natural fools) unfit to be kept at the hospital. Tyson appointed the first nurse at Bedlam,
established the Wardrobe Fund in the 1690s (which standardized clothing and bedding at fixed
prices to outfit patients), introduced cold and warm bathing, and began a relief fund for
discharged patients and their aftercare known as “Tyson’s Gift.” Hale established therapeutic
segregation—separating the incurables from those who could be treated—and promoted gentle
rehabilitation methods. Though conservative treatment was the order of the day in Bedlam,
physicians remained, for the most part, respectful in the care of their patients. Indeed, the authors
of The History of Bethlem argue that the “indiscriminate and violent” medical treatment at
Bethlem may be blamed on the Monroe Family, whose physicians controlled Bedlam from 1728
to the 1816 Parliamentary inquiry into Bedlam.104
Private madhouses began to emerge in the late seventeenth century, often in domestic
settings. They varied greatly from each other and from charity-run Bethlem. They could be
temporary or permanent, run by medical practitioners or clergymen, charitable or designed for
profit. Most were in and around London and gradually spread to provincial towns in the
eighteenth century. Houston notes, “therapies in private madhouses were tailored to the
individual sufferer, but beyond that the experience of care was dictated primarily by social status
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and depth of pocket.”105 It was incredibly rare for mad people to record how they felt during
psychotic episodes and throughout their recovery, but fortunately we have the autobiographical
account of George Trosse and the poetry of James Carkesse to provide insight into treatment in
private madhouses.
George Trosse’s story as he believed his madness derived from demonic possession, but
it was a physician who, through natural treatment, facilitated his patient’s recovery.106 The
nonconformist minister followed conventional Protestant norms in that he stressed his sins and
wickedness, experienced a conversion experience, and lived a life of Godliness after the
experience. However, his experience was unusual in that it took the form of three psychotic
episodes during the 1650s. During these episodes, Trosse suffered hallucinations, delirium, and
violence, lost the ability to control obscene language, was traumatized by fear, panic, and
despair, and repeatedly attempted to bite off his own tongue.107 Though Trosse suffered from
religious melancholy, his treatment took place in a private madhouse each time, and he found
that incarceration did help him.
Trosse’s friends forcefully entered him into a madhouse in Glastonbury in 1656 after
Trosse had locked himself inside his house. He grew more delusional by the day, but Trosse
nevertheless detailed his experience in The Life of the Reverend Mr. George Trosse (1714).
“From this persuasion, that I had been guilty of the sin against the Holy-Ghost,” he recalled, “I
was filled with grievous horror and anguish, with great anxiety and sinking despair.” He
described his experience as “full of horrors and of hell within,” and when his friends lifted him
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from his home he “was under the terrible apprehensions it was the devil that seized me.” He
believed he was suffering from a battle waged between the Devil and God (the religious
melancholy described in the last chapter). Trosse’s mental anguish was only alleviated by a
physician, who Trosse came to call his “Guardian.” The physician cured Trosse by restraining
him (to prevent suicide), maintaining a low diet, and practicing “hard keeping,” all of which
were natural remedies.108 George Trosse exemplifies the disenchantment of the seventeenth
century. Despite his ostensibly demonic symptoms, his friends deemed a private madhouse run
by a physician to be the best treatment.
The poetry of James Carkesse is invaluable for gaining an inside perspective into life at a
private madhouse (Finsbury) and Bethlem Hospital, both run by Thomas Allen at the time of
Carkesse’s confinement. After Samuel Pepys discharged him from the Navy Office for financial
corruption, Carkesse set off on a violent crusade against religious dissenters. As a result, he was
sent to Finsbury, and he maintained that his imprisonment was an attempt to suppress his
ambition: “On me forthwith they laid, with ill intent/Their poisoned fangs, and unto Finsbury
sent/Where dungeon, chains, and physic me did wait/My mad-supposed ambition to abate.”109
The poem that opened this chapter is an indication of his treatment at Bedlam, though he
depicted his horrifying experience in much greater detail in other poetries. He endured purges,
vomits, and bleedings despite their ineffectiveness and accused Allen of having more concern for
the opinion of the King and Court than of his patients. Carkesse also wrote satire from the
doctor’s perspective:
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Without either shirt, or clothes,
I lodged my merry mad youth;
For of kin we may well suppose,
The sober to naked-truth.
His diet was most of it milk,
To reduce him again to a child;
And butter as soft as silk,
To smooth the fierce and the wild.
My potions he turned into drenches,
For he freely would take never a jot;
But by Thomas and the wenches,
They were forced down his throat.
To feel his pulse, I never thought;
In a month I see him but once,
And how my mad physic has wrought,
If I know in the least I’m a dunce.110
In Carkesse’s words we have evidence of infantilization, neglect, and forced medication.
Whether this regimen was the norm we may never know, as the context of Carkesse’s
confinement and treatment is quite suspect. As it turns out, Samuel Pepys—the man who
considered Carkesse his rival and enemy at the Navy Office—was a Governor of Bethlem,
having been nominated by none other than Thomas Allen. Thus, Carkesse was most likely
confined longer than necessary and may have endured harsher treatment. It is no coincidence that
he was one of the only patients to ever have been discharged from Bethlem on his own
petition.111 In Carkesse’s case in particular, political connections mattered.
Dr. D. Irish’s private madhouse regimens were shaped by outside contexts as well,
namely his competition with other madhouses and university-trained doctors. In an
advertisement at the end of his small book, Levamen Infirmi, Or, Cordial Counsel to the Sick and
Diseased (1700), he wrote that he and his son would treat those with melancholy, madness, and
incurable lunacy. Accommodations for the melancholy, mad, and those oppressed with the sense
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of sin included comfortable beds, bedrooms, and being “carefully looked after.” All his patients
would be given “meat, and drink, with good attendance, and all necessaries far beyond what is
allowed at Bedlam, or any other place he has yet heard of and cheaper.”112 Thus, carefully
curated the type of treatment he believed would garner the most patients. Furthermore, he
ensured his readers that his work as a mad doctor was qualified, despite being an empiric with no
university training. “Believe me,” he asserted, “a greater insight is required to the making of a
physician, than what the best books in the world can furnish a man with. . . . He that is only book
learned, his skill at best is but skin deep.” Perhaps as a comfort to his patients, he also stated that
he was merely an “instrument” of God, “since it is not the physician, but God that cures.”113

2.4—Conclusion
I have attempted in this chapter to describe several different methods of treatment for
madness in Stuart-era England and the process by which disenchantment slowly and gradually
took place. I have done so by artificially separating supernatural and natural treatment for the
purposes of organization, though most medical practitioners continued to use both methods
either from the beginning or as a last resort (take the astrologer-physician Richard Napier, for
example).114 Though I have demonstrated that disenchantment began well before the 1660
Restoration, and that there was not a sea-change in attitudes toward natural treatment, we must
keep in mind that the corollary of this is that supernatural or curative measures for madness
remained a relevant aspect of illness and disease. Despite Edward Jorden’s insistence that Mary
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Glover suffered from hysteria, she was ultimately cured through dispossession.115 And while
John Deacon and John Walker wrote that the erratic behavior of John Darrell’s patients was due
to a mental disorder (as described in the previous chapter), Darrell and his followers continued to
exorcise victims of madness and publish tracts defending his actions. As late as 1675, Margaret
Baker described a type of madness in her recipe book “they which be in this madness be there
possessed of the devil, & be devilish persons & will do much harm & evil, worse than they
which be maniac . . . demoniac persons be possessed of some evil spirit.”116
Still, disenchantment had begun in the late sixteenth century and proceeded through the
seventeenth century. The distance between supernatural treatment and natural treatment through
moral philosophy and public and private institutions widened. I argue that, in addition to
Weberian and other theories of disenchantment, we must add the specific contexts of English
religion, politics, and business: Anglicans distanced themselves from any “magical” form of
treatment and medical practitioners competed among themselves and with clergymen. After all,
Jorden, Deacon, and Walker advocated natural treatment at the turn of the sixteenth century,
having been commissioned by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Bancroft.

2.5 Conclusion to Part I
It would be simple to address secularization as a neat box unwrapped by the hands of the
Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, both of which encouraged empiricism, the
scientific method, and an emphasis on reason. But while it may seem paradoxical, both
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movements worked within the Christian framework, for the development of science and
mechanical philosophy during the seventeenth century “readily accommodated demonic as well
as divine intervention in the world by claiming that both God and the Devil operated through the
processes of nature rather than outside them.”117 Indeed, one may enter a technologicallyadvanced, state-of-the-art hospital today and witness a priest giving the last rites to a patient.
Still, the Weberian disenchantment theory endures in its emphasis on marginalizing, but
not displacing, folk beliefs. As Peter Spierenburg explains in The Broken Spell, Weber’s theory
worked in two parts: first, “the marginalization of magical beliefs and explanations and the
evolution of the supernatural” allows for the dominance of a few world religions, and second, in
the “scientific-mathematical view of the world . . . religion eventually occupies a more marginal
position, a process we call secularization.” Secularization is further broken down in the social
and mental spheres: “in the social sphere it relates to a decrease in the power and influence of the
representatives of religion: church and clergy. In the mental sphere secularization concerns a
diminishing of the religious content of world view and ideology.”118 In the historiography of
secularization in England, historians have pointed to three major components, all of which
affected the epistemology of illness. These were the Protestant Reformation and decline of
magic, the Restoration and triumph of government and elite opinion, and the growth of optimism
and sympathy in the cure and attitude toward the insane. I described the Protestant Reformation’s
effect on disenchantment and secularization in the introduction to this chapter, so I will focus
here on the latter two points.
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If the Reformation brought about what Almond termed a “wedge of secularism” between
Catholics and Puritans, the Civil War and Restoration accelerated (though did not dramatically
alter) elite disapproval of eccentric and subversive religious behavior, including enthusiasm,
prophecy, and non-clerical preachers. “Religious therapies were politically dangerous and
magical remedies were slowly being discredited by a combination of factors,” explains
MacDonald. “Their association with political radicalism during the Interregnum, the advance of
natural science, and the growth of the size and respectability of the medical profession.”119
MacDonald reinforces this point in his article: “educated men and women followed the lead of
physicians and scientists largely because traditional religious and magical beliefs about insanity
had been discredited by political events, and not because new psychological theories and medical
treatments provided superior explanations and treatments for insanity.”120 Porter concurs, “in the
disabused atmosphere of post-Restoration England, leaders of elite opinion . . . converged to
discredit the ‘saints’ claims to divine illumination as mere credulity, superstition, and
enthusiasm.”121 We will see this effort to discredit radical religious and political groups during
the Civil War and Interregnum in the rhetoric of madness in Chapter 5.
Historians such as Porter, Scull, MacDonald, and Houston have noted a growing sense of
sympathy for the insane that preceded the nineteenth-century emphasis on moral therapy, a
cultural shift that contributed to secularization. This sympathy may be indicated by many factors,
three of which I will summarize. First, Bethlem Hospital, the model of treatment of the insane
before the growth of private madhouses, took measures to increase the comfort of their patients
in the last quarter of the eighteenth century (see above for improvements in treatment). After the
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Hospital moved from Bishopsgate to Moorfields (in the 1670s) to accommodate more patients,
the number of visitors eager to witness the spectacle of madness continued to grow, reaching its
peak in 1750. However, in 1770 unrestricted visits came to an end as tourists were now required
to provide tickets signed by a governor of the hospital. This was partially due to economics—the
hospital had become financially self-sufficient and did not rely on the contributions of visitors as
part of its income. But there was also elite concern—stemming from the growth of enlightened
sensibility—for the feelings and welfare of the mad consistently subject to voyeurs and lechers.
Lest these new sensibilities are overemphasized, the authors of The History of Bethlem warn, “if
the new men and women of feeling were more aware of the feelings and welfare of the mad,
there was a squeamishness at the heart of such reactions that threatened to shut madness more
firmly away.”122 Furthermore, the end of visiting may have had a detrimental effect on patients.
Sequestered away from family, loved ones, and the outside world, they may have suffered worse
treatment by staff behind closed doors.
An increase in sympathy for the mad was also evident in the Parish Poor Laws and
changing attitudes toward suicide. The Parish Poor Laws were designed to provide support for
the “deserving poor” which included the mentally handicapped. The Poor Laws were a move
toward correction of idle behavior and a departure from punishment as the primary means of
curtailing the vagrancy problem. The Poor Law only provided for people in their own parish, so
some paupers moved to other parishes where the Poor Rate was higher. However, the Poor
Relief Act (also known as the Settlement Act) of 1662 mandated that paupers be removed back
to their places of origin to receive poor relief rather than punishment in their new locations.123
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Along with sympathy towards mad paupers, changing attitudes toward suicide helped
bring about secularization. Postmortem trials against suicide victims determined whether a
person had committed self-murder (felones de se) or were not of sound mind (non compos
mentis). Tudor revolutions in government (whereby the King’s almoner could sue in the Court of
Star Chamber to recover the goods of suicide victims) coupled with the belief that Satan played a
large role in driving a person to suicide resulted in a conviction rate of 95% felones de se
between 1485 and 1660.124 Gradual opposition to the high number of convictions developed
during the seventeenth century as juries were reluctant to see suffering families further punished
by the removal of their property. Besides, medical experts insisted on the role of natural diseases
(such as melancholy) in bringing about suicide, philosophers defended people’s right to end their
own lives, and elites grew frustrated with the devil as an explanation for suicide (a theme
running throughout this chapter).125 These factors amounted to greater judgments of non compos
mentis. By the 1710s and 1720s, 90% of suicides were judged to be the result of madness. This
radical change in sentence rates formed a “tangible expression of the secularization of suicide, of
the opinion that self-destruction was of itself an act of insanity, an end more to be pitied than
scorned.”126 These sympathies led contemporaries to see the mad not as evil or demonic, but
victims of a debilitating illness.
Finally, John Locke and other philosophers and physicians began to view madness more
optimistically, not as a permanent disease or sinful punishment but as a disorder with the
potential to be cured. Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) was a major step
towards the secularization that followed disenchantment during the late-seventeenth and
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eighteenth centuries. Locke’s epistemological theory stated that the mind is a blank slate, or
tabula rasa, when people are born. Anything humans know is based on sensory perception, not
innate ideas. Because, by extension, madmen could not have been born mad (due to tabula rasa),
Locke argued:
they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning: but having joined
together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err, as
men do, that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their
imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deduction
from them…Hence it comes to pass, that a man, who is very sober, and of a right
understanding in all other things, may in one particular, be as frantic as any in
Bedlam…mad men put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions,
but argue and reason right from them.127
Locke thus posited that madmen did not lack reasoning, they just reasoned “wrongly,” which
implied that they could be taught the correct way to reason. In addition, Locke suggested that all
people are susceptible to madness, even those who are “of a right understanding in all other
things.”128
Thus, the Reformation, Restoration, and greater sympathy and optimism concerning
madness were part of the demystification and disenchantment of the mental world of
seventeenth-century elites. The growth of the Church of England’s desire for natural treatment of
madness and economic competition between physicians and medical practitioners and clergymen
were important contexts that affected the natural treatment of madness well before the midseventeenth century. In this part I have addressed madness in the microcosm—in the mind, body,
and soul. In the next part, I will examine the broader meanings of madness in the macrocosm: in
law, gender relations, and political culture.
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PART TWO: ORIGINS AND TREATMENT OF MADNESS
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INTRODUCTION

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide an overview of Stuart-era madness in the macrocosm. In
other words, I examine how madness was perceived in society rather than in the body. By
looking at madness and its meanings in the law, gender relations, and political culture, I hope to
contribute to a discursive analysis of madness’s evolving meaning and how it reflected
seventeenth-century English culture. More specifically, these chapters are designed to gain a
communal perspective of lunacy and idiocy, to interpret how developing notions of anatomy
reflected gender relations and sexed mad diseases, and to identify a language of madness within
political culture that drew upon medical notions of the disorder.
With the exception of sections of Chapter 4, Part II steps out of the bodies of mad people
and into legal procedures, gender prescriptions and stereotypes, and political tensions and crises.
By approaching madness through different avenues, I hope to demonstrate how its meaning
vastly differed depending upon context. Furthermore, I seek to establish madness as a valid lens
through which to gauge Stuart-era boundaries between “normal” and unacceptable behavior.
Finally, I seek to contribute to studies of Stuart legal procedures, finances, gender hierarchy,
prescriptive language, subversive political behavior, and madness as metaphor.
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CHAPTER 3: LEGALLY MAD:
LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PROPERTY, 1540-1660

The said George Compton in the said commission named is a lunatic and unable to
govern himself or his estate and that he was a lunatic the first day of November in
the year of our Lord God one thousand six hundred fifty and two. And that he
hath . . . continued in his said condition of lunacy without having Lucida Intervalla
by the visitation of God and not otherwise to the knowledge of the jurors aforesaid
but how long before the said first day of November the said George Compton
became a lunatic as aforesaid the said jurors know not.
—Inquisition of lunacy through writ de lunatico inquirendo for George Compton, 16541
The above quote describes George Compton, a gentleman from Caton who, through a
petition, warrant, examination, commission, and jury decision, had been legally declared a
lunatic because he was “unable to govern himself or his estate.” His lands, tenements, tenants,
chattels, and goods would have been placed under the guardianship or “committee” of someone
(most likely a family member) who would protect his property from decay until Compton had
become sane again. These arrangements were designed to protect lunatics, idiots, and their
property as part of the Crown’s responsibility.2 But the details of these arrangements and the
steps involved changed over the centuries. Previously under the purview of the Chancery,
information collected about minor wards, lunatics, and idiots, and their property and
guardianship was reorganized and streamlined in the sixteenth century. King Henry VIII created
the Court of Wards and Liveries in two acts predicated on the medieval feudal system. These
were the “The Court of Wards” in 1540 (32˚ Hen. VIII c. 46) and “An Act Concerning the Order
of Wards and Liveries” in 1542 (33˚ Hen. VIII c. 20).3 A century later, the House of Commons
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abolished the Court and tenures-in-chief (and by extension, wardships), and idiots and lunatics
were officially subsumed under the jurisdiction of the Chancery with the Restoration of King
Charles II in 1660.4
Historians gloss over the Interregnum, focusing on the Court’s abolishment in 1645/1646
and its final cessation in 1660 instead.5 In the few pages he devotes to lunatics and idiots, H.E.
Bell writes that after 1660, “idiots and lunatics were committed to the chancellor’s care . . . the
chancellor issued writs to inquire into insanity, and it was natural that he should be granted the
wider jurisdiction, formerly exercised by the Court.”6 Richard Neugebauer’s case studies, though
invaluable, precede the Interregnum, and because his dissertation is centered on the Court of
Wards and Liveries they stop in 1645.7 J.H. Baker describes the abolition of the Court’s
jurisdiction, along with the Courts of Star Chamber, High Commission, and conciliar courts in
1641. He ends his examination of the Court by detailing the abolition of military tenures in 1645
and the switch to English vernacular in 1650.8 Baker’s book is a broad overview of the English
legal system, and as such does not include much information on lunatics and idiots.
In this chapter, I argue that it is important to study the inquisitions of lunacy that occurred
during the Interregnum after the Court of Wards and Liveries’s jurisdiction was abolished. These
cases provide ground-up, communal definitions of lunacy that were more detailed than the
formulaic writing of the previous century. Though many of the inquisitions that followed a writ
de lunatico inquierndo or writ de idiota inquirendo were standard, case studies demonstrate that

“An Act taking away the Court of Wards and Liveries and tenures in capite and by knights’ service and purveyance,
and for settling a revenue upon his Majesty in lieu thereof,” in The Statutes of the Realm, ed. Alexander Luders, et al.
(London: Record Commission, 1810-1828), 5: 226.
5
To avoid repetition, “Court” refers to the Court of Wards and Liveries unless otherwise specified.
6
H.E. Bell, An Introduction to the History and Records of the Court of Wards and Liveries (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), 164.
7
Richard Neugebauer, “Mental Illness and Government Policy in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England”
(dissertation, Columbia University, 1976), 284.
8
J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), 213.
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some inquisitions included thorough descriptions of lunacy that surely informed jurors’
decisions. Madness was therefore defined in the informal testimonies of neighbors, families, and
friends, and in the formal practices of inquisitions. Legal sources provide the opportunity to
access localized definitions of madness that are not possible through medical treatises.
Furthermore, the quantitative evidence regarding the Court of Wards and Liveries’s revenue and
the number of inquisitions post mortem leading up to the Civil War and Interregnum reflect the
economic motivations behind legal definitions of lunacy and idiocy. Therefore, in studying the
legal standard for self-governance and property ownership, the economic and financial straits of
the early Stuarts come to light.
Richard Neugebauer’s work in the legal historiography of madness was the most
influential in the twentieth century. However, H.E. Bell’s An Introduction to the History and
Records of the Court of Wards and Liveries provided the first comprehensive overview of the
court. His monograph is a complete guide to the Court of Wards and Liveries from 1540 to 1645.
The most insightful chapters are Chapter 7, “The Agitation Against the Court,” and Chapter 8,
“The Final Days of the Court,” in which he posits the various reasons for the Court’s downfall
(detailed below). Idiots and lunatics were a minor concern of the Court relative to wards of
tenants-in-chief. As such, Bell dedicates a mere five and a half pages to the legal and proprietary
rights of lunatics and idiots.
Neugebauer challenges Bell and other histories focused on the royal jurisdiction of the
mentally disabled. He argues that these studies treated the experiences of lunatics and idiots in
the Court of Wards and Liveries (1540-1660) as a brief, teleological step toward the positive
improvements of the late-seventeenth-century Court of Chancery.9 In addition, he brings much
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needed attention to manuscript sources, in particular legal sources, in his revisionist dissertation
“Mental Illness and Government Policy in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England” (1976).
To focus on printed sources (medical and theological treatises) skews interpretations of early
modern madness toward demonology, an interpretation that Neugebauer finds is contradicted in
legal sources. This aligns with my argument in Part I of this dissertation, in which I seek to
demonstrate that medical tracts emphasized natural origins and treatment over demonology.
Neugebauer utilizes petitions and inquisitions of lunacy and idiocy to explain the process of
granting custody, the motives behind family and nonfamily members seeking custody, and the
evolution of the court. He concludes that this evolution reflected a “humane paternalism” and
sensitivity to the needs of families with mentally disordered relatives.10
Though this chapter is concerned with property, two scholars, Peter Rushton and Akihito
Suzuki, followed in Neugebauer’s footsteps in utilizing manuscript sources to reach the poor
lunatics and idiots who would not have appeared in Chancery or Court of Wards and Liveries
records. Paupers would have been treated at home, and many would have received aid through
the Parish Poor Law (detailed in Part I). As such, Rushton and Suzuki examine Quarter Sessions
Records. In his article, “Lunatics and Idiots: Mental Disability, The Community, and the Poor
Law in North-East England, 1600-1800” (1988), Rushton concludes that in general, overseers
and magistrates were genuinely concerned with cases of mental disability. Rushton also observes
that the treatment and care of idiots and lunatics was different. Idiots were considered safer and
thus could be taken care of at home, while lunatics were dangerous and more likely to be
institutionalized. Suzuki’s innovative use of Quarter Sessions Records reveals more about the
family and care of the mad in the community. For the most part the mad were looked after at

Neugebauer, “Mental Illness and Government,” 239. For details on this evolution see Chapter 7, “Innovations in
Procedure.”
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home, but who was the main caregiver? What was a typical routine? How did the parochial care
system work? These answers are detailed in his article, “Lunacy in Seventeenth- and EighteenthCentury England: Analysis of Quarter Sessions Records,” in two parts (1991), and he credits
Neugebauer for bringing manuscript sources in psychiatry to light.11
The postmodern work of Rab Houston brought the interactions between society and the
law to the forefront. Though his work centers for the most part on Scotland, his methodology has
universal application in examining psychiatry through a legal lens. He does not discriminate
when it comes to source material, incorporating manuscripts, civil court inquests, family papers,
poor relief documents, newspapers, official reports, and admissions to asylums in his monograph
Madness and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (2000). Furthermore, he recognizes the
benefits and drawbacks of relying on legal sources. One major drawback is hindsight bias, for
the sources reveal the process of defining mental incapacity only after determining that a person
was unwell. In addition, the tidy nature of legal records is an artificial reconstruction of the
complex processes in which these decisions were made. However, legal sources are useful for
uncovering contexts, particularly contemporaries’ testimonies that brought about a decision of
mental incapacity.12 Above all, Houston reminds the reader that we must be conscious of context
at all times, particularly when studying the topic of madness. Because it is “a quintessentially
social illness rather than a mere biological fact, it must be understood in social terms relevant to
the period in which a person lived.”13
This chapter is therefore an effort to distance the history of madness from the printed
sources that were indispensable in Part I. Instead, I draw upon petitions and warrants for lunacy
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and idiocy inquisitions, inquisitions post mortem, statutes, and letters to and from the Secretary
of State.14 Unfortunately, this means that there is less direct context for any given source. But the
advantage of reading manuscripts about legal processes that directly affected many men and
women outweighs this disadvantage. I examine the men and women whose behavior allegedly
necessitated an investigation into their states of mind, and in some cases, the behavior that led to
the investigation. Throughout this chapter, I keep Houston’s methodology in mind: that the law
cannot be understood without broad sociocultural contexts.

3.1 Legal Care of Lunatics, Idiots, and Wards before the Interregnum
Royal authority over lunatics and idiots originated in the thirteenth century in a document
known as Prerogativa Regis. This was written during the reign of King Edward I (r. 1272-1307),
most likely by a crown official, and it summarized all aspects of royal jurisdiction involving
land.15 Two of its sections deal with the Crown’s dual (often contradictory) role as protector and
benefactor of mentally disabled persons, a role that would be the source of tension throughout
the early Stuart era. Prerogativa Regis established two enduring concepts: that the King had a
right and responsibility to care for the lands and well-being of the mentally disabled and wards of
tenants-in-chief, and that lunatics and idiots would be legally classified as having two different
mental deficiencies, and consequently two different legal statuses.16 The Crown’s role as
protector and benefactor continued in the Court of Wards and Liveries.
Though Lunatics and Idiots composed an important, albeit small, part of the Court of
Wards and Liveries’s jurisdiction, its major source of revenue for the Crown came from wards
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(minors of tenants-in-chief of the King), widows of tenants-in-chief, and liveries (money owed to
the King in order for the heir of a deceased tenant-in-chief to gain his or her “relief:” freedom
from wardship and ownership of his or her father’s estate).17 The Court was primarily concerned
with tenants-in-chief of the King whose death resulted in revenue for the Crown. The wording of
the first founding statue of the Court is telling: “For as much as the King’s Highness hath been
heretofore and hereafter is like to be yearly answered of great rents, revenues, and profits . . . the
King’s Majesty his heirs and successors shall be better served in the obtaining or having of the
custody of the bodies of his Highness’s wards and their honors, manors, lands, tenements, and
hereditaments into his Grace’s custody and governance during the minority of their wards.”18
This is significant as it highlighted the economic factors behind wardship.
Wards came under the King’s “custody and governance” upon the death of a tenant-inchief, after which an inquisition post mortem was held. The attorney or receiver of the Court of
Wards and Liveries was informed of the death, most often by an heir of age who hoped to inherit
the land, or, in the case of minor heirs, someone who hoped to purchase the wardship (this could
be anyone—family, neighbors, or a complete stranger). The attorney or receiver then wrote a
warrant to the county’s escheator for the inquisition post mortem. The escheator, possibly
accompanied by the feodary (an executive officer of the Court of Ward and Liveries in each
county) requested the sheriff of the deceased’s county to create a jury. The jury was composed of
persons of social standing who could provide information on the date of death, name and age of
heir, the value of the manors, and the nature of feudal tenures and services due.19
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There were three possible outcomes of an inquisition post mortem. If the vassal had an
heir of age, the heir could “sue one’s livery,” paying his or her “relief:” a fee in exchange for the
Crown’s acknowledgment of the independence of the heir and his or her title and inherited
property. If the heir was a minor (under 21 for a male, under 14 for a female), then the heir
became a royal ward. The king or private purchaser of the ward had control over them (including
their marriage) and received all the revenues of the deceased’s estate, excepting one-third of
lands that were allocated to the widow in the form of a life interest or until she remarried.20 The
third possibility was that, in the absence of an heir, the deceased’s lands were escheated to the
king’s royal lands. Inquisitions post mortem for lunatics and idiots followed the same procedure.
In addition to responsibility for “the ward of all the lands of such as hold of him in chief
by knight’s service,” Prerogative Regis states that “the King shall have the custody of the lands
of natural fools [idiots], taking the profits of them without waste or destruction . . . and after the
death of such idiots he shall render [the lands] to the right heirs, so that such idiots shall not
aliene, nor their heirs shall be disinherited.” In other words, the King would collect the profits of
idiots’ lands until an heir came of age. This arrangement differed from that of lunatics, who did
not have to surrender any of the profits of their lands during their time of lunacy. Instead, the
King was responsible for ensuring that he, or someone who bought the wardship, maintained the
property and land without it going to waste. Once one returned to their lucid state, their land
would be returned to the now-sane person, without losing any profits to the King.21
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Lunatics and idiots fared better through the Court of Wards and Liveries than minor
wards, though their different legal statuses resulted in divergent fiscal situations.22 In the
founding act of the Court of Wards and Liveries, lunatics and idiots had their own section: the
Court would have “authority to survey, govern, and order all and singular idiots and natural fools
now being in the King’s hands or that hereafter shall come and be in the King’s hands.” The
manors, hereditaments, heirs, and successors, wives, and children, rents, and fees of a natural
fool were to “be in the king’s hands . . . by reason of his Grace’s prerogative royal.”23 The
Prerogativa Regis defined lunacy as an impermanent situation from which a victim might
recover. Idiocy, by contrast, was a perpetual mental illness, and as such, the King (or Queen)
stood to profit from their estates while protecting them from harm. Idiots or “natural fools” were
what we would today refer to as mentally disordered or deformed. Their condition had, by
definition, existed from birth or become permanent after an accident (brain damage, for
example). The disorder was often recognizable by physical appearance, which might be
demarcated by deformities, enlarged features, an oddly sized head, or a vacant expression.24
Natural fools were mentally disabled from birth and thus not able to be cured in an institution.
By contrast, lunacy was an impermanent condition that might be interrupted by lucid intervals.
Lunatics were likely to recover from their mad conditions, for if one had the ability to reason
before, it could be regained. John Locke likened the mind of an idiot to that of a child whose
mental deficiency could not improve through education.25 On the difference “between idiots and
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mad men,” Locke wrote, “that mad men put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong
propositions, but argue and reason right from them: but idiots make very few or no propositions,
and reason scarce at all.” Locke attributed idiots’ inability to make propositions or reason to their
incapacity to perceive, retain, or think about ideas.26
The difference in medico-legal definitions of idiocy and lunacy resulted in different
guardianships. An idiot, like minor wards, lost the revenue of their estates (excepting the cost of
their care) to the Crown or whomever purchased their guardianship, though their heirs could one
day inherit it. Furthermore, “the chamber accounts, wards office books and other sources, record
purchase prices for idiots and rental agreements. These documents also indicate that lunatics
passed from the Crown into private hands, although there was no sale price for custody of their
bodies or rent set on their lands.”27 Lunatics, as stated in the Prerogative Regis, might regain
their senses or reason, and as such, did not lose the revenues of their estates. Rather, an assigned
person(s) managed them. In practice, however, they could also exploit a lunatic’s situation
through ruin of estate or reputation. The motivations for becoming the guardian of an idiot or
lunatic varied, from taking care of a family member and insuring that their lands did not go to
ruin, to a stranger taking advantage and gaining as much wealth as he or she could.
For this reason, inquisitions of lunacy and idiocy were crucial. The procedures ran
parallel to inquisitions post. First, a petitioner presented a formal petition to the Master of the
Court of Wards and Liveries to gain a greater sense of security that they would “win” (for lack of
a better word) the custody of a mentally disturbed person. It was not unusual for more than one
party to vie for guardianship of the same person for political or financial purposes. Cordell
Annesley, for instance, was concerned that her elderly father would be deemed a lunatic by
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petition of Sir John Willgosse, who was most likely a political adversary. She therefore asked
Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury (the Master of the Court in 1603) that if her father be found
lunatic, Sir James Croft be assigned guardian. Croft would have Annesley’s father’s best
interests at heart.28 John Reeve similarly wrote to Salisbury in 1607 for the examination of
Richard Badley, requesting that if idiocy were found, Reeve may have custody.29 Sometime
between 1611 and 1618 John Flashman wrote to Salisbury asking that he may regain custody of
his kinsman William Rogers, an idiot whose property had been unlawfully sold by Rogers’s
stepmother Johan Rogers.30 George and Henry Bray, seeking to help their lunatic friend Henry
Williams, “reduce him to his former temperature,” and protect his estate, were successful in
garnering a commission of lunacy in 1629 from Sir Robert Naunton in which they would
compete for custody.31 Other petitions were more formulaic, and simply requested an inquisition.
Aurelian Townshend’s was just that, but sent directly to the King as he was a “well-placed
petitioner.”32 Townshend wrote that Thomas Ivatt’s widow was lunatic, and he hoped to gain
custody of her for the benefit of her estate. Townshend also requested that His Majesty signify
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his approval of the proposal with his signature. The King granted the petition, as is signified by
the Earl of the Holland at the bottom of the manuscript letter.33
Next, the Master of the Court of Wards and Liveries had three tasks. First, order a
warrant for a writ or commission of inquisition to take place. Second, deposit a copy of the
petition and order for warrant in the entry book of petitions. And third, request a court order to be
drawn up designating the county in which the inquisition would take place. The court attorney
then wrote a warrant for a writ (led by an escheator) or a commission (led by a feodary) for the
inquisition. The Chancery, upon reception of the warrant, drew up the actual writ or commission.
From there, the petitioner himself or herself had to deliver the official writ or commission to the
escheator or feodary. This requirement was in place to avoid petitioners reneging on the original
petitions.34
With a writ of inquisition, the escheator gave notice to the feodary (representative from
the Court of Wards and Liveries in the designated county) but examined the mentally disabled on
his own. He then arranged for the county sheriff to impanel a jury, summoned the parties
involved, and guided the jury to their verdict. This panel of jurists was chosen from the
community and composed of twelve men (from the county and of good repute, owning land
worth at least 40s a year) who made the final decision. In addition, the feodary often conducted
or supervised the inquisition. The commission of people (around five men) headed by the
feodary conducted a thorough investigation, the evidence of which would help the jury come to a
verdict. This evidence included testimony of witnesses, family, and friends from the community
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who could attest to the behavior of the examinee.35 If the inquisition was positive—the person in
question was declared a lunatic or idiot—a guardian or committee was chosen by the Court of
Wards and Liveries. Objections could be made to the final decision, but they were costly and
rarely occurred.36
This lengthy procedure ensured that records of inquisitions contained contemporary, local
opinion of abnormal behavior. In addition, inquisitions represented a unique combination of local
and state-led jurisdiction. Whether the escheator, feodary, or both led the inquisition, the jury of
twelve men made the final decision. This process remained relatively unchanged during the 105
years of the Court’s existence, as it garnered revenue for both the Crown and guardians of idiots.
Each step in the process from petition to guardianship cost the petitioner money, money that the
Court accepted in its ever-growing purse.
Once granted custody, guardians garnered revenue from idiots’ lands. Just as the
Prerogativa Regis had “provided the idiot with the necessities of life and protected his estates
from ruin,” but “was entitled to the custody of the body and the revenues of the estate,” so too
did guardians of an idiot. Even before the Court of Wards and Liveries existed, family, friends,
and strangers were able to purchase the fiscal rights to idiots just as they could with wards.
Moreover, the anecdotes describing lunatic and idiot behavior present in the records of the
Interregnum is demonstrative of the power locals had to determine mental competency.
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3.2 The Interregnum: Clues to Legal Definitions of Madness
Parliament abolished many of the King’s prerogative courts in 1641 as England stood at
the precipice of civil war. These included the court of Star Chamber, the Council of the North,
the Court of High Commission, and the Conciliar Courts (Court of Requests, regional conciliar
and equity courts, and the Courts of Admiral and Marshall).37 In 1645/6, the Court of Wards and
Liveries followed suit. Minors—now orphans instead of wards—and the determination of their
guardians was moved to the Chancery following Parliament’s “Ordinance for removing the
Court of Wards.”38 Idiots and lunatics were now under the Lord Chancellor’s care (as they had
been before 1540). Although the Chancery was a court of equity and technically a prerogative
court, it “survived” the purge of prerogative courts as “equitable relief was necessary,” there
were “rapidly increasing property interests whose protection rested solely in Chancery,” and “if
the Chancery were abolished, indescribable confusion would result, for the common law courts
showed no inclination to take over the law of trusts.”39 Still, there were many debates within
Parliament about whether the Chancery should remain.
Despite their move from the Court of Wards and Liveries to the Chancery, historians can
still study the criteria for legally determining whether someone was a lunatic or idiot through the
inquisitions of the Interregnum. Before the Interregnum, writs de idiota inquirendo divulged
some of the informal measures used to establish idiocy in an examination. These included, for
example, whether the person in question knew how many days were in a week, his or her
spouse’s name, how to count money, their age and name, and perhaps literacy. However,
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Neugebauer found that most inquisitions did not provide details on questions posed and
answered. All that was required in final reports was the verdict. This may be because idiocy was
a more common verdict in the early days of the Court (as it provided greater revenue for the
Crown), because it was difficult to define lunacy, or because the manuscripts have not yet been
found. Regardless, this means, “we remain very much in the dark regarding exact official criteria
for making a ‘differential diagnosis.’”40 The following case studies from the Interregnum help to
illuminate some of this darkness and provide ground-up insight into local conceptions of
madness.
Warrants for inquisitions of lunacy or idiocy followed the same basic language nearly
verbatim. They were addressed to commissioners who were described as “good and lawful men
of the city of London” and assigned to determine whether a person “be a lunatic or hath Lucida
Intervalla so that he is sufficient for the government of himself, his manors, messuages goods
and chattels, and of his lands and tenements or not.” The men were to determine details about the
mentally disabled person’s lands, including whether any of the lands were aliened, what lands
and goods remained to him or her, and if not to him or her then to whom, who the listed heir was,
and how old the heir was. The petition ended by stating that the commissioners were to meet at
the assigned place and time of the examination and provide the Chancery with their report. The
petition ended with the date and name of the county’s escheator (Thomas Shadwell).41 The only
major change to this format occurred in 1653, when the warrants, previously from “The keepers
of the liberty of England by authority of Parliament” were now from “Oliver Lord Protector of
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England Scotland Ireland and the dominions thereto belonging to jurymen.”42 This change surely
reflected Oliver Cromwell’s declaration that he was Lord Protector in 1653.
Inquisitions began with the place and date of the inquisition, the list of commissioners,
the reason for the inquisition (a writ) and the list of jurymen. Next, the person was declared a
lunatic, often with the phrase “is a lunatic and unable to govern himself or his estate.” The
inquisition recorded an estimate of when the said person became a lunatic and whether or not
they had lucid intervals. The rest of the document was dedicated to listing all lands and property,
the lunatic or idiot’s heir, and their age. The greatest variations in inquisitions was length. Those
with larger estates had grounds, woods, meadows, tenements, and livestock for which to account
in the legal record.
Though most inquisitions of the Interregnum continued to utilize the same phrase, “not
able to govern himself/herself or his/her estate” as before, some inquisitions delve deeper into
lunatics’ behavior that precipitated a positive verdict.43 Perhaps these descriptions were
exceptions, the result of bureaucratic disorganization in the wake of the Civil War and the
dismantlement of the Court of Wards and Liveries. Regardless, these few case studies provide
examples of how contemporaries described mad behavior and the formal processes of communal
justice. The following descriptions are taken from 39 positive inquisitions of lunacy or idiocy
taken between 1651 and 1659 (this does not include repeated inquisitions or land assessments for
the same person or missing records). Of these 39, 6 were female (15.4 %) and 33 were male
(84.6%); 3 were declared idiots (7.7%) and 36 were declared lunatics (92.3%). The table below
lists names, their legal designation after inquisition, the date of their warrant, the date of their
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John Bridges, gent of Gloucestershire, 1652, NA, C 211/2/B5.
Neugebauer found this phrase in pre-Interregnum inquisitions. See “Mental Illness and Government Policy,” 55.

142
inquisition, and the elapsed time between warrant and inquisition. The table was compiled from
records the author read in the National Archives, Kew, UK.
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Table 3.1 Inquisitions of Lunacy or Idiocy from 1651 to 1659
Name
Roger Talbort
William Saunders
Thomas White
Susan Thorne (F)
William Richards
Sarah Billingsley (F)
George Hort
Richard Pudsey
John Bridges
William Cridlaid
John Rogers
James Robinson
John Pollard
Thomas Cox
Edward Reade
Thomas Howard (Earl of
Arundel & Surrey)
George Compton
Isaac Piggot
Thomas Greene
Douglas Sheffeild (F)
John White
Elizabeth Berkeley (F)
Thomas Berkeley
John Gerard
Mary Lockyer (F)
John Good
John Sparhawke
Elizabeth Bancroft (F)
George Chetham
Robert Tooker
Robert Norris
John Copley
Henry Cutts
John Drought
Sir William le Neve
Susan Spratt (F)
Sir Richard Sprignell
John Reeve
Thomas Taylor

Legal Designation
Lunatic
Non Compos Mentis**
Lunatic
Non Compos Mentis***
Incomplete record
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Non Compos Mentis**
Lunatic

Warrant*
3/2/1651
15/10/1651
21/2/1652
28/2/1652
28/5/1652
28/5/1652
31/5/1652
15/10/1652
29/11/1652
1/2/1653
20/2/1653
20/2/1653
11/3/1653
7/7/1653
12/5/1654
7/7/1654

Inquisition*
18/2/1651
17/12/1651
25/4/1653
18/8/1653
-----------------26/6/1652
11/6/1652
25/11/1652
30/12/1652
4/4/1654
20/4/1654
13/3/1653
23/3/1653
29/7/1653
22/5/1654
24/8/1654

Time
15 days
63 days
> 1 year
> 1 year
-----------------29 days
11 days
41 days
31 days
> 1 year
> 1 year
21 days
12 days
22 days
10 days
48 days

Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Idiot
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Idiot
Lunatic
Idiot
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic
Lunatic

31/10/1654
28/5/1655
5/2/1656
25/3/1656
10/6/1656
13/11/1656
13/11/1656
6/12/1656
12/2/1657
4/3/1657
15/4/1657
28/4/1657
22/6/1657
6/10/1657
19/11/1657
1/2/1658
18/3/1658
24/5/1658
23/10/1658
9/11/1658
20/11/1658
25/11/1658
1/4/1659

1/12/1654
1/6/1655
14/2/1656
April 1657
14/7/1656
14/2/1656****
14/2/1656****
8/1/1656****
Damaged
22/4/1658
30/4/1657
30/4/1657
24/6/1657
11/12/1657
10/12/1657
18/2/1658
12/4/1659
16/6/1658
27/10/1658
19/11/1658
26/11/1658
17/12/1658
27/4/1659

31 days
4 days
9 days
> 1 year
34 days
93 days
93 days
33 days
-----------------> 1 year
15 days
2 days
2 days
66 days
21 days
17 days
> 1 year
23 days
4 days
10 days
6 days
22 days
26 days

* Some manuscripts were heavily damaged; dating is based on best guess.
** Subsequently declared lunatic in later inquisition.
*** Subsequently declared Compos Mentis in later inquisition.
**** Most likely an error; should be 1657.
(F) designates Female
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The first conclusions we may draw from these case studies is the importance of language.
The legal and fiscal repercussions of distinguishing between a declaration of lunacy or idiocy
was clear, but by the seventeenth century, another clarification was needed: between “non
compos mentis” and “lunatic.” The designations non compos mentis, or “of unsound mind,” and
lunatic were both used infrequently before the fifteenth century (their rare usage stems from the
greater revenue the Crown could receive from a verdict of idiocy). The last known return
verdicts of non compos mentis occurred in 1359 and 1501, after which “lunatic” became the sole
legal term for a person whose mental deficiency did not begin at birth and who might experience
lucid intervals once again.44
William Saunders and Edward Reade were declared non compos mentis in their
inquisitions, and as a result were required to endure second examinations in order to determine
their statuses as lunatics. In his initial inquisition on 17 December 1651, Saunders was named “a
non compos mentis and so weak in memory and understanding that he is not able to govern
himself or his manors lordship’s messuages lands tenements goods or chattels.” A subsequent
writ de lunatico inquierendo a little over four years later explained that a commission was
needed “to inquire of the lunacy of Saunders.” Though the inquisition previously declared that he
was a non compos mentis and had been for eleven years, “it was not found in express words that
he is a lunatic or not a lunatic as was required.” The inquisition taken on 5 February 1656
reiterated that Saunders had been declared a non compos mentis, “but now the jurors of this
inquisition say upon their oath that the said William Saunders . . . is a lunatic and not able to
govern himself or his estate.”45 Similarly, Edward Reade’s inquisition stated “whether the said

Neugebauer, “Mental Illness and Government Policy,” 18-19.
William Saunders, esq of London, 1651, NA, C 211/23/S3; William Saunders, esq of Welford, Northamptonshire,
1656, NA, C 211/23/S4.
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Edward Reade be a lunatic or not a lunatic of the said Inquisition [from 22 May 1654] in the said
[previous] committee mentioned at the time of the taking of the same inquisition did not so say.”
However, they would not make the same mistake in this inquisition: “now the jurors of this
inquisition say upon their oath aforesaid that the said Edmund Reade in the same commission
named is a lunatic and not able to govern himself or his estate and without having lucida
intervalla.”46 The inquisitions were much closer in time for Reade, within about four months.
These examples demonstrate that the retired phrase non compos mentis had made a brief return
only to be immediately overturned. Lunatic was the only acceptable legal term, which suggests
that the Chancery was struggling to standardize their inquisitions during the Interregnum, but
that they were striving toward improvement. Moreover, petitioners would once again have to pay
all associated fees with the process of a second inquisition.
Part of streamlining inquisitions in the Chancery was insuring that examinations
accounted for all lands and property. After all, inquisitions were designed to ascertain exactly
how much a lunatic or idiot owned, just as much as it was a strategy to determine their mental
states. In his case, Edward Trenchard’s inquisition had taken place during King Charles I’s reign,
but a reassessment of land was needed. The writ for a second inquisition (17 November 1655)
began, “for as much as we are given to understand that Edward Trenchard, Esq. a lunatic hath
more land and tenements than were found in an Inquisition touching his lunacy . . . we therefore
willing to be more fully certified by you concerning the premises” and “have assigned you . . . to
inquire . . . what more lands and tenements” are held.47 This demonstrates the potential fiscal
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First inquisition: Edmund Reade, of Aston Subedge, Gloucestershire, 1654, NA, C 211/22/R4; second inquisition:
Edmund Reade, of Aston Subedge, Gloucestershire, 1654, NA, C 211/22/R3.
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motivations behind lunatic inquisitions. Though rare, private wardships of lunatics could prove
to be lucrative.
Although most inquisitions continued the pre-Interregnum formulaic verbiage, “unable to
govern himself/herself or his/her estate,” as an explanation of idiocy or lunacy, Interregnum case
studies offer glimpses of alternative language in which lunacy or idiocy was described, as well as
the behaviors that warranted a positive verdict. These range from phrases to full descriptions and
provide greater insight into how abnormal behavior was perceived by family, friends, and
neighbors. For instance, when William Saunders was declared non compos mentis, it was
because he was “so weak in memory and understanding that he is not able to govern himself or
his manors.”48 Before her initial inquisition verdict of non compos mentis was overturned, Susan
Thorne was also declared “weak in memory and understanding.”49 These two cases establish that
commissions and escheators considered a lack of memory (perhaps due to brain trauma or
dementia, we can only guess) to be indicative of mental disability. Unfortunately, there is no way
to know what measures examiners used to determine “weakness in understanding.”
Phrases in the inquisitions of George Hort (11 June 1652), John Bridges (30 December
1652), William Cridlaid (4 April 1654), and Thomas Taylor (27 April 1659) also hint at the
criteria for positive verdicts of lunacy. Hort’s inquisition stated that for fourteen years he “hath
been altogether distracted so that he is insufficient for the government of himself.”50 The
contemporary meaning of “distracted” was “much confused or troubled in mind; having, or
showing, great mental disturbance of perplexity,” or “deranged in mind; out of one’s wits;
crazed, mad, insane.”51 Therefore, Hort’s behavior may have fluctuated from deep confusion and
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an inability to concentrate to wild behavior. According to commissioners, Bridges “hath been
from a child deficient.”52 Because he was not “deficient,” from infancy, Bridges was not
classified an idiot. His “deficiency,” whatever that may have been, had been present for sixteen
years and warranted a verdict of lunacy.
The phrases describing lunacy in Cridlaid and Taylor’s inquisitions, though brief, proffer
specific symptoms of madness. Cridlaid was “a lunatic and hath Lucida Intervalla, being
distracted by fits, so that he is insufficient for the government of himself or his manors.”53 “Fits”
may have referred to “a paroxysm of lunacy,” a period of lunacy, or “a sudden seizure of any
malady,” including “fainting, hysteria, apoplexy, paralysis, or epilepsy.”54 Given that hysteria
was a disorder unique to women, most likely Cridlaid was suffering from epilepsy, a convulsive
disorder that authors such as Thomas Willis categorized under the umbrella of madness (see
Chapter 1). In perhaps the most perplexing case, Taylor was declared a lunatic whose lunacy had
been present since 1 November 1657 “by reason of the dead palsy in his head.”55 A “dead palsy”
was a palsy that produced “complete insensibility or immobility of the part affected;” in other
words, a paralysis that halted the function of part of the body.56 Thus, Taylor’s brain or mind had
been rendered useless. These case studies serve as evidence that symptoms such as distraction,
deficiency, epilepsy, and head palsies befitted a legal designation of lunatic.
The inquisitions of Richard Pudsey and John Rogers are particularly telling in the reason
jurors found them to be lunatics. Both men’s commissioners provided full descriptions of their
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behavior, a scarce but invaluable account of what locals deemed inappropriate conduct. Pudsey’s
inquisition is difficult to read, but one can make out the commissioners’ description:
Whereby…know and believe that he hath been since the said time very much
disposed to melancholic very corrupt in his [reason?] and fancies and oftentimes
hence manifested much distemper and distraction of mind and unsoundness of
judgment especially since about the [time in past]. He went on the ridge of a
house in […] aforesaid and walked backward and forward and . . . . he hath often
spoiled and consumed his clothes or his [missing piece] his moveable estate…57
In his melancholic state, Pudsey was distracted and not able to make sound decisions, to the
point of risking his life on the roof of a house. His melancholy also led him to abandon his
responsibilities: the care of his land and his clothing. Both inactions were indicative of madness,
as property and appearance were valued status symbols in early modern England.58 Rogers’s
behavior was more alarming, for
the said John Rogers commonly being so melancholy and reserved that he will not
but with some difficulty be drawn to speak, and commonly when he doth speak, it
will be with bitter […], cursing and blaspheming, and when any other than his
ordinary keeper be in the room when he is, he will go into some corner of that
room and there with his face close towards the wall will stand without motion or
speech and will not without some violence be forced from that posture…59
According to the examiners, Rogers was erratic and unpredictable, vacillating between periods of
silence and staring at a wall to extreme rage. It would seem that his lack of self-control was the
impetus behind his declaration as a lunatic.
One final case study demonstrates not how lunacy was determined, but sanity (or a
“sound mind” as contemporaries would have termed it). Susan Thorne was judged non compos
mentis on 18 August 1653 for she was “so weak in memory and understanding” that she was
“unable to govern herself and her estate but hath not Lucida Intervalla.” A new judgement was
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issued on 5 May 1658 when the seventy-four-year-old was the subject of a second commission
and inquisition. The commissioners “inspected the body of Susan Thorne in the said commission
named and have examined the said Susan upon several questions and demands.” They ultimately
determined that “she is compos mentis and able to govern her estate and hath given to us a very
good account of her faith and religion.”60 Her case demonstrates not only that inquisitions could
be amended years later, but also that the absence of lunacy was determined through an
examination of body and mind, as well as religious testimony.
These Interregnum case studies of inquisitions draw attention to a previously unstudied
period in the legal proceedings of the mentally ill. The 1650s was a particularly critical time, as
the procedure for determining lunacy and idiocy was removed from a court that had existed for
105 years, and the welfare of the allegedly mad were moved to the Chancery. In analyzing these
cases, we find the importance of language, the symptoms of lunacy, how contemporaries
perceived madness and justified a legal verdict of lunacy or idiot, and the possibility of a later
declaration of compos mentis. Moreover, the absence of Satan in any warrant or inquisition
supports Neugebauer’s thesis that demonological implications in madness were overrepresented
in published works of the period. In fact, the only mention of the supernatural is the inclusion of
“by visitation of God” in each inquisition, meaning that the lunacy or idiocy one experienced
was sanctioned by the Lord.
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3.3 The Economics of Madness and Wardship
In reading documents, acts, and inquisitions on lunacy and idiocy, one can sense the
tension between care for the mentally disabled’s’ wellbeing and desire for profit. The 1610
Royal Instructions to the Court of Wards and Liveries (transcribed in Neugebauer’s dissertation)
is representative of this tension. While it stated that idiots should be “according to nature of
friends, that will take charge of them, such competent allowance for their maintenance,” and
lunatics “may be freely committed to their best and nearest friends, that could receive no benefit
by their death and the committees bound to answer,” profit was the priority. This is evidenced by
the first line of Royal Instructions: “That you do observe the like rules, orders, cautions and
considerations, as well for our profit, as otherwise, in committing and disposing of the lands,
fellable woods, fines of copyholds of inheritance, or for lives, of idiots, as by these presents are
prescribed for wards.”61
Still, historians maintain that care of lunatics and idiots was mainly positive. As Bell
argues, there was no effort made by the Crown to gain profits from lunatics, only idiots.62
Nevertheless, instances of abuse of power did occur, as documented by the Court and Secretary
of State correspondence.63 During his tenure as Master of the Court, Salisbury received notice
from the Deputy Feodary of Somersetshire, Robert Perry, that the lunatic Richard Stocks was
chained to a straw bed “after the fashion of Bedlam,” and that his “keeper,” William Storr, had
ruined some of his land.64 Neugebauer provides a solemn reminder of proceedings regarding the
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mentally disabled and their property: “at the center of these conflicting ambitions and affections,
interests, sympathies and greed, stood the disabled man, ringed by his nuclear family and, around
them, the extended family.”65 Thus, in scrutinizing the history of madness within the Court of
Wards of Liveries, it is possible to examine one of the Crown’s strategies to raise money.
Moreover, these fiscal tactics demonstrate that the motivations behind the foundation of the
Court of Wards and Liveries in 1540—idiocy inquisitions and royal fiscal interests, according to
Neugebauer—continued into the early Stuart era.66
The Court did not hide its pragmatic motivation for inquisitions and inquisitions post
mortem: revenue for the royal coffers.67 Its very foundation, besides codifying his father’s
practice, was motivated by Henry VIII’s desire to collect more income. This was not unlike the
increase in suicide convictions of felones de se during Henry’s reign, in which the property of
those who committed suicide while compos mentis became custody of the Crown.68 The Crown
was also forthright in selling wardships to the highest bidders, private persons who may or may
not have been related to the minors, idiots, or lunatics, but who could take custody and the
revenues of their estates. The possibility for abuse of person and property was ever present.
From its inception, the Court of Wards and Liveries was critiqued for its sale of
wardships and guardianships. Concern for the wellbeing of wards, lunatics, and idiots steadily
rose; in the end, they had virtually no control over their bodies or estates. The Crown was not
blind to these concerns, as shown by King James I’s Commission with Instructions and
Directions, Granted by His Majesty to the Master and Council of the Court of Wards and
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Liveries, For Compounding for Wards, Idiots, and Lunatics (1618). The publication recognized
exploitation as engendered in the Court; “now that time and experience have produced the
knowledge of sundry defects,” the solution was a simple matter of working out the kinks in the
system. After mentioning the Court’s benefits to wards (care and providence, education,
pursuance of their inheritance), the publication describes how the Court and guardians had
unwittingly “been careless of their education, married some in mean places, committed wastes
and spoils upon their lands, and in the end have exacted greater sums of money for the marriage
of such wards.” Exploitation of land was a particularly troublesome problem. Before a ward
came of age or an idiot had passed away, guardians might lease their lands to speculators who
sold stock and timber, cropped land until it was exhausted, and allowed buildings to fall to
decay. Forced marriage was also not in the wards’ best interest.69 The remainder of the
publication was dedicated to fixing these problems, and, as always, ensuring the income of the
Crown: “much of the profit that might have been raised for us, hath been diverted to diverse
suitors and committees [petitioners and guardians], who by obscuring the truth of the wards’
estate, and by misinforming of the Court therein, have reaped greater profit.”70 Selling of
wardships, control of marriage, and waste of land were all means by which the Crown profited
from the Court of Wards and Liveries, directly and indirectly.
Additional evidence of the Crown’s fiscal intentions was King James I’s attempt to
abolish the Court in exchange for an annual income of £200,000 in 1610.71 Sir Robert Wroth’s
proposed abolishment of the Court of Wards and Liveries in James’s first Parliament reflected
doubts about the welfare of wards; “the old complaints of children being seized from their
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kinsfolk and sold to strangers appeared again, together with the accusation that wards’ lands
were spoiled and wasted.” However, James disregarded the proposal in 1604 and again in
1609/1610 when the House of Commons offered the King £100,000 per year.72 When James
refused this offer, he couched his decision in terms of his responsibility as protector of wards.
However, his benevolence is doubtful considering that on 26 April 1610, the Commons were told
that James would not accept any less than £200,000 per year in compensation, and that the feudal
tenures must still be maintained. The Commons would not agree, as they “felt that wardship was
so much a prerogative matter that it could not be extinguished unless the whole basis of the
feudal tenures was destroyed too.”73
Chancery writs for inquisitions into lunacy and idiocy returned verdicts of idiocy more
frequently, as this meant greater revenue for the Crown. Manipulation of language resulted in a
verdict of idiocy 80% of the time between 1301 and 1392 and between 1485 and 1540.
Neugebauer observes that this was “an inherently unlikely distribution of severe psychiatric
disorder.”74 Unfortunately, we do not have equivalent data for inquisition outcomes during the
Stuart Era, but we do know the distribution of inquisitions post mortem of lunatics and idiots
from King James I through Charles II. Inquisitions post mortem were conducted to determine
how much property a tenant-in-chief, lunatic, or idiot had in his or her possession at the time of
their death. As was often the case, the heir was a minor and the profits of the deceased’s estate
became a source of royal income (explained in greater detail below). The Index of Inquisitions
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Preserved in the Public Record Office does not separate idiots and lunatics from wards in their
lists of inquisitions post mortem. As such, I compiled the numbers.

Table 3.2: Inquisitions Post Mortem of Lunatics or Idiots
Lunatics

Idiots

Total

James I (r. 1603-1625)

120 (65.6%)

63 (34.4%)

183 (100%)

Charles I (r. 1625-1649)

164 (79.6%)

42 (20.4%)

206 (100%)

Interregnum (1650-1659)

44 (91.7%)

4 (8.3%)

48 (100%)

Charles II (r. 1660-1680)

41 (91.1%)

4 (8.9%)

45 (100%)

Table compiled and tabulated by the author from Index of Inquisitions Preserved in the Public Record Office, vol.
III-IV (New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1963). The Index of Inquisitions provides information through
Charles II’s 32nd regnal year (1680), though he reigned until 1685.

While Neugebauer’s numbers reflected inquisitions pre- mortem and the numbers in the table
above represent inquisitions post- mortem, we may conclude with a reasonable degree of
certainty that the “distribution of severe psychiatric disorder” became more accurate over time.
Idiots had comprised 80% of inquisitions and commissions in 1540. A century later, they were a
mere 8.9% of inquisitions post mortem. The reason for this change in percentages, however, is
more complex. Perhaps this reflects the evolution of the Court of Wards and Liveries, as
Neugebauer posits, from an institution founded upon royal fiscal interests to an “institution
offering benevolent protection to many more subjects, usually at reasonable costs.”75 Or, more
pessimistically, perhaps it was simply that the Crown was just as likely to gain revenue from a
deceased lunatic or idiot, depending on their inheritance. Regardless, the proportion of idiots to
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lunatics according to their legal definitions in the later period was most likely smaller as
demonstrated by inquisitions post mortem.
Growing concerns about the Court did not interfere with King James I’s or King Charles
I’s desires to raise money for the Crown, a direct reflection of the fiscal problems of the Kings’
reigns preceding the Civil War. James I and Charles I both struggled to raise money while
abiding by the idea that the “King should live of his own.” James needed money for gifts,
pensions, and forgiveness of debts (Mark Kishlansky estimates that he spent £30,000 per annum
on pensions and £47,000 on jewels in 1604 alone). Charles demanded money for military
expeditions against Spain and France and to help his Protestant Allies in the Thirty Years War.76
Father and son resorted to extra-parliamentary means to fund their vices and ambitions, and I
argue that the increase in petitions, inquisitions, and inquisitions post mortem of idiots and
lunatics reflected the financial straits of the early Stuarts.
The average number of petitions for a writ or commission of lunacy increased during the
final years of James I’s and Charles I’s reigns. From 1611 to 1615, the average was 15.9 per
year, and from 1629 to 1632, the average was 14.1 per year. However, from 1617 to 1620, the
average number of petitions under James I increased to 18.2 per year, and from 1637 to 1641, the
number was up to 18.8 per year.77 In addition, the number of positive lunacy or idiocy
inquisitions increased from the creation of the court in 1540 to its abolishment in 1645, as
illustrated in Neugebauer’s line graph below.
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Figure 3.1: “Average Number of Positive Mental Disability Inquisitions Per Year for
Five Year Intervals From 1540 to 1640”

Reproduced by permission of Richard Neugebauer from his “Mental Illness and Government Policy
in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England,” 263.

One might ask if the increase in petitions simply reflected population growth, but that is not the
case: “the sudden sharp increases [in petitions] in the late 1590s, and again in the latter 1630s,
together with the slump in the 1620s, are incompatible with any current hypotheses or evidence
regarding sixteenth and seventeenth century English demography.”78 The following graph
demonstrates a similar pattern in inquisitions post mortem for lunatics and idiots.
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Figure 3.2: Inquisitions Post Mortem of Lunatics and Idiots
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Graph compiled and tabulated by author from Index of Inquisitions Preserved in the Public Record Office, vol. III-IV
(New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1963). Though the authors of the Index of Inquisitions categorize
inquisitions post mortem through 1649 to be under the purview of Charles I, the author has ended the chart at 1641,
the last year before Charles fled London and Parliament abolished many of the prerogative courts.

The graph demonstrates that the number of inquisitions post mortem of lunatics and idiots
steadily rose during the reign of Charles I.
Furthermore, the fact that no list contained all cases from these extent records, that is,
each archive typically provided several names not found elsewhere, makes almost certain that
some cases do not appear in any surviving records. Using the inverse of the "Bernoulli Census"
or "capture-recapture method," Neugebauer is able to estimate the total number of cases of
lunacy and idiocy handled in the Court of Wards and Liveries, including those cases for whom
no records whatsoever survive among governmental records. These estimates, provided for each
decade, are reported in the table below. These estimates, based on classical probability theory,
indicate that whereas the total number of known cases from 1540-1639 is 657, the total number
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of cases both known and estimated, fall somewhere between 663-717, reflecting that documented
cases represent a non-trivial underestimate of the true volume of court business.
Table 3.3: “Incidence of Extant Certification of Mental Disability by Archive and Decade.”

Reproduced by permission of Richard Neugebauer from his “Application of A Capture-recapture Method (The
Bernoulli Census) to Historical Epidemiology,” American Journal of Epidemiology 120, no. 4 (1984), 630.

The potential revenue of the Court of Wards and Liveries was most likely part of extraparliamentary means utilized by the early Stuart kings to raise funds. Forced loans, granting and
selling monopolies, selling Crown lands, selling Crown jewels, and Ship Money were all
attempts by James and Charles to profit without Parliamentary sanction.

3.4 The Cessation of the Court of Wards and Liveries
The route towards abolishment of the Court of Wards and Liveries began in 1641, when
legislation dismantled many of the prerogative courts. Nevertheless, the Court, Chancery, and
Exchequer remained, and the King ordered their removal, along with the Dutchy of Lancaster,
the Court of Requests, and the First Fruits and Tenths to Oxford from Westminster. Parliament
opposed the move to Oxford as Charles had raised an army, thereby entrapping any person who
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“as have occasion to attend, cannot with any safety to their persons or estates repair, his majesty
having in effect declared all persons that have contributed anything in aid or defense of the
Parliament and the privileges thereto to be guilty of high treason.”79 The prerogative courts were
so crucial to the King that he attempted to move them, in their entirety, to Oxford. In the case of
the Court of Wards and Liveries, he failed. The Court split into two—one at Oxford, one at
Westminster—and neither recognized the jurisdiction of the other.
Finances were still an issue, however. In “An Ordinance for the due and orderly receiving
and collecting of the Kings, Queens and Princes Revenue, and the arrears thereof” (1643),
Parliament stated that any revenues from the Court of Wards and Liveries and other prerogative
courts should be diverted to the Commonwealth. This was due to the “bloody and unnatural
war,” and meant to preserve “His Majesty and the whole kingdom from the most cruel and
endless designs of Papists, delinquents, and ill-affected persons.”80 In other words, Parliament
was still convinced that their well-meaning King had been led astray, and that Charles and
Parliament would reconcile.
Due to the incompatibility of two separate Courts of Wards and Liveries, as well as the
mounting agitation against the Court’s practices and its status as a prerogative court, it was
abolished 24 February 1645/6.81 At first, the House of Commons offered £100,000 per year as
compensation to the King. As Parliament gained ground in the Civil War, the amount lowered to
£50,000. It took a few years to finish the business of wardships, which was achieved through the
receiver-general, a Revenue Committee, and the Exchequer, while jurisdiction of lunatics and
idiots was moved to the Chancery. The transition from Court of Wards of Liveries to Chancery

“Ordinance against removing the Term to Oxford,” in Acts and Ordinances, 65.
“An Ordinance for the due and orderly receiving and collecting of the Kings, Queens and Princes Revenue, and the
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was tumultuous—a reflection of the uncertainty of the Interregnum. In 1653, an “Act Touching
Idiots and Lunatics stated “whereas the persons of idiots and lunatics have received much
damage, and their estates been much wasted, spoiled, and embezzled” since the Court of Wards
and Liveries was abolished, “be it enacted . . . that the said bills for the passing of the custodies
of the persons aforesaid, under the Great Seal, shall be first signed by the Council of State.” In
addition, committees and commissioners for the custody for the custody of the Seal should “in all
cases give relief in law and equity to the said idiots and lunatics.”82
The final abolishment of the Court of Wards and Liveries came with the Restoration in
1660. “An Act taking away the Court of Wards and Liveries and tenures in capite and by
knights’ service and purveyance, and for settling a revenue upon his Majesty in lieu thereof,”83
was the final nail in the coffin of the Court of Wards and Liveries. Just as the Restoration
Settlement did not bring back the prerogative courts disbanded in 1641, so the Court would not
be revived. After the Restoration, the Chancery continued to have jurisdiction over lunatics and
idiot. King Charles II signed a warrant on 10 November 1673, stating, “it belongs to us in right
of our royal prerogative to have the custody of idiots and their estates, and to take the profits
thereof to our own use, finding them necessaries, and also to provide for the custody of lunatics
and their estates without taking the profits thereof to our own use.” For since the “disuse” of the
Court of Wards and Liveries, idiots “are now in our immediate care.”84
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3.5 Conclusion
The Court of Wards and Liveries was created both as a means of revenue for the Crown
and guardianship for wards, lunatics, and idiots. Early Stuart-era financial straits are reflected in
legislation and quantitative data regarding the Court of Wards of Liveries preceding 1641. The
number of positive inquisitions as well as the number of inquisitions post mortem steadily
increased during the reign of James I and Charles I, particularly in the 1630s. Moreover,
examples exist in which guardians exploited idiots and lunatics by wasting their lands and
providing bad treatment. Thus, through madness, it is possible to examine revenue tactics at the
local and state level, which were authorized at the expense of the mentally disordered.
More importantly, the abolition of the Court of Wards and Liveries provides a glimpse
into informal, communal descriptions of madness, as well as formal Crown jurisdiction. The
combination of growing agitation against the court for its practices, coupled with the tide of Civil
War, made it impossible for the Court to survive. Although inquisitions of lunacy and idiocy in
the Interregnum followed the same procedures, the language was not as standard as it had been
before the Court was abolished in the 1640s. This window before the Court’s business ceased
completely in 1660 affords small, but significant insight into how communities were part of
setting legal standards for self-governance and property holding. One who was weak in memory
and understanding, distracted, mentally handicapped from birth, had fits, was melancholy, lacked
reason and judgement, or engaged in odd behavior (such as walking on a roof or staring at a
wall) was deemed unfit to care for their estates. And, in cases of idiocy, there was profit to be
made.
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CHAPTER 4: MAD MEN AND MAD WOMEN: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF GENDERED MAD DISORDERS

The place from whence comes life, is also the breeder of the most deadly poison.
—Nicholas Culpeper, Culpeper’s Directory for Midwives (1662)1
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty. Make thick my blood.
Stop up the access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visiting of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
The effect and it. Come to my woman’s breasts
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief.
—William Shakespeare, Macbeth (1606)2

Though witches had prophesied that Macbeth was destined to be king, Lady Macbeth
feared that her husband would not be ruthless enough to carry out King Duncan’s murder. In
preparation to do the deed herself, Lady Macbeth called upon supernatural agents to provide her
with the necessary strength and bravery. What restrained Lady Macbeth from committing murder
was not her conscience, but her body: breasts full of milk and thin blood that caused her to feel
remorse. In demanding that the spirits “unsex” her, she pleaded to be released from a weak,
female body. It was this same weak body that would later cause her madness. The Doctor and
Waiting-Gentlewoman witnessed Lady Macbeth sleepwalking, opening and closing her closet,
writing, and scrubbing her hands to remove imagined bloodstains. Though unsure what course of

Nicholas Culpeper, Culpeper’s Directory for Midwives: Or, A Guide for Women (London, 1662).
William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine, Folger Shakespeare Library Edition (New
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2013), 1.5.47-57.
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treatment ought to be pursued, the Doctor was convinced that Lady Macbeth had gone mad,
concluding: “Infected minds/ To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets.”3
In this chapter, I focus the study of early modern madness on women’s and men’s bodies,
just as the opening quote focused the madness of Lady Macbeth on her body. Studies of women
and madness in England tend to focus on the medieval period (with mystics such as Margery
Kempe, for example), or the modern period (with Victorian-era diseases such as Hysteria).
Although there are a few autobiographical writings left by the mad, such as those of George
Trosse, James Carkesse, Goodwin Wharton, Eleanor Davies Douglas, and Dionys Fitzherbert,
few wrote down their mental ailments in the early modern period. Consequently, women are
largely absent from overviews of early modern English madness, and instead compartmentalized
into books based on their mad diseases and prophetic visions.
This chapter is therefore in part a call for a study of women’s and men’s madness in
early modern England that covers the entire range of gendered mad diseases, from Greensickness
and Hysteria, to Suffocation of the Mother and Satyriasis. In order to do so, an understanding of
how contemporaries conceptualized the early modern body is critical. Until the Renaissance,
Europeans followed Galen’s one-sex model of the body, in which the female body was a male
body, inverted. This meant that while there was only one type of body, there were two genders.
Women were the weaker, mentally and physically, of the two. After the advent of dissections and
final acceptance in the early seventeenth century of two different but complementary sexes
(detailed below), one might think a greater sense of equality would be established between men
and women, perhaps due to the realization that the uterus was a necessary aspect of procreation
unique to women. However, according to Anthony Fletcher, the transition from one- to two-sex
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models of the body reinforced and strengthened gender roles, “thus a doctrine of subordination
based upon medical evidence was entirely consonant with the central theological tenets of
women’s inferiority.”4 Along similar lines, Joan Scott posits, “Sex was not a transparent
phenomenon . . . it acquired its natural status retrospectively, as justification for the assignment
of gender roles.”5
My argument stems from Fletcher’s and Scott’s assertions that shifting understandings
about bodies and sex (division of reproductive functions) reinforced gender stereotypes. I
contend that the resurgence (from the ancients) of womb-derived mad disorders in the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reflected the acceptance of the two-sex model by those
practicing physic, while simultaneously reinforcing cultural and societal gender discourse about
women that had originated in humoral theory and Christian theology. Further, I argue men’s mad
disorders continued to be based on gendered humoral balance rather than their sex. In order to
avoid the binaries prevalent in earlier histories, such as that of gender/sex and man/woman, I
organize primary sources by the gender roles, temperaments, and stereotypes that contemporaries
thought led to these gendered disorders within newly sexed bodies. I neither separate disorders
nor sexes, insofar as that is possible.
It is telling, for example, that the womb disease hysteria (or Suffocation of the Mother),
which Edward Jorden reimagined in his 1603 publication A Brief Discourse of a Disease Called
the Suffocation of the Mother was followed, a mere 12 years later, by the work that cemented the
two-sex model in England: Helkiah Crooke’s Microcosmographia: A Description of the Body of
Man (1615). Sexed diseases, such as Suffocation of the Mother, emerged as the two-sex model
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gained acceptance among physicians in England. Moreover, an analysis of the origins of
gendered mad disorders demonstrates that they became part of the medical vernacular between
the 1580s and 1670s. Altered perceptions of bodies not only strengthened gender roles but also
the gender of disease and disorder.
A study of gendered madness also highlights two important aspects of Stuart-era gender
and sex. First, men who wrote medical and philosophical books shaped contemporary
perceptions of women’s minds, bodies, and spirits. Second, how men and women perceived their
own bodies. To examine these relationships I analyze treatises, medical case studies, doctors’
notes and journals, medical advertisements, and literary references. I review only those mad
disorders that would have been diagnosed as specifically deriving from the sexed body (i.e.
reproductive organs). Therefore, I have chosen to exclude prophecy from this chapter. Prophecy
was a platform for women’s voices to be heard through the sanctioned authority of God or,
alternatively, considered a form of madness to be dismissed. As such, prophecy deserves a
longer analysis than is permissible in a chapter of this length. Furthermore, the topic has already
been addressed by many historians in great depth.6
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4.1 Gender Theory and Historiography
Joan Scott brought gender theory to the fore with her article, “Gender: A Useful Category
of Analysis” (1986). She challenged historians who advocated women’s history alone and who
argued that gender history would be a step backward for women’s histories. Joanne Meyerowitz
explains how Scott alleviated these concerns: she reassured scholars that gender would neither
erase nor de-politicize women’s history, stating instead that the influence of feminist history
would expand.7 Scott did this by first pinpointing the major problem with theories of women’s
subordination: they were reductive and simplified. Theories of patriarchy, Marxist approaches,
and the concepts of object-relations and post-structuralism excluded issues of politics and power,
overemphasized materialist explanations, and limited the histories of women by focusing on their
roles within the home and fixing the male/female binary as ever-present and unchanging.8
Instead, Scott defines gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on
perceived differences between the sexes,”—including cultural symbols and normative concepts
constructed in the economy, polity, and social organizations that men and women regularly
transgressed—and a “primary way of signifying relationships of power.” For the purposes of this
chapter, her proposal to study politics through her new definition of gender is particularly
relevant, as she argues that the differences between men and women must be recognized as
socially constructed and therefore never fixed.9 In the transition from the one- to two-sex model,
the opposition between male and female genders intensified and evolved.
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Scott’s influence is evident in Merry E. Wiesner’s Gender in History (2001), in which
she tackles gender in topical chapters avoid the “arbitrary and artificial nature of all
boundaries—chronological, national, methodological, sexual.”10 Wiesner recognizes the
contributions of gender theory in new theoretical perspectives such as queer theory, postcolonial
studies, and Critical Race Theory. Nonetheless, gender theory still faced many challenges,
including where biological scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, and historians drew the line
between gender and sex, the tendency to regard “the male experience as normative” (e.g.
textbooks dividing subjects into “artists” and “women artists”), and the uneven geographical and
chronological distribution of histories of women’s experiences. She also emphasizes how
prescriptive language did not represent lived experiences.11
Kathleen Canning also highlights the role of lived experience, but juxtaposes it with the
role of discourse in the dichotomy that developed following the linguistic turn. Her Gender
History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class and Citizenship (2006) is a detailed
account of the genesis and evolution of gender history, the theoretical controversies it
confronted, and its practical applications in historical writing. The common thread throughout
Gender History in Practice is her goal of ‘theorizing historical analysis and historicizing
theoretical concepts.”12 In other words, Canning applies theories to history writing but also
describes the historical and historiographical contexts in which gender theories arose. For
instance, in her chapter on the body she finds that in the wake of the First Great War,
contemporaries in the Weimar Republic worked to ameliorate the distance between the “male”
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and “female” home fronts, which juxtaposed political meanings upon female and male bodies.
She emphasizes the ways in which the body was a “historically contingent site of subjectivity,”
an observation that I apply to this chapter.13
Yet, gender historians still have methodological problems to solve, some of which I
attempt to address in this chapter. In a special issue of The American Historical Review dedicated
to Joan Scott, Scott contributes a short essay entitled “Unanswered Questions” (2008), in which
she proposes applications of gender theory which have yet to be adequately explored. One of
these is to ask, “not only how gender constructs politics, but how politics constructs gender.” In
other words, questioning how concepts such as science, disease, and madness (I added madness,
of course), affected gender, not just how gender constructed the power relations that made up
politics. Scott implores historians to see gender not only as a constructor of politics, but
constructed by politics. A second important issue is the construction of sex. Today we take for
granted that sex is biological and that gender is constructed, a concept historians were beginning
to grapple with in the latter decades of the twentieth century. However, Scott argues that sex is
also a construction that continues to be defined by biological determinism (though I would argue
Anthony Fletcher’s Gender, Sex, and Subordination in England 1500-1800, published in 1999,
does challenge the notion of sex as biological).14 “Sex was not a transparent phenomenon,” she
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insists, “it acquired its natural status retrospectively, as justification for the assignment of gender
roles.”15
The sex/gender binary is one of four themes Sonya O. Rose deconstructs in What is
Gender History? (2010). Rose’s monograph is an introduction to gender theory and its
application in history. She tackles bodies and sexuality, the addition of other demographics to
gender (e.g. race, class), and how gender has become an aspect of historical knowledge. In her
chapter, “Men and Masculinity,” she demonstrates that histories have, in addition to sidelining
women, left out the specific experiences of manhood and how this shaped men’s behavior, which
influenced both sexes. Each of her chapters reads like a historiographical essay, introducing the
audience to gender history and its main quandaries. The first chapter, “Why Gender History?”
explains how gender history developed as an outgrowth of women’s history and succinctly
defines the mission of gender history: to understand how the relationship between men and
women, along with their perceived differences, differ depending upon specific cultural norms in
given civilizations.16
These historians of gender history have influenced the methodology of this chapter.
Binaries such as those between gender and sex and between man and woman are avoided in
favor of organization by gender roles. This is an attempt to put these disorders in conversation
with one another, as they would have been in the seventeenth century, rather than separate them
into different chapters. Gender history has demonstrated the need to understand relationships
between men and women within their temporal contexts, and although there were social forces at
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work in seventeenth-century England that conditioned the gendered imaginings of sexed bodies,
I do not believe mad disorders specifically geared toward women were a method of social or
patriarchal control. I agree with Michael MacDonald that “neither cultural presumptions nor the
institutional structure of Tudor and Stuart England permitted the use of psychiatry to stigmatize
and confine potentially disruptive groups. . . . [patriarchy] did not need to manipulate the
concepts of insanity or the institutions that treated it to prop up the social edifice.”17 This may
have been true in the following century with the growth of private madhouses and public
asylums, but it was not a factor in the seventeenth century.
The historiography of men’s and women’s specific mental disorders in early modern
England may be divided into three different but overlapping categories: individual disorder,
literary references, and autobiography. Though histories of specific diseases or disorders are
significant contributions to the history of women’s madness, they artificially draw lines between
women’s mad disorders that they knew to be derived from the same source: their gendered
bodies.18 A work that considers all women’s lunacy, including Suffocation of the
Mother/Hysteria, Greensickness, and female-specific melancholy, would offer a more complete
picture of the gendered bodies historians have recognized behind these disorders.
A discipline in which women’s and men’s madness is considered as a whole is literature.
William Shakespeare provided a plethora of characters on which to draw. Consider Lady
Macbeth who opened this chapter; King Lear as well as Ophelia and Hamlet, men and women
whose descent into madness shaped the central questions of love, righteousness, and self-doubt
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within their respective plays. Literary scholars have drawn upon these characters and eighteenthcentury novels to provide historical context for early modern gender culture in works such as
Duncan Salkeld’s Madness and Drama in the Age of Shakespeare (1994), Carol Thomas Neely’s
Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture (2004),
and Kenneth S. Jackson’s Separate Theaters: Bethlem (‘Bedlam’) Hospital and the
Shakespearean Stage (2005). They demonstrate how the stage, politics, and medicine shaped
perceptions of gender as well as challenge the comparison between Bedlam (the hospital) and
Bedlam patients on stage.
The final category is autobiographical and biographical, in which historians transcribe
and edit contemporaries’ writing. These are often, but not always, women’s prophetic or spiritual
writing that contemporaries either took to be the words of God or the words of a mad woman.19
While these histories are invaluable as rare insights into how the mad interpreted their
experiences, these voices are analyzed in isolation as a reflection of religious and political
circumstances with little regard to medicine.
Michael MacDonald’s essay, “Women and Madness in Tudor and Stuart England,”
(1986) and Mark S. Micale’s Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness
(2008) are demonstrative of the historical application of gender theory that I wish to emulate.
MacDonald argues that madness “wore a masculine visage,” as “both in its stereotypes and in the
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institutions that certified people as mad, Tudor and Stuart society was more concerned about
men who fell insane than women.”20 This is shown, for example, by the Court of Wards (the
cases of which were 80% men), literary representation (in “Mad Tom”) and the higher number of
men locked up in Bedlam. Yet, despite this “visage,” the case notes of physician Richard Napier
tell a different story. Napier treated patients from 1597 to 1641, and the ratio of women to men
who sought him out for mental disorders was 2:1. MacDonald attributes this disparity to
“gynecological maladies and obstetrical disasters,” children’s deaths, barrenness, relationship
problems, death of spouses, and, in small part, village relationships. Thus, MacDonald manages
to analyze the relationship between genders, as well as the multiplicity of contemporary mental
disorders, in one article.
Micale is exemplary in his use of gender theory, particularly in his first chapter, “Hysteric
Women and Hypochondriac Men.” His overarching argument is that male experts were
unwilling or unable to identify a male version of hysteria within their own gender, despite its
existence since female hysteria was first diagnosed in ancient times. He draws upon non-medical
sources to uncover male hysteria, which he juxtaposes throughout the monograph with female
hysteria (they had the same symptoms). Micale locates the acknowledgement of male hysteria in
the seventeenth century, when, due to autopsies, the origins of hysteria shifted from the uterus to
the nervous system. It was at this time that neurology replaced the original medical conjectures
about mad disorders in males. Thomas Willis and Thomas Sydenham introduced a “masculine
variant of the disease:” “hystero-hypochondriasis.” 21 Though the remainder of Hysterical Men
deals with history after the seventeenth century, Micale establishes that it is possible to avoid the
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binaries of sex/gender and men/women in examining mental disorders of the past. I apply this
gender theory to my analysis of madness by interweaving the history of men’s and women’s
mental disorders.

4.2 From One Sex to Complementary Bodies
Gender-specific mental disorders of the early modern period reflected ancient and
contemporary views of the body. Whether one subscribed to Galen’s one-sex model of the body
or the emerging model of two “incommensurable sexes,” female bodies were considered weaker
and subordinate to males during the early modern era. The onesex model—the predominating anatomical belief system since
the second century—proposed that the two genders were
determined by the balance of four humours in the body: yellow
bile (hot and dry), black bile (cold and dry), phlegm (cold and
wet), and blood (hot and wet). In this schema, the only way to
determine gender was through humoral balance. Females were
Figure 4.1: Male and Female from
Andreas Vesalius, Compendiosa
totius anatomie delineatio, aere
exarata: per Thomam Geminum
(1545).

cold and wet, hence, for example, they had excess blood in
their bodies and needed to excrete it through menstruation.
Males were hot and dry. The balance of humors determined

gender (whether someone was male/masculine or female/feminine) up to and through the
Renaissance.22 Females were not only inferior in body and mind, they were inferior in spirit.
Figure 4.1 from the Flemish anatomist Andreas Vesalius’s Compendiosa totius anatomie
delineatio, aere exarata: per Thomam Geminum (1545) reflects the Christian doctrine of original
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sin. This is indicated not only by the snake between the male and female and the apple the male
holds, but also by the female’s hand covering her genitals. Nevertheless, anatomists represented
females and males as having the same internal reproductive structure.
Anatomy was secondary to gender in the one-sex model because
men and women were thought to possess the same reproductive organs
(what anatomists termed “parts of generation”). Females, in lacking the
critical heat that men possessed, retained male reproductive organs
inside their bodies. The vagina was an inverted penis; the uterus or
womb an inverted scrotum; the ovaries inverted testicles aptly named
“female testicles.” The womb was not unique, as “the neck of the womb
was nothing other than a penis turned inward and the bottom of it
nothing but the scrotum inverted.”23 See, for example, Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Female
reproductive organs.
Andreas Vesalius,
Compendiosa totius
anatomie delineatio, aere
exarata: per Thomam
Geminum (1545).

Though this drawing by Andreas Vesalius looks like a penis (what
contemporaries called “the yard” or “virile member”), it was actually
the uterus, vagina, and external genitalia of a woman. The illustration

beside it is a depiction of the vagina and uterus connected to female testicles, and its phallic
shape would be difficult to identify as female today. Yet, Vesalius lived during the Renaissance
when dissections were the foundation of anatomical science.
Londa Schiebinger, Thomas Laqueur, and Anthony Fletcher pinpoint the origins of the
two-sex model of the body at different times and for different reasons. All authors recognize
dissection as integral to anatomy and medicine from the fourteenth century, at which point the
discovery of two different sexes may have been possible. Fletcher writes that the first dissections
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began around 1400, and they “exposed many Aristotelian and Galenic fallacies about the female
genitalia, even as they continued to produce representations of the male and female body in
terms of structural homology.”24 Schiebinger notes that dissections of women had begun in the
fourteenth century, and the Montpellier Codex (1363) provides an example.25 Laqueur describes
Renaissance dissections as “extravagantly public theatrical” displays that “advertised the
conviction that the opened body was the font and touchstone of anatomical knowledge.”26 But if
these dissections demonstrated that men and women were different, why did centuries pass
before the two-sex model became the dominant belief?
Schiebinger, Laqueur, and Fletcher have similar hypotheses regarding why dissections of
the body did not immediately displace the one-sex model for the two-sex model. In essence, the
ancient belief of one body for two genders was so engrained in the early modern mind that it was
difficult to challenge. Laqueur explains that “the ancient account of bodies and pleasure was so
deeply enmeshed in the skeins of Renaissance medical and physiological theory . . . and so
bound up with a political and cultural order, that it escaped entirely any logically determining
contact with the boundaries of experience.”27 In this case, he asserts, “believing is seeing.”
Schiebinger identifies an “incomplete revolution” in that anatomists were unable to completely
disregard the humoral model. Fletcher states anatomists “remained Galenists at heart who were
often Aristotelian in their thinking.28 Laqueur posits that language was also key in the drawn-out
acceptance of women’s bodies. The absence of terms for ovaries, women’s “seed,” and specific
vessels certainly did not hasten the observation of difference.
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The paradigm shift occurred when Renaldus Columbus and Gabriele Fallopius
“discovered” the clitoris in the mid-sixteenth century.29 They likened the clitoris to a female
penis because, with touch, it became larger and harder. If the male and female penis were
corresponding parts, this meant that the womb or uterus was unique and the recipient of “proper
recognition and even admiration for its role in reproduction.”30 Men and women were different,
but complementary, and although the humoral concepts of balanced bodily fluids remained an
important aspect of understanding bodies, the two-sex model had emerged. For most historians,
Fletcher and Schiebinger included, the discovery of the clitoris was the impetus for change, as
evidenced by Crooke’s Microcosmographia.31
At first glance, Crooke supported the Galenist view of the body wherein a female was the
imperfect inversion of a male for lack of heat. Males and females had testicles (today we call
them ovaries), and Crooke explained, “wherefore heat abounding in men thrusts them forth of
the body, whereas in women they remained within, because their dull and sluggish heart was not
sufficient to thrust them out.” Crooke continued, citing Hippocrates and Galen in his description
of woman as “less perfect than a man,” made “as a receptacle of the seed of which a new man
was to be created.” 32 However, in the “Controversies” section following the chapter, he
addressed the question of “how the parts of generation in men and women do differ.” After
providing a summation of the ancient response to this question, he strongly dissented. “Me thinks
it is very absurd to say,” he insisted, “that the neck of the womb be inverted is like the member
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of the man.” In other words, the womb was not an inverted penis and
scrotum. His reasoning was fourfold. First, the womb had one cavity
while the male “yard” had two. Second, he referenced Fallopius and
“his clitoris” as shaped like a male penis. Third, the scrotum and uterus
had different textures, whereby the bottom of the womb was “all fleshy
within and woven with manifold fibers (see Figure 4.3). Finally, male
and female testicles differed in figure, size, substance, and structure.33
He based these observations on reason and dissection.
Perhaps the greatest piece of evidence supporting Crooke’s
identification of the womb as different from the penis is his
frontispiece (Figure 4.4). The female model, though still modestly

Figure 4.3: Womb, from
Crooke’s
Microcosmographia
(1615), page 224.

covering herself, is pregnant and has her womb on display (lettered “L” and “O”). She contrasts
her body from the man beside her, whose nervous system is most prominent. Other anatomists
would follow Crooke such as Thomas Bartholin (Anatomy, 1668), and Thomas Gibson (The
Anatomy of Human Bodies Epitomised, 1682), who
insisted on two different, but functionally compatible
anatomies. Of course, the shift was not immediate, and
some physicians wavered between the one- and two-sex
bodies. Doctor John Sadler, for instance, seemed to
support Galen’s one-sex model: “the form and figure of
[the womb] is like a virile member, only this excepted,
Figure 4.4: Frontispiece of Crooke’s
Microcosmographia (1615).
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Yet, in the next paragraph, he described the unique qualities of the womb, including its texture.34
It is vital to keep in mind that this change did not occur suddenly.
Women’s gender roles and stereotypes did not change as a result of their newfound,
uterus-derived importance. Rather, humoral-based gender, which supported gender roles and
stereotypes, were incorporated into the two-sex model.35 Historians Sara Mendelson and Patricia
Crawford observe, “the female body was one of the most significant sites where contemporary
medical theorists wrote the text of women’s otherness, weakness, inferiority, and passivity.”36 As
such, I utilize Scott’s gender theory to explore the ways in which concepts such as science,
disease, and madness affected gender, but also how gender constructed the power relations that
made up the politics of madness and disease. With the emergence of the two-sex model of the
body, sexed bodies combined with gender roles to create sexed mad disorders.

4.3 Madness and the Two-Sex Model of the Body
Despite sharing many mental disorders—melancholy, mania, frenzy, lunacy, and
idiocy—females and males had never been equally predisposed to them. For instance, males, as
the hotter gender, had less control of their temper, were more apt to become angry, and suffered
from disorders that reflected this (such as fever and rage). Melancholy was different for women.
Robert Burton wrote that although both sexes may be melancholic, women were more
“grievously troubled,” than men in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1632).37 The reason for this was
clear: “some make a question whether this head-strong passion [melancholy], rages more in
John Sadler, The Sick Woman’s Private Looking-Glass (London, 1636), 5.
The transition was slow as in any paradigm shift. Two other major questions about female and male bodies—
whether orgasm was necessary for procreation, and whether women contributed to procreation or were merely a vessel
for men’s seed—remained sources of debate.
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women than men,” he began, “but sure it is more outrageous in women, as all melancholy is, by
reason of the weakness of their sex.”38 Burton was not alone in this assessment. Historian Vieda
Skultans argue, “the contrast is striking between women’s melancholy and the contemporaneous
affliction in The Elizabethan Malady. Melancholy, when it affects women, is always described as
women’s melancholy. It is not described in the attractive terms of other kinds of melancholy,” as
deriving from, for example, philosophical dilemmas.39
As the two-sex model proliferated amongst medical men and women, sex and gender
became inextricably linked. Women were different from men in that they had a uterus
specifically designed for procreation, they were cold and wet, and thus the weaker sex in body
and mind. This meant that their gendered roles in early modern culture were not altered by the
new model, but rather reinforced. In this section I demonstrate that the shift from the one-sex
model to two-sex model had a profound influence on conceptions of madness. I posit that
contemporary physicians were unable to look beyond the gendered body and its accompanying
gender roles when diagnosing various types of madness, which began, first and foremost, in the
sexed body.
4.3.1 Prescribed Gender Roles and Stereotypes
England was “patriarchal” but not a “patriarchal system,” meaning that women were able
to modify, change, reject, or accept patriarchy throughout the period. To be sure, the meaning of
patriarchy itself changed over time according to evolving customs and belief systems.
Nevertheless, society was still “dominated by men.”40 Contemporary prescriptive language
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structured how women ought to behave, and popular literary stereotypes highlighted women’s
(perceived) flaws. As a result, literary sources, the law, and conduct books, bolstered by
Christian theology and medical beliefs, described women as subordinate to men in mind, body,
and spirit.
According to Mendelson and Crawford, prescriptive gender discourse derived primarily
from medical understandings of women’s bodies, religious teachings, the law, popular notions,
and stereotypes. Because women were dominated by cold and wet humours, their temperaments
indicated both physical and temperamental weakness. Females, as inferior males, were weak,
passive, quiet, patient, and peaceful. In a similar vein, religion taught that women had a lesser
status than men because of the Fall (original sin) and because they were made from the rib of
Adam. While the individualism of Protestant teachings ostensibly promoted spiritual equality
(with the emphasis on Scripture), husbands’ authority over their wives and children increased as
they became responsible for the moral and religious well-being of the household.41
The law also prescribed gender roles, women alone were required to remain faithful (a
baby’s mother was always a certainty; its father was not). Mendelson and Crawford elucidate,
“by the 1690s the House of Lords was of the view that a man, irrespective of his own adultery,
was entitled to divorce his adulterous wife and to remarry, and from 1699 onwards there were
attempts to turn female adultery into a statutory offence. No wife could obtain an act of
Parliament to divorce an adulterous husband.” Furthermore, under the doctrine of coverture,
women’s legal rights were subsumed under that of their husbands, as, according to the law, they
were one person. A woman relied on her husband to take legal action on her behalf. Furthermore,
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women could not make legal contracts or bring forth cases of marital rape. In summation,
medical theory and religion prepared women for a life of submission and piety.42
Jokes, fairy tales, songs, and proverbs propounded popular notions and stereotypes about
women that suggested they were incapable of following their prescribed roles. “Instead of being
obedient, pious, chaste, and silent, women were said to be insubordinate, hypocritical, lustful,
and garrulous by nature” which were “manifestations of a single fundamental defect: female
disobedience to male authority.” Women’s sexuality, in particular, was considered insatiable.
This was due to the assumption that women needed sex directly after menarche, as well as the
fear men had of being cuckholded.43 Deviancy also came in the form of scolds (shrews), gossips,
whores, and witches. Moreover, there were literary stereotypes for each stage of life from which
men and women could draw inspiration. As a maid, a woman could be portrayed as a virtuous
virgin or an old spinster. As a wife, a woman was either a devoted mother who stayed at home
and basked in the glow of domesticity, or an “idle city dame” with no scruples about gossiping
and gadding with her friends. As a widow, one could be a moral exemplar in need of protection
and charity, or a suspicious independent perpetually up to no good.44
Many women “internalized the discourses” and did not question their positions in the
home or community. Rather, their subordinate role to men was viewed as a natural part of the
Great Chain of Being’s divine hierarchy. However, it is important to keep in mind that women
were capable of resistance within the patriarchal construction, as proven by the historiography of
the past three decades. This resistance was done in specific women’s spaces, speech, and
friendships, through material culture (exchange of textiles, food, medicine, etc.), in religious
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prophecy, preaching, leadership, work, and politics.45 However, the gendered mad disorders
upon which this chapter is based were grounded in the prescriptive roles women were told to
uphold, as well as their inevitable failures to do so. This made them susceptible to the mad
distempers they endured.
4.3.2. “Particular to the Female Sex:” Mad Disorders and Their Emergence in the Wake of
the Two-Sex Model
Prescribed gender roles, along with the two-sex model of body, resulted in mad disorders
that were “particular to the female sex.” These included Suffocation of the Mother (womb),
which was a physical and mental disorder caused by the uterus arising, displacing other organs,
and preventing the sufferer from breathing. This diagnosis was first identified in Edward
Jorden’s A Brief Discourse of a Disease Called Suffocation of the Mother (1603) and in Edward
Topsell’s The History of the Four-Footed Beasts (1607).46 The word “hysterical,” (first used in a
translated version of a work by Jean de Renou, A Medical Dispensatory, in 1657) as in a
“hysteric passion/hysteria,” was another term for Suffocation of the Mother in the seventeenth
century, and movement of the womb was the most popular theory of its origin. Its etiology
shifted during the mid to late seventeenth century, by which time dissections had proven that the
uterus could not move on its own. John Johnston, Professor of Physic in Frankfurt, wrote “that
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the womb may ascend out of its place towards the upper parts as high as the stomach, is the
opinion of some, but false. For ‘tis so tied with four ligaments, that it cannot be moved upwards
at all.” Instead, he contended, the cause of The Suffocation of the Mother was a malignant
vapour (exhalation) arising from the womb and spreading throughout the body.47 Philosopher
and physician Nicholas Fonteyn similarly wrote, “for though a woman be dead, yet can you not
with an ordinary strength remove the Matrix from the natural place.” He found two causes for
The Suffocation of the Mother: retention of men’s seed and the cold and moist humoral
environment of the uterus. Results of this distemper could vary from a feeling of suffocation to
oppression of the heart, fainting, weak pulse, and convulsive fits.48 Culpeper likewise ascribed
the disease to corrupt seeds and lack of menstruation in the womb, which created an evil vapour
that floated upwards.49 Though Culpeper here referred to men’s seed, it was women’s wombs
that mixed the seed with evil humors to create evil vapours, hence the first quote opening this
chapter. It seems the causes of this disorder were manifold and changed throughout the century.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it would evolve in meaning to a nervous disorder.50
Greensickness, originally a disease “characterized by greenish discoloration of the skin,”
took on its sex-specific meaning in Robert Green’s Mamilia, A Mirror or Looking Glass for the
Ladies of England (1583). Greensickness was a mental and physical disorder that occurred after
a woman’s menarche if she maintained her virginity, often “for want of a husband.”51 Though
virgins were predisposed to this distemper, the causes were lack of menstruation, the gathering of
bad humours that obstructed the vessels of the womb, and an “evil diet” of chalk, earth, and clay
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(which today might be diagnosed as an iron deficiency). Eating these unnatural foods alone was
considered symptomatic of insanity, but this was in addition to the other manifestations of
Greensickness: fainting, disdain for meat, heart palpitations, difficulty breathing, melancholy,
and swelling of the face.52 A similar disorder specific to women was called “frenzy of the
womb,” which, originating in the Nympha (labia minora), was the precursor to today’s diagnosis
of nymphomania. This will be explored further below. Though the authors of these texts still
quoted Hippocrates and Galen, the origins of these body-derived mental disorders, all first
diagnosed and described within 100 years of one another, is demonstrative of their tie to the twosex model. Suffocation of the Mother and its later form Hysteria, Greensickness, and frenzy of
the womb were disorders found in many anatomist’s and physician’s books.
“Particular to the female sex” and similar phrases in advertisements for physic is
evidence of the direct link between the newly emerged two-sex model and women’s mad
disorders of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. An anonymous advertisement titled
Nothing without God (1670) insisted that the physician “cures the Greensickness and opens all
obstructions belonging to women.”53 Similarly, John Newman offered to cure “all distempers
incident to women,” including “the fits of the Mother.”54 Peter Maris asserted that he could
remove “Greensickness and other distempers peculiar to women.”55 The physician Stephen
Draper considered himself a women’s specialist, having “cured many of hundreds of your sex.”
He drew upon contemporary discourse to associate women with their disorders: “there are many
distempers that women and maids are subject to, by weakness proceeding from the defects in
nature, but oftener by grief and melancholy humours.” These distempers included “a

Culpeper, Culpeper’s Directory, 100-101; Johnston, Idea of Practical Physic, 80-81.
Nothing Without God (1670).
54
John Newman, By His Majesty’s Authority (1680).
55
Peter Maris, Advertisement (1700)
52
53

185
Suffocation, or uprising of the Vapours of the Mother,” the movement of the womb throughout
the body, and “all curable distempers of the womb.” There was a dominant theme in Draper’s
and the proceeding men’s writing: women’s bodies were so different from men that they had
sex-specific diseases. This was clear in Draper’s conclusion appealing to the goodwill not of
“women,” but of the Other sex for which he was so qualified to cure: “Ladies, this printed paper
is humbly presented to your candid censure, with the purest love imaginable to your sex.”56
Advertisements identified distempers unique to women, but deemed it inappropriate to
pinpoint the actual disorders. Thomas Saffold recommended his “Ague-Pill,” which was “good
to cure women of all such distempers as are not seemly to name in this Bill.”57 Another doctor
practiced similar caution in promoting his pill, which he insisted cures “Greensickness, with
many other things in women not fit to be mentioned.”58 The author of the In James’s-Street in
Covent-Garden advertisement likewise maintained that he cured “the Greensickness in
virgins . . . and all distempers which are incident to women, which are not convenient
[appropriate] here to mention.”59 Was this to protect women’s propriety or to prevent disgust in
their readers? Most likely, the omissions were motivated by both factors, but it is clear that these
disorders had to do with the uterus.
Women’s advertisements written by women utilized the same rhetoric of sex-derived
mad diseases. A doctor’s wife recognized “that many women . . . through modesty, are unwilling
to let a common physician know their distempers,” and as such, she believed herself uniquely
qualified “for the safe and speedy curing of all manner of diseases particular to the female sex.”60
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A gentlewoman in Holborn included Greensickness among her list of curable ailments, which
caused “various symptoms in young women . . . so that most distempers incident to women may
arise from it.”61 Anne Laverenst’s parents taught her physic, and she was confident she “shall be
able to cure any distemper incident to womankind,” her advertisement having been addressed
“To Ladies and All Others of the Female Sex.”62 Willemina Sasbout van Socburgh, newly
arrived in England, also considered herself a woman’s specialist. She used some variation of the
phrase “cure all women and maids” four times in her publication. Though van Socburgh boasted
that she had the skills necessary to cure myriad maladies in women, over half of them were
gynecological in nature. These include “Suffocation, or an uprising in the Mother; that is, when
the Mother comes to swell or arise, when there is any rotten substance in her.”63
Advertisements establish that mad diseases such as Suffocation of the Mother,
Greensickness, and other distempers were inextricably linked to one sex: women. That the mad
disorders all arose within a 100-year period is not coincidence, as it was concurrent with the shift
from the one- to the two-sex model. The next two sections connect sexed disorders with the
gendered discourse on which they were based.
4.3.3. Sexed Bodies Beget Sexed Mental Disorders
Within the two-sex paradigm, sex-specific mad disorders emerged (or, in the case of
hysteria, re-emerged). I have found when the origins of men’s mad disorders were linked to the
reproductive organs (which, from my research, was rare), they were frequently described in
purely physiological terms. This meant that they were involuntary and not caused by any mental
or moral deficiency. By contrast, woman-specific mad disorders were always linked to the womb
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(uterus) in some form, and they were coupled with some type of mental or moral weakness. I
support these arguments with a contrast between Suffocation of the Mother, Greensickness, and
frenzy of the womb in women and Satyriasis (or Priapism) in men.
Hippocrates’s maxim “omnium morborum causae sunt Uteri” (“uteruses are the cause of
all diseases”) from De Loci in Homine was adopted into the two-sex model of the body.
Anatomists and physicians adapted this medical theory and its Christian equivalent of original
sin into the mad disorders of the seventeenth century. The uterus was the source of problems in
women because it was in communication with other parts of the body. Doctors and anatomists
used different language such as “sympathetic to,” “consent with,” or “correspondence with” to
describe the relationship between the womb and the animal faculty (brain), natural faculty
(liver), and vital faculty (heart). Edward Jorden, Nicholas Culpeper, and Nicholas Fonteyn are a
few examples of physicians who wrote that the womb was capable of wreaking havoc because of
its far-reaching effects. Jorden explained that the brain, heart, and liver “are affected in this
disease [Suffocation of the Mother] and do suffer in their functions as they are diminished,
depraved, or abolished, according to the nature and plenty of the humor, and the temperament
and situation of the Mother.”64 This made the womb particularly dangerous.
The uterus was certainly to blame in Jorden’s A Brief Discourse of a Disease Called the
Suffocation of the Mother (1603) that opened Chapter 2. His work brought the ancient disease of
hysteria into the early modern era. In 1601, Jordan argued in court that Mary Glover, his young
patient, was not bewitched or possessed by the Devil but instead was suffering from a natural
disease. While it was better to be considered mad than possessed, the ways in which Jordan
described The Suffocation of the Mother drew upon preconceived notions of women’s bodies as
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weaker and susceptible to bodily disruption. Jordan explained that hysteria was often called “The
Suffocation of the Mother” because the Mother (or womb) moved about the body, compressed
various faculties, and made it hard for women to breathe. As a result, they choked. Rather than
moving, sometimes the womb, “annoyed” by “some unkind humor,” would try to rid itself of the
humor and communicate the problem to the principal faculties of the body (the brain, heart, and
liver).65
Of particular importance in Jorden’s Discourse is his section on the ways in which The
Suffocation of the Mother affected the mind. For Jordan, the disruption in men’s and women’s
minds occurred for different reasons. Men’s minds were corrupted through negative emotions or
thoughts, and women’s through uterine problems (he does not bring up the possibility of male
sex organs as the origin of madness). “The internal sense is depraved when a man doth imagine,
judge, or remember things that are not as if they were,” opined Jordan. “We see [a depraved
internal sense] in those fools which we call naturals, in mad men, in melancholic men, in those
that are furious, in such as do dote, in such as are distracted through love, fear, grief, joy, anger,
hatred, etc.” By contrast, “deprivation of the internal senses” in women was brought about by
“the fits of the Mother.” Moreover, hysteria often caused “an alienation of the mind...whereby
[women] sometimes will wax furious and raging deprived of their right judgment and of rest.”66
In Jordan’s assessment there was a direct connection between the uterus and a disturbed mind.
Doctor John Sadler from the City of Norwich detailed all manners of “uterine affects, or
diseases arising from the womb,” one of which was the mad disorder The Suffocation of the
Mother, in The Sick Woman’s Private Looking-Glass (1636). The symptoms were similar to
those Jordan described. The womb, rising toward the diaphragm, caused women to choke.
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Movement of the womb caused madness as, in conference with the brain, breathing was
interrupted and “she falls to the ground, as one being dead.” This was not surprising to Sadler,
given that in terms of diseases, he asserted, “I found none more frequent, none more perilous
than those which arise from the ill affected womb . . . there is no disease so ill but may proceed
from the evil quality of it.”67 Fonteyn also built on the womb as malevolent, citing Hippocrates’s
de Locis in Homine in the first chapter of The Woman’s Doctor (1652). Though Fonteyn did not
believe the uterus was capable of moving about the body, he still blamed women’s madness on
the womb’s vapours in addition to their insatiable passion. “Lecherous women” and “lusty
widows” were most disposed to the disease, he asserted, “but married women that enjoy the
company of their husbands, and such as are with child, are seldom invaded by it.”68 Sexuality
outside of marriage, coupled with an evil womb, was the perfect amalgamation for the Mother to
cause madness.
Women’s unique physiology would be the bane of their sex, as Doctor William Harvey
and Italian physician Alessandro Massaria made clear in their works. Harvey, a physician known
for discovering the circulation of blood, asserted that women’s constitution made them
particularly susceptible to medical problems. In his On the Generation of Animals (1651) Harvey
lamented, “No one of the least experience can be ignorant what grievous symptoms arise when
the uterus either rises or falls down, or is in any way put out of place, or is seized with spasm—
how dreadful, then, are the mental aberrations, the delirium, the melancholy, the paroxysms of
frenzy . . . all arising from unnatural states of the uterus.”69 R.T.’s translation of Massaria’s De
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Morbis Fæmineis; The Woman’s Counsellor (1657) echoed the same sentiments. “Wherefore, is
it not requisite to call such infirmities women’s diseases,” he asked, “and for them to institute not
only a proper treatise, but a special cure.” As a direct consequence of their condition, women
suffered from the symptoms of The Suffocation of the Mother: rising of the uterus, retention of
seed, and ceasing of menstrual terms, the outcome of which was “sometimes madness itself.”70
Physicians demonstrated that the two-sex model of the body was in full force during the Stuartera. The womb was not an inverted penis, but rather a body part specific to women which could
cause the detrimental mad disease Suffocation of the Mother.
Greensickness and frenzy of the womb were two separate but similar disorders in that
they originated in the wombs’ exposure to too little or too much sexual activity. According to the
sexual mores of early modern England, women were to remain virgins until marriage. Those who
had carnal relations before marriage could be branded whores or lecherous deviants. To remain a
virgin for too long was also problematic, for women ought to be producing children. Once again,
stereotypes and the two-sex model of the body converged into mad disorders. One parallel
disorder that caused madness in men if it lasted was Satyriasis, a prolonged erection of the yard
(penis) due to purely physiological problems. It was not due to lecherous or virginal activity.
Instead, men were victims.
Harvey’s Exercitatio anatomica de circulation sanguinis (1651), Johnston’s The Idea of
Practical Physic (1657), and Robert Pierce’s Bath Memoirs (1679) each detailed the debilitating
mad disorder Greensickness. Harvey opined that this disease affected women whose “uterus
grows hot, their menses flow, and their bosoms swell,” but have remained “too long unwedded.”
Without marriage, women were sexually unsatisfied, and Harvey likened them to animals: “all
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animals, indeed, grow savage when in heat,” he insisted. “In like manner women occasionally
become insane through ungratified desire, and to such a height does the malady reach some, that
they are believed to be poisoned, or moonstruck, or possessed by the devil.”71 The cure for
women in these states was a husband who could provide “hymeneal exercises,” a euphemism for
intercourse. As Robert Boyle reported, an eighteen-year-old girl was examined by Doctor
Harvey, who, believing her malady to have been caused by the uterus, advised her parents to
provide her with a husband. Boyle concluded that as a result of her marriage, the patient was “to
many men’s wonder, cured of that strange disease.”72
Pierce kept an extensive casebook of the patients he cured through drinking and bathing
in the waters of Bath, a region in the southwest of England. He began the ninth chapter of Bath
Memoirs (1697) with a description of the case studies that were to come, “those maladies that are
peculiar to the Female Sex.” He then explained the reason he would not provide patients’ names
as he had done in previous chapters with his male patients: the “modesty of their sex,” and the
“respect we owe them for it.” He also explained that “since God and nature has given them the
heavier end of the staff, in bearing the burdens of this life, we ought (in good manners, as well as
in justice) to make it as easy to them as we can.” 73 Women’s diseases were apparent both in the
young and old, married and unmarried, those with children and those that were childless, Pierce
elucidated. He divided the chapter, aptly named “Women’s Diseases” into five sections:
Greensickness, barrenness, problems with conception after the birth of one or more children,
miscarriages, and “uterine fluors.” Much of this chapter (particularly the middle three sections
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on barrenness, problems with conception, and miscarriages) was spent extolling the virtues of
Bath and its curative waters. But his descriptions of Greensickness and Uterine Fluors
(menstruation), which were not necessarily tied to women’s reproductive role, are especially
insightful for Pierce’s descriptions of women’s susceptibility to these diseases.
One female patient of Dr. Pierce experienced dreadful pain before drinking the waters of
Bath. Lady Berisford’s daughter, 19 years old, was brought to Pierce because she was suffering
from “the Virgin Disease.” He described her condition in grave terms: “besides the usual
discolour of the face, want of appetite, spirits, and strength . . . she was more than ordinarily
troubled with Vapours, and strange Fits, doubtless Hysterical.” Her treatment involved drinking
Bath water and bathing in it for several weeks, after which she seemed to recover. The doctor
had high hopes for Lady Berisford’s daughter, stating “I hope my Lady . . . by giving her to a
good husband, prevented a relapse.”74 Pierce’s observation of this patient thus ended with a note
that spoke to women’s unique vulnerability to Greensickness, and its only true cure: sexual
relations with one’s husband.
Pierce’s book also reinforced the persistent belief that the uterus was a cause of disease.
Referencing “omnium morborum causae sunt Uteri,” he added “if those parts in women are not
the cause of all diseases incident to that sex, to be sure they are greatly their aggravation.” He left
no doubt that women’s weak bodies and their menstrual cycles were the causes of women’s
diseases. “It is not always [women’s] faults...that bring upon them the beginnings of these
distempers” he insisted, though he referenced “too frequent and various venery, lascivious
thoughts and imaginations” for those cases when hysteria was a women’s fault. Instead, he was
adamant that women’s diseases were the result of “their very frame,” which “lays them liable to
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it. Nature making that part a sink, and drain to the rest of the body.”75 Pierce could not be clearer:
it was women’s inferior bodies that caused symptoms of madness in women. Johnston referred to
the madness of Greensickness as “the Virgin’s Disease,” in his chapter titled “Of the Symptoms
more familiar to those that live out of wedlock.” He insisted that virginity itself called forth an
abundance of “crude humors” that could also lead to The Suffocation, “madness of the womb,”
and melancholy in women. Symptoms of Greensickness included head pain, madness, and
humors and vapours moving throughout the body. “‘Tis called the virgins’,” Johnston explains,
“because it appears most of all to virgins, and truly to the fairer, endued with a white colour,
thence the tincture from crude humours is the easier.”76
Johnston also described the desire for venery, a parallel disorder to Greensickness that
overcame hypersexual women drove them to pure insanity. “Well-fleshed virgins,” in other
words, virgins ready for sex, young widows, and women whose husbands were impotent, were
most susceptible to this disease. His description is horrific, as women suffered “in sadness and
silence suppressing their desires,” or screamed out in laughter, anger, or “bawdy discourse.”
Some even went so far as to throw themselves at men, or in Johnston’s words, “prostitute
themselves.”77 Yet this melancholy was not due to unnatural desire alone. Johnston blamed a
body part newly important to anatomists: the clitoris. Women who wanted to have sex
experienced a swollen, hard clitoris. Though by this time the clitoris was the “female penis,” in
women it was a disorder, not an erection. It is telling that, as a last resort, Johnston suggested that
“the flesh must be cut off” as a cure.78 Even when madness was the result of similar physical
symptoms, men and women’s bodies were treated differently.
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Culpeper and Felix Plater likewise recognized the abnormal behavior that developed
from women’s lustful nature, diagnosed as frenzy of the womb. Widows and virgins were
susceptible to frenzy of the womb according to Culpeper, as this disease arose in those “mad for
lust,” and it “tends to madness.” Affected by their extreme desire for sexual indulgence and
bawdy thoughts, women engaged in inappropriate behavior, soliciting and lying down for men.79
In addition to these licentious thoughts, there was a physical cause in the vagina. The Nymphae
(labia minora, and the linguistic origin of the disorder Nymphomania) grew hot and swollen. The
Nymphae affected the clitoris, or “the seat of venery.” The Nymphae and clitoris also became
warm through consuming hot spiced meats and wine, dancing, and reading “bawdy histories.”
The chief physician and professor at Basil, Felix Plater, warned his readers about the mad
behavior that proceeded from women who remained unsatisfied. They engaged in “sordid, nasty
actions,” as “this disease occasions many to try unlawful things, and to fall into great sins to
appease lust.” Plater went so far as to include bestiality in the list of behaviors to which women
would resort if they remained sexually unfulfilled in Platerus Golden Practice of Physic (1664).
To be sure, this was a woman’s problem. “This is oftener in women than men,” Plater asserted,
“as weakness is oftener in men than women; as in foul and pocky women, or the like.”80 Thus,
women’s sexual thoughts and bodies worked against them.
The parallel disorders in men, Satyriasis and Priapismus, were rarely described as the
result of men’s impure thoughts, marital status, virginity, or hypersexuality as Greensickness.
The term “Satyriasis” first emerged in 1657, though descriptions of the condition had been
circulating through the medical community since the early seventeenth century.81 Men’s
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prolonged erection was considered purely physiological, a far cry from the blame placed on
women for remaining virgins or acting in any way sexual. Johnston prefaced his description of
Satyriasis by stating “lechery is too great a proneness to venery by default of the seed, sometimes
also so great, that ‘tis turned into madness.” An irregular erection of the yard was caused by an
abundance of blood and the heat of the seeds within their vessels. Johnston used purges and
vomits as cures. Notably, he did not suggest cutting off the yard as he did the clitoris a mere two
pages later.82 According to Crooke’s Microcosmographia (1615), the erection of the yard for a
prolonged period of time was unnatural, neither following the animal faculties of the brain (by
will of the imagination) nor the natural faculties of the liver (involuntary). Moreover, Priapismus
was “altogether without lust or appetite,” the opposite of frenzy of the womb in women. The
cause was crass and thick wind or vapour from the nerves or ligaments.83
Erections were spontaneous and unintentional in the onset of Satyriasis. No thought was
required, and as such, men’s characters were not called into question. Physician Robert
Bayfield’s Enchiridion Medicum (1655) described Priapismus as “a disease in which the yard is
extended in length and bigness without any lusting.” Instead, the causes were abnormalities of
the arteries, vapours, or celibacy. Priapismus was defined as Satyriasis when the condition was
accompanied by “a panting and beating of the yard.”84 Thomas Blount was equally as matter-offact in his glossary definition of Priapism (Priapismus): “a disease when the yard is stretched out
in length and breadth, nothing provoking the patient to lust and desire; if it come with a beating
or panting of the yard, then the evil is called Satyriasis.”85 In my examination of 32 uses of the
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words “Satyriasis” or “Priapismus,” only two sources referenced mentality or morality to explain
these disorders. They stated that Satyriasis resulted from “a desire and appetite to carnal
copulation,” and “an immediate desire of venery.”86 Still, “desire” was less severe than the
stereotype-laden rhetoric of women’s sexed mad disorders.
Although these disorders were in medical treatises, did lay people worry about them in
their daily lives? Evidence in manuscript recipe books, which contained medical and culinary
recipes, suggest that they did. As early as 1606, Mrs. Corlyon recorded a recipe for
Greensickness that included raisins, licorice, annyseed, chamomile, rosemary, sorrel, violet
leaves, French mallows, and water. After sitting in water for 12 hours, boiling, sitting, and
straining, one-third pint of the medicine was to be taken before getting out of bed. The patient
was to “sweat gently if it offer itself.” Her recipe for the “risings of the Mother” was a bit
simpler, and it included laying a thick layer of chickweed and mace and applying heat. This
medicine, she insisted, would cause the Mother “to fall to the right place.”87 Constance Hall’s
recipe for convulsive fits (1672), which often accompanied Suffocation of the Mother, was to
“take rosemary, stamp it, strain it, give it in a spoonful of beer before the fit or now.” For
Greensickness, Hall recommended, “take Rosa solis new gathered, beat it into a conserve with
sugar, let the party take as much as a nutmeg. Fast 2 hours after using it. Exercise in a weeks’
time it shall cure them.”88 Margaret Wentworth preferred a powder for the cure of Greensickness
(c. 1679-1694), which contained sugar, mace, cloves, nutmeg, and steel.89 Other recipe books by
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Thomas Lodge (1623) and Margaret Baker (1675) and anonymous medicinal recipe books (from
c. 1600-1610, c. 1625-1700, 1675, and 1700) list complex and detailed recipes for frenzies,
convulsive fits, the Mother, and Greensickness.90
Further evidence that sexed mad disorders were part of contemporary medical vernacular
may be found in The Countess of Huntingdon’s death certificate. Her physician, Peter
Chamberlain, wrote that the disease to which she succumbed “was the inversion of the Mother or
place of conception.” Though she suffered from the Mother, Chamberlain reported that she died
in peace, as “she received her last hour with as much ease and slumber to a quiet mind and
labored body.”91 Moreover, though the meaning of the Mother changed over time and became a
nervous disorder termed “hysteria,” it remained for the most part a woman’s disease. Lecture
notes of an eighteenth-century British physician contain multiple references to hysteria and his
patients Isabel Hay and Ann Fenwick suffered from the distemper. Upon discovering his patient
Mary was “a hysteric case of 4 years standing,” she was considered “not a proper subject for us.”
As for Margaret Duncan, “she has been here since the 31st of October and may continue until
next October, for anything we can do for her. She has had symptoms of Hysteria.”92 Though it
evolved in diagnosis, Suffocation of the Mother and Hysteria’s connection with women endured
through the centuries.
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4.3.4. Women’s Gender Roles Reinforced in Mad Disorders
Anatomists and physicians nearly always described The Suffocation of the Mother,
Greensickness, and frenzy of the womb in a way that reinforced gender roles and stereotypes.93
Though humoral-based disorders may have strengthened gender roles for men, my research
indicates that this was not so for sex-based mad disorders. Rather, in the few instances where
men’s reproductive mad disorders were mentioned, they were straightforwardly physiological as
demonstrated by the diagnoses of Satyriasis and Priapism. Therefore, this section focuses on
women and gender discourse. The previous section, which also emphasized mad disorders that
originated in sexed bodies, has already demonstrated the reinforcement of some gender
stereotypes. Women were lecherous, lustful, and, paradoxically, too virginal at the age of
procreation, thereby making them more susceptible to these mad disorders. But investigating
women’s stereotypes does not just tell us about women. If women were to be passive, we may
conclude men were to be aggressive. If women were to be submissive and subordinate, men were
to dominant. In this section, I demonstrate how medical writing often included, either in the
preface, dedicatory, or main body, an explanation as to why women, besides their anatomy, were
subject to sexed mad disorders. Thus, the two-sex model of the body bolstered, rather than
lessened, the enduring humoral-based gender conventions.
One of the most important gender prescriptions for a woman was to be submissive and
subordinate to her husband. This meant that she was to be passive and modest and recognize that
she was stronger with a husband than without. Just as Pierce recommended a husband to stave
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off Greensickness and Harvey prescribed “hymenal exercises” for his patient, so other physicians
insisted that women who had regular intercourse with, or became pregnant by, their husbands
would be the healthiest. In his treatise on Suffocation of the Mother, Jorden wrote that women
“enjoying the benefit of marriage,” though capable of falling ill with the mad disease, “had their
respiration and vital faculties untouched.” In other words, they did not experience the harsh
symptoms the disease was capable of producing. Further on, Jorden reiterated this point by
stating that in addition to the other causes of the Mother, “the want of the benefit of marriage in
such as have been accustomed are apt thereunto.”94 R.T.’s translation of Massaria’s De Morbis
Fæmineis is more direct, though R.T. would only write “her husband may give her a present
remedy.” Massaria had written a more promiscuous suggestion, which R.T. left in Latin “lest it
offend the Maids:” “Si maritus ungat penem suum cum oleo gariophilorum admixto parum olei.
Amygdat: dulc: ad Caliditatem prioris temperandum, & cum uxore coeat; Matrix subito
descendet.”95 Translated, Massaria’s remedy was “If a husband should anoint his penis with oil
of cloves having been mixed with little oil of sweet almond for the purpose of regulating the heat
of the former, and let him mate with his wife, the womb will suddenly descend.”96 Culpeper
agreed that sex with one’s husband was useful. In fact, he listed it as a cure for Greensickness
(only for women who were married, of course).97
Women, as the more passive and modest sex, were said to be more inclined to mental
disorders and diseases in general. The first line of Jorden’s discourse on The Suffocation of the
Mother referenced the gendered stereotype of women’s temperaments. “The passive condition of
womankind,” he declared, “is subject unto more diseases and of other sorts and natures than men
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are, and especially in regard of that part [the womb] from whence this disease which we speak of
doth arise.”98 Modesty was also stereotypical behavior for women, as seen in the advertisements
above. The result of modesty was naiveté about the mad disorders of their own sex. Massaria
began his work on women’s diseases by stating “this being a subject, which too much modesty,
or indeed as it is, simple folly of many of the female sex, hath hindered them from attaining to.”
He later stated that many women keep the same “secret disease” yet are too “shamefaced and
modest” to inform their doctors about them.99
In addition to submission and modesty, physicians reinforced women’s weakness in body
and mind. Sadler believed women had the right to know how to treat themselves because he was
born of a woman himself. Due to the “manifold distempers of the body” and “through your
ignorance and modesty” he “could not but do my best, to inform and advise you in the
conservation of your own health.” He continued, “how necessary therefore the knowledge of
uterine diseases is, judge yee. And how many of you labor of them, all through your own
ignorance and modesty, woeful experience makes it manifest. For when a woman is afflicted
with any disease of the womb; first through her ignorance, she knowing not the cause thereof
being not instructed in the state of her body. And secondly loath to divulge” the illness to her
physician.100 In other words, women’s modesty and ignorance both caused their illnesses and
prolonged or prevented treatment. It was a cyclical problem from which women could not
escape. That women were not capable of helping themselves is also clear in Massaria’s work.
The first cause of the diseases of women, he wrote, is “that women carry diseases a long time
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about them, and root it in them, and yet are either voluntarily, or foolishly ignorant thereof.”101
The conclusion to be drawn was that women needed men to help them with their own bodies.
Men who consciously streamlined medical jargon wrote that it was done specifically for
women reading their books. I think it worth leaving Sadler and Doctor Bernard Mandeville’s
quotes intact so that their tones may be detected. After explaining that Sadler had deliberately
omitted some information for the fairer sex’s “modesty,” he wrote, “I have also stooped to your
capacities in avoiding hard words and rhetorical phrases, desiring rather to inform your
judgements with the truth, through a plain manner, than to confound your understandings with a
more rhetorical discourse.”102 75 years later, Mandeville echoed the same views: “In treating of
the hysteric passion, and what more immediately relates to the complaints of the fair sex, I have
likewise taken care, that to fit it for their perusal nothing should be cramped with Latin, to render
that part pleasant and entertaining as well as plain and instructive.”103 Thus, mad disorders were
evidence not only of the physical weakness of women’s reproductive organs in the two-sex
model, but also of the re-emphasis of gender rhetoric and stereotypes.

4.4 Conclusion
The sexed disorders of the seventeenth century were not static, and they underwent
change as medicine advanced and cultural stereotypes evolved. Dissections proving that the
uterus was incapable of moving, coupled with other theories about hysteria, caused leading
physicians to abandon the hypothesis that the disorder was sex-derived. Thomas Sydenham
wrote that hysteric diseases appeared in numerous forms, “for in whatever part of the body it be
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seated, it immediately produces such symptoms as are peculiar thereto.” The external causes of
hysteric diseases included “disturbances of the mind,” fasting for too long, or excessive
evacuations. The internal causes were irregular motions of the spirits, in particular of the animal
faculty (mind and brain), which corresponds with psychoneuroses today.104 Because hysteria no
longer was caused by the uterus, Sydenham compared hysteria and hypochondria’s similar
symptoms. This would become common in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth
century, as demonstrated by the titles of Doctor Bernard Mandeville’s A Treatise of the
Hypochondriac and Hysteric Passions (1711) and Doctor Richard Blackmore’s A Treatise of the
Spleen and Vapours: Or, Hypochondrical and Hysterical Affections (1725). Despite the
corresponding disease in both sexes, women were still the weaker gender according to their
temperaments: “hence women are more frequently affected with this disease than men, because
they have received from nature a finer and more delicate constitution of body, being designed for
an easier life and the pleasure of men, who were made robust.”105 This explains why women
were often diagnosed with nervous disorders and “the vapours” in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
Just as Thomas Willis was integral to the disenchantment of madness (see Chapter 2), he
also figured predominantly in the shifting definition of The Suffocation of the Mother. Willis is
credited with “discovering” the nervous system during the mid-seventeenth century by linking
the nerves to the brain and the brain to mental illness. Indeed, he doubted the ability of the womb
to ascend in women’s bodies despite the opinions of many “modern physicians.” He reasoned,
“for that the body of the womb is of so small bulk, in virgins, and widows, and is so strictly tied
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by the neighboring parts round about, that it cannot of itself be moved, or ascend from its place,
nor could its motion be felt.”106 Instead, distempers arose from parts of the body that men and
women had in common: “we are at length persuaded…that the distemper named from the womb,
is chiefly and primarily convulsive, and chiefly depends on the brain and the nervous stock being
affected.”107 But if Willis’s writing is demonstrative of a departure from the uterus as the chief
cause of madness, it was certainly not the end of female-specific diseases.
Madness is a unique malady with which to analyze gender relations and discourse in the
Stuart era. Unlike a toothache, which affected both sexes, and excessive menstrual bleeding,
which only affected women, madness was a disorder of the body and mind that contemporaries
could identify with one gender or both. In the case of madness, the transition from the one-sex
model of the body to the two-sex model of the body reinforced pre-existing gender stereotypes of
the humoral system. This chapter demonstrates that studies of medicine, disease, and madness
can be instructive in understanding contemporary aspects of society, such as gender relations. In
this case, mad disorders reinforced the humoral temperaments and stereotypes that women were
modest, submissive, sexually insatiable, and weak in body and mind.
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CHAPTER 5: THE LANGUAGE OF MADNESS: RHETORIC OF THE
BODY AND MIND IN POLITICAL CULTURE

Bedlam broke loose? yes, Hell is open’d too:
Mad-men, & Fiends, & Harpies to your view
We do present: but who shall cure the Tumor?
All the world now is in the Ranting Humor.
—Samuel Sheppard, 16511
In an allegorical play-pamphlet, The Disease of the House: Or, the State Mountebanck:
Administering Physic To a Sick Parliament (1649), a swindling doctor advertised his medicine as
a guaranteed cure for the ailing Parliament. “Come come, me have an antidote can cure your
body,” he promises. “Me make it new head, set it on sure.”2 The missing head was that of the
late King Charles I. The Rump Parliament, led by Cromwell, had tried and executed the King in
1649, leaving England without its figurative “head.” The doctor lamented Parliament’s
condition, now desperately ill without its King: “Me feel the pulse of the state, begar sick, sick,
sick; desparate sick; no head at all; it swoons in mine hand . . . this is a grand distemper in the
Brain; begar all mad, mad, mad, all England be very lunatic; you find yourself not well.”3 The
anonymous author’s description of the state as “sick” and without a “head” was part of a
common English trope that utilized the body as metaphor. The doctor’s diagnosis, however, went
beyond the body and incorporated the mind. The state had a “grand distemper in the brain” and
had grown “mad” and “very lunatic.” These descriptions of the state bore a remarkable
resemblance to contemporary accounts of insanity, which characterized the condition as a type of
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brain sickness. Ultimately, the doctor and his assistant Capon were unable to save Parliament
because, “the Devil’s turned loose, and all is topsie-turvy.”4
The Disease of the House is an example of the ways in which madness and its
associations (brainsickness, lunacy, distemper) were dispatched in the political culture of
England’s mid-century crisis. In his essay, “The Reconstruction of Discourse: Towards the
Historiography of Political Thought” (2009), J.G.A. Pocock defines “language” or “rhetoric”
present in early modern English political discourse as “a distinctive mode of utterance . . .
possessing its own terminology, style and conventions, and revealing as we come to know it the
implications and assumptions on which it rests and from which it regularly proceeds towards
conclusions, which are to some degree predetermined.” These discursive “speech acts”
influenced the audience, the speaker, and the “language-structure” itself.5 Following Pocock’s
model, I argue that pamphleteers employed a shared language of madness within the political
discourse of the Civil Wars and Interregnum. This language served to pinpoint and delegitimize
contemporaries of both sides’ gravest concerns: factionalism, political unrest, and sectarian
religion. Moreover, the rhetoric of insanity highlights three behaviors considered mad in political
culture: altering the natural order (e.g. disobeying the authority of the King or parliament),
changing one’s appearance (particularly the head), and engaging in religious enthusiasm (erratic
behavior that accompanied divine madness or oneness with God). Although this rhetoric was
used primarily in a derogatory sense, the strong language and tone of these political works
suggest that some writers may have considered their subjects to be truly mad, or out of their
minds.
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To further elucidate this point I have chosen a radical religio-political group that
represented all three lunatic behaviors for a case study: the Ranters. Fittingly, they were dubbed
the “Mad Crew,” and their critics frequently employed the language of madness to describe their
activities. The Ranters were a sect that flourished during the period under examination,
particularly in the years between 1649 and 1651. During the 1640s and 1650s, the world seemed
as though it had turned “upside down,” and the theology and practices of the Ranters only added
to this fear. Sectarians transgressed demarcated lines of social, political, and cultural norms,
along with acceptable religious practice. Royalists, moderate Presbyterians, and less radical
religious sects believed that Ranters’ spirituality subverted the laws of nature and acceptable
behavior. They promoted adultery, polygamy, and promiscuity. Indeed, the Ranters appeared to
be mad. At least, that is how politicians, divines, and anonymous pamphlet authors wrote about
them. In turn, Ranters themselves drew upon this rhetoric by describing their own spirituality as
a version of madness.
This study of the rhetoric of madness contributes to the history of political culture in
early modern England. The definition of “political culture” is ever evolving, but this chapter
aligns closely with Kevin Sharpe’s interpretation: the interweaving of the history of ideas and the
history of events. He suggests that to do this, historians must “historicize and particularize” the
history of ideas so they may “study the discursive performance or cultural act both as a political
event and ideological gesture.” What emerges is “a set of common validating languages which
contemporaries read, fused and glossed in quite different ways (at times conflicting ways); and a
struggle (unresolved) to claim those languages and representations, to control meaning itself.”6
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In other words, political culture contextualizes speech acts while simultaneously recognizing that
speech acts themselves contain the potential for political power. An analysis of rhetorical
madness also responds to Sharpe’s request for new avenues through which to study political
culture, in particular “the politics of attitudes to learning, madness, emotion and zeal.”7 The
rhetoric of madness provides a unique perspective with which to gauge how contemporaries
understood madness itself (the idea), as well as its implications in the political arena (the events).

5.1 A Deluge of “Mad” Publications
Contemporaries described England as “upside-down” during the English Civil War and
Interregnum. This is clear in the frontispiece of John Taylor’s Mad Fashions, Odd Fashions, All
out Fashions (Figure 5.1), wherein the horse
drove the wagon, the castle and candle are
upside-down, a man plowed the field instead of
cattle, fish fly in the air, and a man’s legs and
torso are switched. The end of censorship in
1641 encouraged the publication of more radical
tracts than ever before. When parliamentary
pressure caused King Charles I to abolish the

Figure 5.1: Frontispiece of John Taylor’s Mad
Fashions, Odd Fashions, All Out Fashions, or the
Emblems of These Distracted Times (1642)

Court of Star Chamber and the Courts of High Commission, censorship ended. This led to an
inundation of what Mary E. Fissell terms “cheap print:” small pamphlets, ballads, and
newspapers available to all classes and levels of literacy. Publications rose from 600 titles per
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year in the 1630s to 2,000 titles per in 1641, to 4,000 titles in 1642.8 Sharpe notes that the Civil
War (which began in 1642), allowed for “powerful pamphlet literature” that debased established
authority. In so doing, “the Civil War desacralized authority and fully politicized culture.”9
Nevertheless, this period of unhindered publishing was brief. The enactment of parliament’s
Printing Act in 1649 began to limit publishing, and Cromwell later reinstated regulations against
printing from 1655 to 1658 that were even more severe than those predating the Civil War.
Writers and printers who had taken issue with the King and Parliament rushed to publish
their concerns. Readers eagerly gobbled up whatever propaganda they could find, whether true
or false.10 While the Great Chain of Being analogy ensured that comparisons to the body (the
head as state, King, father, or husband) would be a common feature in the early modern English
vernacular, times of crisis, particularly the English Civil War and Commonwealth, were rife with
mentions and accusations of an unhealthy mind. That contemporaries drew upon a language of
madness is indicative of the volatility of the times as the English were witnessing the unity of
their country and Parliament coming apart at the seams.
5.1.1 Parliament, the King, and Factions
Political writers invoked the language of madness when questioning the authority of the
King or parliament. In addition, they utilized the language of madness to address the politically
factious nature of the time. The Great Chain of Being was a system of correspondences: the
King corresponded with God, with the head of the household (father), with the leader of the
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animal kingdom (lion), and with the head—or reason—of the body. “Thus the “body politic”
corresponded with the human body, in that the King was the head and ruled over the body.
Though largely metaphorical, invocations of the body in political writing were meaningful to
early modern readers when the politicized body provided an analogy for the commonwealth.11
Thus, references to a madness indicated that the entire kingdom was in danger. Furthermore,
pamphleteers drew upon madness to describe subversive actions or writing. Madness in these
cases was therefore unnatural, abnormal, and dangerous.
Parliamentarians described England’s conflicts as a consequence of the influence of King
Charles I’s advisors. When Charles I called Parliament in November 1640, it had been over 12
years since Parliament had met. Members of Parliament were reluctant to blame the King for
their troubles so they concentrated on Charles’s counselors. They insisted that Thomas
Wentworth, earl of Strafford and Lord Deputy of Ireland, had misled the King and posed a threat
to England with his army stationed in Ireland. John Pym, a leading Parliamentarian, described
his displeasure with Charles’s counselors in Mr. Pym’s Speech, Delivered at a Conference
betwixt both Houses (1641). Pym characterized the counselors, particularly Thomas Wentworth,
as a disease, both “contagious” and “infectious,” that had spread throughout the kingdom. In
blaming Wentworth and King Charles’s advisors, he avoided criticizing Charles or Parliament
directly. These evil counsels affected not only the body of the Commonwealth, but the brain. “I
shall remember the evil counsels about the King, whereof we have often complained,” lamented
Pym. “Diseases of the Brain are most dangerous, because from thence sense and motion are
derived to the whole Body. The malignity of evil counsels will quickly be infused in to all parts
of the State.”12 Wentworth and the other counselors guiding Charles were driving the King mad,
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which in turn would destroy the state. Pym drew upon a rhetoric of the mind, which suggests that
contemporaries were familiar with corporeal tropes and had some awareness of “diseases of the
brain,” or madness.
Six years later, an anonymous royalist pamphlet described Parliament as suffering from a
disease in The Plague at Westminster. Or, An Order for the Visitation of a Sick Parliament
(1647).13 The satirical pamphlet was written from the perspective of the House of Commons,
supplicating the House of Lords to fix the problems facing England. The House of Commons
lamented their actions against the King, for “we have not rebelled against you, but against the
King, our most gracious Lord and Governour ... we now too well (O Lords) understand that we
have grievously sinned.” The House of Commons proceeded to beg the House of Lords to
consider the sickness of their bodies, which were ravaged with “hunger, thirst, nakedness, want
of our limbs, deformities, sickness and mortality.” The metaphor of disease was not limited to
their bodies. “Consider the infirmities of our minds,” pleaded the House of Commons, “the
furious rages, envies, rancor, and curatives, the implacable sorrows and desperate passions, the
continual hell, torments, and remorse of conscience (for our late forced rebellion against our
king).” These problems of the mind were the result of losing their metaphorical head: the King.
Furthermore, the Lords’ response to the House of Commons was their acknowledgement “that
you have done the part of a body without a head.”14 In this case, the anonymous pamphleteer
drew on the rhetoric of the body and mind to chastise the House of Commons for their poor
decisions. The consequences for not supporting Charles, the Lords warned, would be grave.
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Royalist authors distraught by the ravages of Civil War disparaged those who did not
support the King or the “ancient and orthodox faith.” The anonymous author of England’s Mad
Petition (1647) created a fictitious pamphlet from supporters of Parliament, who, having caused
such chaos in England, petitioned for “the enlargement of Bedlam, and other respective places”
so that they may be housed there.15 These supposed petitioners readily admitted, “whatsoever
mad exploits have been reported as done heretofore, ours will hold no parallel; we have
exceedingly surpassed all mad shavers, mad companions, mad blades, mad rogues, mad rascals,
mad Toms, mad Maudlins, mad Besses, and mad-caps.” They even recognized their mental
deficiency in their actions: “we…have madly armed ourselves, madly marched into field, madly
waged battle, madly killed one another…have madly involved ourselves in (almost) universal
lunacy and apostasy from God and our King.”16 For their actions, these petitioners saw no other
recourse than to expand Bedlam. The author of the pamphlet also wrote Parliament’s response to
the petition, in which they took full responsibility for the crazed state of the country and for their
supporters’ actions. “Have you not danced after our mad pipe,” asked Parliament, “we are as
mad as he that’s maddest among you.” Parliament then suggested “shortly shall our wits
recover…we shall see England cured of her madness.”17 Thus, an entire pamphlet was dedicated
to lunacy of Parliament, its supporters, and their victims: all of England.
John Taylor’s Mad Fashions, Odd Fashions, All Out of Fashions (1642, Figure 5.1)
lamented the chaos of the Civil War, likening England to Bedlam. Throughout the poem he
described the graphic horrors of the Irish Rebellion, sectarian disrespect for the Church of
England’s rites, and disloyalty to the King as contributing to the “world’s turned upside down,
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from bad to worse . . . men’s wits are monstrously disfigured.” The language of madness is clear
in a verse from page four, “For like as on the poles, the world is whirled,/ So is this Land the
Bedlam of the World…Men’s brains and wits (two simples beat together)/ From thence (mixed
and compounded) are sent hither…/From all these mouths and more, mad sects are sent,/ Who
have religion all in pieces rent.18 The poem as a whole invoked insanity as the only plausible
explanation for the many political, religious, and social issues that plagued England. Taylor
concluded that to correct their upside-down world, it was necessary to avoid Popish rites, obey
the Church of England, pledge loyalty to the King, and respect parliament.
An anonymous manuscript bundled with “A Collection of Poems and Ballads in Ridicule
of the Parliamentary Party during the Quarrel with Charles I” similarly grieved the state of
England. The poem is titled “I tell thee Tom, where I have been,” a reference to the character
Mad Tom. “The men the maids and every lad/ God bless them all are quite run mad/ Worse than
any Bedlam Tom,” the author bemoaned. He or she touched on their perception of the troubles of
the time. This included sectarian preaching (“Some preach in carts, and some in tubs/ And to the
pulpit ever shrubs), disloyalty to the king (“This day they pray for Charles are King/ And then
they speak treason as a thing”) and the ignorance of Parliament (Some take their swords, and
some their staves/ And gathers God knows how many knaves/ Worse Tom then thou or I/ And
go down to Parliament/ To pass such laws as they’ll assent”).19
5.1.2. Roundheads, Soundheads, and Rattle-heads
The ways in which the language of madness was utilized depended upon whether one
was a Royalist or Parliamentarian. For Royalists, madness was supporting Parliament and Pym.
For Parliamentarians, madness was loyalty to King Charles I. For some contemporaries, madness
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was factions and unrest in general. The language of insanity therefore indicates that alterations to
the natural order, particularly challenges to authority, hierarchy, and peace, was lunatic in
behavior. While the language of madness may have been metaphorical within these specific
examples, they reveal more broadly that subversion of authority was considered indicative of
insanity.
The rhetoric of language reinforced the notion that madness was tied to physical
appearance. Lack of clothing (as seen in Chapter 2), oddly shaped heads, and even unorthodox
dress represented unreason. This is clear in the pamphlet wars between Parliamentarians and
Royalists, or more specifically between Roundheads and Cavaliers. Although “Roundhead”
originated as a disparaging term for Parliamentarians with short hair, it was coopted by
Parliamentarians as a general insult against Royalists. This was possible because derogatory
terms could be based not simply on appearance, but perceived intelligence (or lack thereof). A
prime example is the illustration The Sound-Head, Rattle-Head, and Round-Head (1642), in
which an Anglican cleric is the Sound-Head (of sound mind), a Catholic friar is depicted as a
Round-Head, and somewhere in the middle is a Rattle-Head (Figure 5.2 ).20 Here, the Roundhead
is not a short-haired Parliamentarian but a Catholic friar, complete with tonsure and crucifix in
hand. A church with a statue of the Virgin and Child stands in the background. The Roundhead
shares the crucifix with a man who is half-Jesuit priest and half-Anglican bishop. “Rattle-head”
was a derogatory term for Royalists or Cavaliers, and meant an “empty-headed person” or
“rattle-brain,” uncoincidentally.21
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The connection between the two-faced Anglican bishop/Jesuit priest and the Catholic
friar is clear. In addition to their grasp of the same crucifix, the caption below the friar reads
“Since these Round-Heads with Rattle-Heads agree/Romish malignants Round-Heads (right)
may be.” Thus, the Royalist was represented by both Roundhead and Rattle-Head, the latter of
which was often used as a derogatory term for Cavaliers. This pamphlet demonstrates that we
cannot look at these pejorative terms solely as reflective of appearance or as randomly assigned.
Writers drew upon the language of mental disorders that formed an important part of political
debate and a means of delegitimizing different political and religious views.

Figure 5.2: The Sound-Head, Rattle-Head, and Round-Head (1642). The British Museum Collection Online,
museum number: 1848.0911.443.
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The soundheads description of the roundhead (1642) reinforced the notion that
Roundheads were actually Cavaliers, not Parliamentarians. This was a response to An exact
description of a Roundhead, and a long-head shag-poll (1642) (which itself was a response to
anti-Parliamentarian tracts, in particular by the known-Royalist John Taylor). The soundheads
description of the roundhead was thus written to set the record straight: Roundheads were
Royalists, and the tract would once and for all “satisfy the whole world in the resolution of this
monstrous beast, who and what he is, and by what marks he may be known and seen.”22 The
author wrote that Roundheads were actually Cavaliers who had hidden their smooth, bald heads
beneath the fashionable wigs worn primarily by Royalists.
Beyond descriptions of their anatomical heads, the pamphlet alluded to the language of
madness pervading the political jargon of the period. The author wrote that a Roundhead was
“bushed and shagged down to his back,” and “while his brains do ache and crack, And his
tongue doth swear and chat, and curse his brother Roundheads that, Turned him into a counterrat.” A Royalist was a “Roundheaded gentleman in his new periwig, his head and his wits
running around, led and carried up and down by every fool…till he hath run out and lost all his
wits.”23 Indeed, with a smooth head, “he is deprived of his natural wits: his hair being newly
gone, his wits went presently.” Descriptions of Roundheads’ mental state continued, for “he is a
person whose mind and intellectual part is full of blindness, darkness, simplicity, and gross
ignorance; yea palpable gross thick darkness, that may be felt, yea willful blindness...such who
are the brainless generation of ignorant persons…it being ever the property of profane fools to
speak evil of that which is good, and them that profess goodness, through their monstrous
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ignorance.”24 These words surpassed characterizations of Royalists as political and religious
rivals. By insisting that Roundheads were fools, crack-headed, and brainsick, the author of this
pamphlet deemed them unworthy of notice. They were mad animals by nature, and thus readers
were not to give their words any credence.
Royalists, the prolific John Taylor in
particular, also wrote about the mental deficiencies of
Roundheaded Parliamentarians. In his 1642 pamphlet
Heads of all fashions, Taylor characterized
Parliamentarians and sectarians based on the
supposed shapes of their heads (as is clear by the
fictionally shaped heads on his frontispiece, Figure

Figure 5.3: Frontispiece of John Taylor’s
Heads of All Fashions (1642).

5.3). A Roundhead, for example, was “a man whose brains compact, whose verilies [truths] and
trulies are an act.”25 People he called “deep-heads” allowed their fears of Catholicism to extend
to fears of unmitigated monarchical control (as in Spain and Rome). Taylor chronicled “deepheads” as having “an apprehensive brain.” He described Arminians (those who followed
Archbishop’s Laud’s Catholic-leaning efforts to beautify the church and raise the caliber of the
clergy) as having “a shallow brain.” Uneducated “narrow-heads” were those “whose brains are
couched, into a tiny room, may not be touched.”26
Altered dress and appearance, whether real or the result of imaginative propaganda, was
prominent in the language of madness. Legal and medical texts referred to physical deformities,
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including the size and shape of one’s head and face, in their diagnoses of idiocy.27 Furthermore,
dress was an important aspect of politics and indicative of the wearer’s mental state. Disparaging
remarks about Royalist periwigs and their baldness beneath suggested a voluntary nudity of the
head. References to deformed heads in political culture were tied to authentic means of
identifying mental disorder, and as such the language of madness was employed to delegitimize
rival political groups. These pamphlets make clear that deformities and socially unacceptable
forms of dress were indicative of madness.
5.1.3. Sectarians
Authors dedicated to the Church of England employed the language of madness to
delegitimize religious radicals, and in so doing, highlighted the deviancy and mad behavior of
enthusiasm (an attempt to achieve oneness with God previously called “divine madness”).
Though far from Popish leanings, their behavior was just as egregious. Sectarians were more
vocal than ever before within the freedom that came with civil disorder, gathering members,
publishing tracts, and meeting in conventicles. For Richard Carter, author of The schismatic
stigmatized (1641), these “repining reformers, quarrel-pickers, and corner-creepers” were a
group of “brain-sicks” who deigned to preach despite not being members of the clergy. Indeed,
Carter wrote that they “brawl their brains out of their brain-sick brows” like the Anabaptists as
they babbled, reproached episcopal order, and disavowed the rituals of the Church of England.28
Carter included a poem with direct references to mental disorders to conclude the pamphlet. In
addition to labeling sectarians “this brain-sick crew,” he wrote:
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Against disorders fools will prate,
Controlling King, Church, and State,
Bishops preach wrong, but Cobblers right;
(If judge may be the brain-sick-wight [creature]).
Their trade is all to prate, and hear,
Because they are all mouth and ear;
Like hounds, they hark, and bark about;
Our church is combed with this rout…
He that shall at my verses stick,
Perhaps may prove some schematic:
Sectaries, brain-sick heads are sick,
All spur-gald Jades [horse] will wince and kick.29
The language of madness was familiar vernacular in a society where the mad routinely roamed
the streets and were rarely sequestered away. Beyond direct references to madness, Carter
described animalistic behavior that contemporary medical practitioners believed was inherent in
the insane.30 His writing extended beyond mere labels. In utilizing the trope of the mad as
animals, Carter drew clear and defined connections between mad behavior and the behavior of
schismatics in order to falsify their claim to religious authority, as well as emphasize the danger
of allowing their practices to continue.
Defenders of the Church of England accused sectarian preachers of delivering their
sermons from a tub, an indication of their rebellion against ecclesiastical order.31 “Tub
preaching” was a common insult as sectarians preached wherever they could, often in meetings
called “conventicles” outside the Church of England. John Taylor referred to sectarians as “mad
men and fools,” with “devout ignorance,” who deserved to preach in a tub in An Honest Answer
to the Late Published Apology for Private Preaching (1642). “There was some hope of your
Reformation,” he began, “if you were but wise enough to know you are fools.” Taylor continued
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to reject the propensity of sectarians to preach in places other than the church: “what a ridiculous
thing it is to see a fellow with a starched face screw his body into twenty postures, sitting in a
tub . . . yet is as zealous in this serious folly, as if he thought he should go quick to heaven.”32 In
reducing radical religious groups to preaching in a filthy bath, Taylor drew upon a contemporary
trope as part of the language of madness.

5.2 The Ranters: A Case Study
Ranters represented the epitome of disorder, so much so that their public spirituality and
writing precipitated the act entitled “Punishment of Atheistical, Blasphemous and Execrable
Opinions,” or the Blasphemy Act on August 9, 1650.33 This act targeted those who claimed
equality with God, denied the existence of heaven or hell, swore, consumed alcohol excessively,
and committed adultery, incest, or murder. The first offense resulted in imprisonment for six
months, and the second offense resulted in banishment.34 As Parliament suppressed Ranter
writing like Abiezer Coppe’s A Fiery Flying Roll: A Word from the Lord to all the Great Ones of
the Earth (1649), George Foster’s The Pouring Forth of the Seventh and Last Vial Upon All
Flesh and Fleshiness (1650), and Thomas Tany’s Theauraujohn his Theous ori apokolipikal: or,
God’s light declared in mysteries (1651), anti-Ranter writing was thriving. Royalist and
moderate politicians wrote alongside divines and anonymous authors in pamphlets and playpamphlets that portrayed Ranters as dangerous and mentally unstable. Their behavior included
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all three concerns listed above: disdain for authority, socially unacceptable physical appearance,
and deviant behavior and enthusiasm.
Historians’ interest in the Ranters emerged during the 1970s with A.L. Morton’s The
World of the Ranters: Religious Radicalism in the English Revolution (1970) and Christopher
Hill’s The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (1972).
Morton’s book provided the first extensive overview of Ranterism, its main leaders, and other
radical religious groups of the same period. He notes that Ranters’ religious beliefs—that all
could be saved, not simply “the minority of the godly bourgeoisie”—had subversive social and
political implications. While Morton concludes that the Ranters were a movement rather than a
sect, he argues that the Commonwealth nevertheless perceived the Ranter movement as a threat
in need of repression. As such, it had the potential to be influence the urban poor and small
producers.35 Hill writes that radical ideas came from groups like the Ranters who “refused to
bow down and worship” the bourgeois revolution.36 He supports Morton’s characterization of the
Ranters as a group of largely itinerant radicals who found their voice during the mid-century
breakdown in governmental authority. Though he concedes that Ranters varied in their beliefs
and lacked a recognized leader, he contends that a self-identifying group of Ranters did exist.
Not all scholars agree.
J.C. Davis and Jerome Friedman published their books on the Ranters in consecutive
years (1986 and 1987 respectively), but their interpretations of the Ranter movement are quite
different. Before Jerome Friedman’s Blasphemy, Immorality, and Anarchy, only Hill and Nigel
Smith (who published an edited volume of Ranter writing) had provided an “honest appraisal,”
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albeit incomplete, of the Ranters. Friedman’s objective is to distinguish between Ranters’ writing
and anti-Ranter writing to produce a more “complete and objective appraisal” of their beliefs.37
Most of the book is devoted to an analysis of the writing of over 15 Ranters, and he concludes
with a brief overview of anti-Ranter writing. Though Friedman studies the Ranters as a
legitimate group, Davis argues that the Ranters were not a cohesive group, but rather a projection
of society’s fears and anxieties.38 Moreover, he finds the Ranters too disconnected and too
difficult to define. For Davis, the Ranters did not exist.
Byron Nelson vehemently disagrees with Davis in “The Ranters and the Limits of
Language” (1991). While he concedes that Friedman’s assessment of the Ranters was too “tidy
an organization scheme,” Nelson insists that Davis’s denial of a Ranter movement is a “mistake”
within a book “careless in its logic.”39 Hill, who identifies a disorganized but cohesive Ranter
group, is the most accurate assessment according to Nelson. The rest of Nelson’s article is
concerned with the language and style used by the Ranters themselves, which Nelson notes
“often veers close to desperation and madness.”40 Ranters acknowledged elements of madness
within their own writing, an important occurrence that will be explored in greater depth below.
Clement Hawes provides a literary perspective on Ranters’ writing in Mania and Literary
Style: The Rhetoric of Enthusiasm from the Ranters to Christopher Smart (1996). Hawes utilizes
three case studies—Abiezer Coppe, Jonathan Swift, and Christopher Smart—to describe the
“manic rhetoric” that evolved over the course of two centuries. Manic rhetoric rebelled against
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hierarchies of socio-economic privilege and discourse, but he argues that the “elite equation of
enthusiasm with madness...served to denigrate it and eventually justify ‘shutting up,’ in all
possible its users.”41 Furthermore, he posits that, “the label of madness has excluded rival forms
of explanation for the manic.”42 Nevertheless, I contend that the parallels between perceptions of
madness and the rhetoric used by anti-Ranter writers and actual madness are too strong to
overlook. Rather than seek meaning over the course of one hundred years, I wish to restore the
rhetoric of madness to a specific historical moment. Dismissing madness as an “elite equation”
inevitably distorts the intensely dynamic nature of the concept of madness itself, which was
continually subject to change.
Rather than study Ranters’ writing, Kathryn Gucer explores the “libelous and mocking
terms” with which anti-Ranter Presbyterians and Royalists described the radical sect. The antiRanter pamphlets were written, Gucer argues, in order to ensure their political authority. By
drawing attention to the Ranters’ licentious behaviors and religious beliefs, often characterized
as “madness,” the pamphleteers hoped “to persuade their readers not to use their own reason to
consider the sectarian claims to authority.” Gucer studies the “rhetorical weapon” of Ranter
madness to demonstrate the fluidity of political groups and associations in the 1640s and 1650s.
Groups that normally found themselves at odds (such as Presbyterians and royalists) found a
common enemy in radical sectarians. Indeed, they hoped that by emphasizing Ranters’ unreason,
readers would, paradoxically, forego their own reason and unquestioningly accept the
Commonwealth’s authority.43
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Based on the language deployed in anti-Ranter tracts, contemporaries both intended to
silence Ranters and believed that Ranters were truly mad. Ranters were Antinomians who
believed that the age of law had been replaced by an age of grace.44 Their belief in universal
grace allowed Ranters a great deal of freedom that was bolstered by their pantheism, or belief
that God was present in all living things. The result was absolute liberty without fear of spiritual
repercussions. “Ranters believed that God dwelt inside them,” explains Nigel Smith. “Sin was
thus made to disappear.”45 Ranters met in taverns where they danced, sang, drank to excess,
smoked, and blasphemed with their “fellow creatures.” They lived sexually licentious lives as
they did not believe in heaven or hell. In addition to their religious convictions, Ranters were
politically subversive. According to Friedman, “most thought King Charles a fool and Cromwell
somewhat worse than that, and had little patience with any of the political ideologies of the
age.”46 The language that anti-Ranter writers drew upon therefore aid in our understanding of the
political atmosphere in the 1640s and 1650s. What is important for this chapter is not whether
Ranters actually performed the actions described in the pamphlets, but rather how
contemporaries described what they believed to be happening at these meetings.
One of the easiest ways to accuse Ranters of insanity was to call them “mad.” The verb
“to rant” meant, “to talk or declaim in an extravagant or hyperbolical manner; to use bombastic
language...to orate or speak in a melodramatic or grandiose style.” But “rant” could also mean,
“to talk or declaim hyperbolically, wildly, or furiously, now esp. as if mad or delicious,” most
often in conjunction with the verb “to rave.”47 In addition to utilizing a derogatory name that
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implied madness, anti-Ranter writers regularly dubbed Ranters the “Mad Crew” or characterized
their gatherings as “mad.” The anonymous author of The Ranters’ Reasons Resolved to Nothing
(1651) included the subtitle “The fustification instead of the justification of the Mad Crew.” John
Holland, a self-described “eye and ear witness” to Ranter meetings, subtitled his pamphlet “A
More true and fuller Discovery of the Doctrine of those men which call themselves Ranters: Or,
The Mad Crew,” with “The Mad Crew” much larger than the rest of the subtitle. The anonymous
author of The Routing of the Ranters promised that he would provide a “full Relation” of
Ranters’ “mad meetings,” and the author of The Ranters’ Declaration described his pamphlet as
providing information on the Ranters’ “mad Dream” and the “mad-Ranters further Resolution.”
It is not clear how or when the Ranters were named the “mad crew,” but according to The
Ranters’ Reasons Resolved to Nothing, the radical sect eventually adopted the name. The author
wrote, “I see you will verify and fulfill the title which you have given yourselves; you will first
or last profess yourselves to be a mad Crew.”48 When these writers described the Ranters as mad,
did they merely draw upon a common insult? Further exploration of political pamphlets suggests
that the language Ranter critics used to defame the Ranters was very close to how physicians and
theologians described their mad patients. The author of The Ranters’ Reasons Resolved to
Nothing warned the radical sect that if they did not change their ways, they would end up like
others in their group who, “through a wise hand of Divine severity, have been struck with
corporal madness, and have ended their days in extreme rage and fury.”49 “Corporeal madness”
was not simply an insult. It was a frightening condition, which contemporaries would have seen
regularly in their towns.
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Writers who used the word “brainsick” to describe Ranter activity were using an
adjective for clinical madness. Indeed, physicians and laymen began to focus on the brain and
nervous system as the root of madness during the late seventeenth century. Richard Cosin’s
definition of insania, for example, was “such be all they, whom commonly we term either
frantic, brain-sick, cracked-witted, cock-brains, or hare-brained men...they have many strange
conceits, toying fancies, and perform sundry, rash, indiscreet, mad, and foolish parts.”50 Ranters
used the term “Brainsick” to describe traditional religion, thereby turning accusations of madness
on their detractors. The following Christmas carol is in M. Stubbs’s The Ranters Declaration
(1650) and the anonymous The Arraignment and Trial with a Declaration of the Ranters (1650):
They prate of God; believe it, Fellow-Creature,
There’s no such Bugbear, all was made by nature:
We know all came of nothing, and shall pass
Into the same condition once it was:
By natures power, and that they grossly lie,
They say there’s hope of immortality:
Let them but tell us What a soul is, then
We will adhere to these mad brain-sick men.51
References to “brainsick” are found in the works of seventeenth-century physicians who
described clinical madness. Thomas Adams described corporeal madness as a madness that
“obsesses the brain.”52 Thus, there existed a connection between genuine mental incapacity and
the language with which anti-Ranter writers documented Ranter spirituality.
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Seventeenth-century English men and women recognized unrestrained passion as a
symptom for insanity (as seen in the last chapter). Anti-Ranter sources are teeming with
references to oversexed women and adulterous men. Women were available to all Ranter men
regardless of marital status. Orgy-like meetings were common. According to Hell Broke Loose:
or, the notorious design of the wicked Ranters (1651), Nicholas Kate of Hartwel said that “any
woman was as free to him as his wife.”53
The author of The Routing of the Ranters
(Figure 5.4) wrote that the infamous
Ranter Abiezer Coppe “commonly lay in
bed with two women at a time; whereof he
being soberly admonished by an officer of
the army, he replied that it was his liberty,
and he might use it.” In Samuel
54

Figure 5.4: Frontispiece of The Routing of the Ranters
(1650).

Sheppard’s play-pamphlet, The Jovial Crew, Or, The Devil Turned Ranter (1651), the character
Apostatus stated “by our only Sacred Lawes, every mans wife must be at his friends use.”55
Because Ranters did not believe in sin, they had no reason to worry about adultery or multiple
partners.
Although Ranter critics portrayed female Ranters as lascivious, these women
paradoxically seem to have gained agency through their control over sexual situations. Ranter
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sex was never characterized as forced. Rather, men and women engaged in consensual sexual
relationships. In The Routing of the Ranters, a female Ranter attempted to seduce a man in order
to gain his possessions. The narrator explains that “in this kind of coupling together...the woman
doth commonly make choice of the man she will dwell with.”56 In The Ranters’ Recantation
(1650), Mrs. Hull initiated a sexual ritual with another Ranter. The author recounted a Ranter
meeting that took place 17 December 1650 in White-Chappel, wherein Mrs. Hull led a dance,
telling the male attendants that “She would show them a new way to be merry.”57 The narrator
continues,
calling to one of her fellow creatures to sit on her knee, she [Mrs. Hull] bid him
take up her coats and smock, which he did: Then, said she, Now pray thee kiss me
round; He answered, Dear sister, it is my duty: After which greeting, he was to set
her on her head, to go about the room on her hands, with her coats about her ears,
in performance of which uncivil action, another fellow-creature began to peep,
which she perceiving, said, Sir, You shall pay for your peeping: and so
immediately, in the presence of about 60 persons, entered into venial exercise.58
Mrs. Hull was in complete control during this sexual ceremony. She initiated the exercise and
determined when it would stop (when someone began to “peep”). Female Ranters did not feign
modesty, as is demonstrated in Figure
5.5. Women’s sexual assertiveness,
that which allowed them some control
in Ranter meetings, was a sign of
madness.

Figure 5.5: Frontispiece of John Reading’s The Ranters
Ranting (1650)
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Another indication of madness was the display of flesh or nudity. Hell broke loose
mentioned a “notorious Ranter” named Vaughn who entered a church “in a Holland Shirt,
without doublet, or breeches, silk stockings, white shoes, and a cap on his head.”59 Describing a
meeting of Ranters, the author of Routing of the Ranters wrote that the meeting was “spent in
drunkenness, uncleanness, blasphemous words, filthy songs, and mixt dances of men and women
stark naked.”60 Indeed, the frontispiece of The Ranters’ Religion (Figure 5.6) features three
naked women and four naked men, one with an erect penis, participating in a dance. A devilish
figure in the corner with feathered wings looks on, stating “Behold these are Ranters.”61 Early
modern English men and women valued clothing as a status symbol because it indicated both
occupation and rank. Therefore, to forego clothing indicated utter madness.
Finally, the mad were consistently compared to beasts in England. Without reason, man
was reduced to a brute. Contemporaries observed the mad, who “acted oddly: now motionless,
withdrawn, now praeternaturally violent.
They gobbled strange foods, such as
vermin and dung, or refused to eat . . .
Some bayed at the moon, or howled like
dogs...Altogether, they were sub-or antihuman.”62 Writers used this same
language to depict Ranters. When
officers and a guard happened upon a
Ranter meeting, they discovered
Figure 5.6: Frontispiece of The Ranters’ Religion (1650)
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“monsters of mankind,” and “lascivious beasts” who were “openly satisfying their lusts.”63
Similarly, the Anglican E. Pagitt opineed, “The Ranter is an unclean beast, much of the make
with our Quaker, of the same puddle...their infidelity, villainies, and debouchments are the same,
only the Ranter is more open.”64 Animalism, like nudity, were behaviors that would have linked
genuine madness with Ranters in early modern minds.
Perhaps even more intriguing were Ranters who called themselves mad. Although they
drew upon the same rhetoric of madness as anti-Ranters, they considered theirs to be a different
type of madness: divine or ecstatic madness. Divine madness did not have the same negative
connotations as corporeal madness, or complete loss of reason. Rather, a person could achieve
oneness with God and transcend the material world, the outward appearance of which was mad
behavior (raving, speaking in tongues, babbling, etc.). The soul could only break free from the
body after a fight between God and Satan for a person’s soul. This formed part of the conversion
experience for Antinomians such as the Ranters. During this moment, Ranters seemed to lose
control of their faculties. Released from their bodies, Ranters could prophecy or hear voices from
beyond as indications of divine madness.65 Critics called this behavior enthusiasm.
William Erbery described divine madness in The Mad Man’s Plea: Or, a Sober Defense
of Captain Chillinton’s Church (1653). Erbery was a Seeker, a radical religious sect closely
associated with the Ranters. In his short pamphlet, Erbery argued that the “Lords fools,” “mad
folks,” and “mad men” were actually the wisest and closest to God.66 He cited biblical figures
who were mad to support his argument. “Not only Paul, but Christ was counted mad...the reason
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is, the wisdom of God is foolishness with men.”67 Erbery followed the pantheistic argument that
God controls all, and thus “if God makes natural innocents, why not spiritual fools? and mad
men too?”68 Divine madness was a positive condition, brought on by God in order to reach
salvation. Similarly, an anonymous Ranter tract defended Ranters and their spirituality in A
Justification of the Mad Crew in Their Ways and Principles (1650). The author listed Ranter
beliefs—monotheism, that God exists in all people and things, that good and evil are one in the
same, that heaven and hell do not exist and more—but only after explaining that madness
derived from the presence of God in man: “it is a common thing for God in the many and several
appearances of himself to be called of men, mad, a fool, a drunkard, a vain person. It is true, the
Lord in himself acts madly as to you, vainly cursedly, and profanely, as to you...”69 Then, the
author proceeded to differentiate between corporeal madness, a type of madness which would
require the intervention of a physician or theologian, and divine madness. Ranters
are not (though they act thus madly) a people bereaved of their senses, as you
term it, that have lost their understandings; for they can if they please be as sober
as any of you, speak as rationally, as judicially, act as civilly and discreetly as
you, and depart not from this fleshy holiness...but as the Lord by a mighty hand
and out-stretched arm, acts them and carries them out.70
This defender of the Ranters rationalized a type of spiritual madness that would have appeared
irrational to contemporaries.”71 Nevertheless, Ranters accepted the madness that the Lord
brought upon his subjects.
Other well-known Ranters recognized their spiritual madness in their writing, including
Abiezer Coppe, George Foster, and Thomas Tany (pseudonym Theauraujohn). Abiezer Coppe’s
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writing and public behavior were as unconventional as they were unpredictable (see Appendix A
for a list of known Ranters). He was arrested under the Blasphemy Act in 1650 before he
recanted and changed his career from preacher to physician.72 His unique writing style led many
to view him as a madman, and evidently he did too.73 Coppe passionately wrote that when he
met God “My bowels trembled, my lips quivered, rottenness entered into my bones, &c...the cup
of the Lords right hand, Was put into mine hand, &c. And it was filled brim full of intoxicating
wine, and I drank it off, even the dregs.”74 Coppe called himself mad in other publications as
well. In the conclusion of A Fiery Flying Roll: A Word from the Lord to all the Great ones of the
Earth (1649), Coppe wrote about an experience in which he was “raving mad,” and other men
tried to shut him up.75 Because his madness was the work of God, Coppe could not be faulted.
George Foster and Thomas Tany also considered themselves divinely mad. Foster
maintained that his madness derived from God in The Pouring Forth of the Seventh and Last
Vial (1650). “You may read that Paul was counted mad,” he began, “and so say I, whether I am
mad or besides myself, it is for your sakes: as it is the good pleasure of my Father for to make me
so, that I may give you warning of what he will do, or God in me speaks to you.”76 Foster
continued to comfort his reader: “let not the notion of madness possess your spirits, as for you to
think that I am mad, but rather think it is the pleasure of the Father to turn the world upsidedown, and so to make use of me as he did of his son Jesus Christ.”77 Foster believed he was a
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vessel for God, and hoped that though he experienced divine madness, his readers would not
consider it insane. Similarly, Thomas Tany justified his mad behavior as spiritual madness,
wherein “God giveth wisdom to the simple, and makes the tongue of the stammerer speak plainly
mysterious mysteries, yet unlearned; this I know, and from sense I speak, this is a riddle to
you...Who was my teacher here? None but the Lord: I read no books, though I am mad, I tell you
by madness I am instructed.”78 The Ranters were not to blame. God, in his infinite knowledge,
was the cause of divine madness.

5.3 Conclusion
With the Restoration of 1660, the world was ostensibly turned right-side up again.
Parliament’s Clarendon Code made the Church of England the only legitimate church in
England. Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, Quakers, and Ranters were now treated alike as
nonconformists. The Act of Uniformity (1662) stated that the Book of Common Prayer must be
used at all services and that ministers must be ordained in the Church of England. The 1650
Blasphemy Act, combined with the Act of Uniformity, ensured that Ranterism did not last. By
1660, Quakers had absorbed the Ranters and taken “what was spiritually best and discarded most
of what made the Ranters so radical and interesting.”79 Studying the rhetoric of madness and the
during this brief period is a means of understanding the political culture of the Civil War.
England was without a head while its body and government lay diseased and dying. Radical
religious sects subverted order in a chaotic time with behavior so erratic that writers could only
describe it as mad. Even the sectarians themselves described their spirituality as madness.
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Through the language of madness, which was both metaphorical and derogatory, a
greater understanding of contemporary perceptions of madness is possible. In the mid-century
crisis, to undermine the natural hierarchy, alter one’s appearance, or practice deviant behaviors
including enthusiasm, spelled mad behavior. Moreover, the language of madness provides
insight into the political culture of the Civil War and Interregnum, highlighting contemporaries’
greatest concerns. They feared factionalism, political unrest, and sectarian behavior, and
consequently sought to delegitimize the actions of any groups who were part of these problems.
Historians have looked past references to madness, particularly in relation to the Ranters, as
merely derogatory. The metaphor of lunacy was pervasive and resonated with contemporary
politicians and divines because they drew upon recognizable stereotypes and tropes of madness.
So, did the writers of these pamphlets about Parliamentarians, Royalists, sectarians, and
Ranters truly believe that the people about whom they wrote had mental disorders? Perhaps they
did, perhaps they did not. What is more important in examining the language of madness is
gaining a better grasp on how contemporaries understood madness at the time through their
references to ostensibly medical or religious disorders in the arena of political culture. We learn
that someone called “brainsick” or “mad” disdained authority, was animal-like, or was on the
opposite side of a Civil War that turned England upside-down in the middle of the seventeenth
century. We also learn that Roundheads and Cavaliers found each other so threatening that
contemporaries resorted to questioning their sanity to delegitimize their positions. This
demonstrates the volatility of the times, as well as the importance placed on mental capacity in
cheap print and pamphlets. When questioning belief systems and appearance was not enough,
contemporaries could draw upon a shared language of madness, one ordinarily reserved for
lunatics and fools, in order to further demoralize their political opponents.
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5.4 Conclusion to Part II
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine madness in the macrocosm. Apart from some parts of
Chapter 4, Part II has dealt not within the body of mad people, but with the idea of madness in
society. In other words, how madness was perceived. Madness was more than a disorder of the
mind and body in the seventeenth century. It was a legal label assigned by one’s peers and a jury,
one which could lead to loss of control of property. Madness reflected gender relations and
stereotypes along with a paradigm shift in anatomy. And madness was a language used to
describe crossing the boundaries of authority, acceptable appearance, and proper religious
behavior within political culture.
The common thread between these chapters is that the concept of inanity could not be
contained. Unlike other medical distempers, such as vomiting, a toothache, or fever, a disorder of
the mind was subject to the input of the community, court system, anatomists, and pamphleteers.
Its association with people’s behavior and transgression of norms meant that people with these
conditions were always on trial, both literally and figuratively. These are not the only avenues
into which madness spilled. It was also a major part of literature and literary tropes (in theaters,
art, poetry, and song), of economics (do the mad deserve financial assistance? When is taking
their property helpful or hurtful?), and of societal status (elites could afford better care). My
point is this: because madness was a part of nearly every aspect of society, analyzing the subject
not only informs us more about madness itself, but also about seventeenth-century English
culture in its reflection.
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CONCLUSION

In madness persons are not deprived of their grosser senses of the outward nature,
as seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and feeling, for those they retain as before, but
they are bereft of the inward senses, or distinguishments; and when so ever this
happens to any, then the soul is unclothed, and all its fantasies and imaginations
become as it were substantial unto them, as material things are to those that are in
their perfect senses, and under the government, of reason.
—Thomas Tryon, A Treatise of Dreams and Visions (1689)1
Thomas Tryon’s observation that madness reflected the freedom of the soul is an apt
metaphor for conclusions about insanity in the Stuart era. The concept of madness was
unrestrained, as it was a mental and physical disorder whose meaning reflected the dynamism of
medicine, theology, the law, gender relations, and political culture of seventeenth-century
England. Consequently, this disorder deserves greater inclusion in the narrative, not only as a
disorder of the body and mind, but as a lens for social, cultural, political, and economic aspects
of the Stuart era.
Mad people reflected the mental world in which they lived, and in turn they impacted the
culture and society around them. Though marginalized, they were physically present in the
community, private madhouses, Bethlem, and in the streets. Moreover, they were represented in
song, the theater, witticisms, proverbs, the legal system, discussions of gender, political culture,
and even as watermarks in publications. In studying the trajectory of hypotheses surrounding
mad disorders, it is possible to track the evolution of medical theories. Although this change was
gradual, the beginnings of a paradigm shift from the supernatural to natural concepts of illness
may be detected. There was a movement away from demonology and humoral theories toward
chemistry, moral philosophy, natural science, and neurology between 1603 and 1714.

1

Thomas Tryon, A Treatise of Dreams and Visions (London, 1689), 252-253.
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Furthermore, sexed mad disorders reflected the steady, though reluctant, acceptance of the twosex model of the body.
Madness was not just a disorder within the body; it was an abstract tool used by various
groups for their respective purposes. The Church of England’s hierarchy and university-trained
physicians favored a natural approach to diagnosing and treating the distemper in order to
delegitimize their religious and professional competition. Catholics, Puritans, and folk medical
practitioners favored supernatural systems in which they could draw upon demonology, religious
therapy, alchemy, and quack medicine. Writers of cheap print declared Royalists or Cavaliers
mad, depending on their loyalty in the Civil War. Therefore, the motivations behind the medical
and political uses of madness reflected the contexts in which it was invoked.
Context mattered when one invoked mental disorder, as it was adaptable to various
definitions and situations. If the Crown needed to raise royal revenue, local officials blurred the
lines between idiocy and lunacy to gain more property and sell wardships. Definitions of sexed
madness fit gendered stereotypes about the relations between men and women. The language of
madness was a recognizable vernacular in the political and religious pamphlet wars of the midcentury crisis. Thus, the disorder was labeled and diagnosed in a variety of ways suitable to
divergent situations. In many ways, perceptions of madness were more pervasive than madness
itself.
Because madness was adaptable, its invocation did not require the mentally disordered or
their consent. Perceptions of madness were filtered through clerics, medical practitioners,
neighbors, legal representatives of the Crown, anatomists, moral philosophers, and politicians.
Although a few people did write about their own experiences with this distemper, most of the
records we have of the mad are written from the perspective of a person in a position of power.
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Though this creates a barrier to mad voices outside the religious arena (most wrote about their
insanity in terms of divine madness, religious melancholy, enthusiasm, or prophecy), all is not
lost. The ways in which contemporaries perceived, utilized, and manipulated this confounding
disorder allows us to investigate the intricacies of seventeenth-century economics, medicine,
religion, gender, the law, and political culture that I have investigated throughout this
dissertation.
Finally, we must recognize that the mad had agency. Like Dionys Fitzherbert, they
sought treatment in the early modern medical market, in which one could choose to see a trained
physician, cunning man or woman, divine, quack doctor, alchemist, or eclectic healer who used
all methods. Before the era of the asylums, their treatment was restricted only by their financial
means. They followed the advice of physicians such as Dr. Pierce who, for example,
recommended husbands as a cure for Suffocation of the Mother or Greensickness. They fought
positive inquisitions of lunacy as in the cases of Thomas Cox and Susan Thorne, the latter of
whom was subsequently declared compos mentis. And, as exemplified by the Ranters, they
embraced the label of “mad,” altering its derogatory meaning into a positive connection with
God. In reading between the lines of the primary sources available, madness is at once both a
reflection of the society in which it was evoked, and the disease of people whose disorder
hindered, but did not eliminate, their agency.

The proliferation of private madhouses and lunatic asylums in the following two
centuries resulted in what many scholars have called the “trade in lunacy.”2 The tension between
the effort to cure insanity and the desire for profit characterized these institutions run by

2

This phrase may be traced to William Ll. Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy: A Study of Private Madhouses in
England in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).
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physicians, private entrepreneurs, and benefactors. Anecdotes proliferate regarding the
mismanagement and abuse pervading the lunatic asylums of late eighteenth and early nineteenthcentury England. Samuel Bruckshaw lamented his 284-day imprisonment in the Scout Mill
madhouse, where he was forced to remain before neighbors noticed that he was sane in 1774.3
Other stories and official parliamentary reports revealed physical and mental abuse within
private madhouses and public lunatic asylums.
There was little guidance as to how to manage lunatic asylums until the late eighteenth
century. This led to abuse of power by non-medical justices, officers, and superintendents.
Though susceptible to mismanagement, the motivation behind creating lunatic asylums was
honorable: they were useful in providing relief for poor families who could not afford private
treatment, as well as protecting the general public from dangerous lunatics. However, these
asylums (whether public, private, or voluntary) were initially built for the housing or “custody”
of the insane rather than for curative treatment. When Parliament recognized that inhumane
conditions existed in asylums and the sane were wrongly interned, a Select Committee of the
House of Commons led by Thomas Townshend investigated and found that there were financial
problems, no physicians, and no registration lists of patients. Thus, a bill was introduced in 1763
for the regulation of private madhouses and passed in 1774. The Act for Regulating Private
Madhouses mandated that all madhouses would be licensed by the Committee of Royal College
of Physicians, that they would be inspected once a year, that a central register of all confined
lunatics would be maintained, and that there would be a penalty for concealing or confining
patients without a license. Although the law was meant to protect the public and patients through
the “physicians’ integrity,” this was not so. Instead, it “licensed the abuses of the status quo,”

See Samuel Bruckshaw, “One More Proof of the Iniquitous Abuse of Private Madhouses,” (London, 1774) and his
other work “The case, petition and address, of Samuel Bruckshaw” (London, 1774).
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explains Roy Porter, as “It was not a general measure of regulating or reform. It gave no brief to
evaluate therapy, judge cure rates, criticise standards of hygiene, health, restraint, care of
whatever.”4
In voluntary asylums, such as the York Lunatic Asylum founded in 1774, governors were
chosen by the amount of money donated rather than by merit.5 The London Chronicle ran a story
soliciting money in order to build the asylum, and “proposed a subscription for the erecting a
suitable building, for the reception of Lunatics generally, being either parish poor, or belonging
to distressed and indigent families.”6 Thus, the asylum was ostensibly founded for honorable
reasons.7 However, those who paid 20 pounds or more were deemed governors, which led to
controversies regarding the management of the asylum. In an administrative system based on
financial contribution, it is not surprising that suspicions arose regarding how money was spent
and whether the true purposes for building the asylum—relieving the indigent lunatics—was
carried out.
In the Report from the Committee on Madhouses in England, Godfrey Higgins described
the deplorable conditions he found in the York Lunatic Asylum when he investigated the entire
building:
When the door was opened, I went into the passage, and I found four cells, I
think, of about eight feet square, in a very horrid and filthy situation, the straw
appeared to be almost saturated with urine and excrement; there was some
bedding laid upon the straw in one cell, in the others only loose straw…the walls
were daubed with excrement; the air holes, of which there were one in each cell,
were partly filled with it; in one cell there were two pewter chamber-pots loose.8
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Pauper females were incarcerated in these four cells, but women were not the only victims of
cruelty and neglect. When William Vickers was dismissed from the asylum, Charles Maples (a
surgeon) explained that Vickers “had the itch very bad, was also extremely filthy, for I saw his
wife not only comb several lice from his head, but take them from the folds of his shirt neck; his
health was so much impaired that he was not able to stand by himself; his legs were very much
swelled, and one of them in a state of mortification.”9 In addition, keepers had sexual relations
with female patients, they beat and flogged the patients, and falsified records. Despite denial of
inhumane restraint, Higgins found chains in his investigation.10
The York Lunatic Asylum was by no means the only asylum implicated for
mismanagement and abuse in the report. This resulted from the failure of the 1808 County
Asylums Act. The Act had changed the management hierarchy of public asylums in order to
prevent these types of abuses, and Smith explains that it was designed to create “comprehensive
national system.” The Act established that county asylums would be built and controlled by
county justices. “Visiting Justices” would oversee the construction and management of the
asylums.11 This was ostensibly to prevent the types of abuses that occurred in private asylums,
and must have helped to a degree when backed by the government. However, there were still
problems with the management of asylums.
But there were glimmers of hope. In order to improve the management and treatment of
lunatic patients, physicians collaborated in meetings, reports, and publications. These efforts
facilitated the growth of education, knowledge, and debates regarding lunatic asylums and the
insane. In 1841, Dr. Samuel Hitch founded the Association of Medical Officers of Asylums and
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Hospitals for the Insane. These medical officers created a permanent parliamentary committee,
“the first positive step designed to influence legislation affecting the control of asylums and the
welfare of the patients committed to them,” and published a journal.12 The Asylum Journal,
written between November 15, 1853 and July 2, 1855 was the predecessor to the British Journal
of Psychiatry. Articles ranged from correspondence between doctors and asylum superintendents
to prevention of bed sores and the connection between ear tumors and insanity. An important
aspect of the journal was ongoing debates about various aspects of treatment, such as restraint
versus non-restraint, within which doctors shared their various perspectives and experiences.
Contributions to the journal also contained important statistics and information on treatment
practices in other countries.
William Tuke founded the Retreat at York in 1792 and based its management on the
“new social spirit” of the Society of Friends. The institution relied on religious and moral
principles in order to assist their fellow Quakers with their afflictions. In 1814, Reverend Sidney
Smith wrote a review of Samuel Tuke’s report on the Retreat at York. Smith commented that the
Retreat at York was a model of government and management for other asylums: “the Society of
Friends seems rather to consult the interest of the patient than the case of the keeper,” explained
Smith, “and to aim at the government of the insane by creating in them the kindest disposition
towards those who have the command over them.” But Smith understood that the Retreat was an
exception among many, for “the aversion to inspect places of this sort is so great, and the
temptation to neglect and oppress the insane so strong, both from the love of power and the
improbability of detection, that we have no doubt of the existence of great abuses in the interior
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of many madhouses.”13 Thus, the beginning of the nineteenth century suggested hope for
improvements, despite the small amount of change. This change is most evident in the 1840s and
1850s. Management improved, physicians made executive decisions, and the moral treatment
adopted at the Retreat at York spread.
Moral treatment incorporated work, leisure, religious participation, reasoning, and
amicable interaction between patients and the medical staff. John Thurman described moral
treatment in his Observations and Essays on the Statistics of Insanity, which included “mental
cultivation,” healthy recreation,” and education.14 In addition to cultivating the mind, physicians
began to accept that there could be no uniform plan of treatment. Each patient would need to
have a unique plan for their recovery. In addition, physicians no longer advocated the older
methods of treatment, such as cupping-glasses, blistering, or purgatives.15
Within the new system of moral treatment, doctors and medical officers engaged in a
great debate: restraint versus non-restraint. Dr. Conolly popularized the non-restraint system in
the Hanwell Lunatic Asylum. After a trial period, he determined that they could do away with all
forms of restraint. The Middlesex magistrates then considered a report on the Hanwell County
Lunatic Asylum and agreed that it should be implemented in other asylums.16 Their published
findings helped spread the adoption of moral treatment.
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While physicians could agree that moral treatment was the most beneficial course for
patients, they did not agree on whether restraint should be eliminated completely. Dr. Edward
Simpson wrote a letter to The Asylum Journal in which he admitted that restraint had been
barbarous in the past, but improvements now allowed comfortable, but limited restraint. While
non-restraint was admirable, he asked which would be worse: to harm a lunatic by holding him
with restraints, or to allow the lunatic greater freedom during which he might harm other
patients. “Which is the lesser of the two evils?” he asked. “Which is the truer humanity? On the
one hand, to endanger or peril the safety of others, to permit self-inflicted wounds, to confine in
gloomy solitude; on the other, to associate, by means of (I repeat) painless restraint, the
otherwise dangerous maniac with the cheerful and inoffensive of his companions.”17 A small
degree of restraint, he argued, was better than complete solitude for a dangerous lunatic. In the
same way, Dr. James Huxley lamented that the debate over restraint versus non-restraint had
become too black and white: “The question of restraining has unfortunately become too
controversial. The ground of dispute has been narrowed to the single proposition of ‘All or
none.’”18
While physicians disagreed about the exact way to go about moral treatment, it is clear
that lunatics’ physical space in society had shifted. Madmen and madwomen were no longer
roaming the streets or cared for within the community as they had been in the seventeenth
century. The asylum was the new home of the insane, and Foucault’s Great Confinement, if there
was one in England, had begun.

Edward Simpson, “To the Editor of the Asylum Journal,” The Asylum Journal 1, no. 7 (July 1854): 111.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF RANTER NAMES

I have yet to come across a list of “known” Ranters in secondary scholarship. This is a list of
Ranters that scholars have named in various secondary sources (often more than once) and the
names of accused Ranters in primary sources. Please note that this is not an exhaustive list, and it
is based only on the sources I have read.
Ranter names in primary sources:
Hen. Arthington
Jo. Ask
J. Collins
Ed. Copinger
Joshua and Joan Garment
Jo. Gerrard
Gilbert
Elisabeth Haygood
J. Kendall
F. Ket
Richard King
Elisabeth Penny
Joan and John Robins
T. Shakespear
Margaret Hollis Spinster
J. Reeve
Eliz. Trule
M. Waddleworth
Jane Waggle
Jo. Webb
Tho. Wiberton
Ranter names in secondary sources:
Jacob Bauthumley
Laurence Clarkson (pseudonym Claxton)
Abiezer Coppe
Richard Coppin
George Foster
William Franklin
Captain Francis Freeman
Mary Gadbury
Joshua Garment
Captain Robert Norwood
John Pordage
John and Joan (pseudonym Mary) Robins
Joseph Salmon
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Thomas Tany (pseudonym Theaureaujohn)
Thomas Webb
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